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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis explores the conditions under which incumbent regimes in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood cooperate effectively with CSDP missions by adhering to and adopting 
the objectives set out by their mandates. In establishing whether and under what 
circumstances CSDP missions successfully cooperate with third country governments by 
inducing the acceptance of and adherence to their mandates, this thesis reclaims a focus 
on the local dimension of EU partner countries in order to explore the extent to which 
domestic stakeholders display agency in their relations with the EU and are able to 
constrain and/or facilitate its foreign policy. It thus asks: under what conditions do 
incumbent regimes in host countries embrace EU-driven strategies and reforms? The 
thesis examines two CSDP functions – rule transfer and confidence-building – across 
three CSDP missions in the Eastern Neighbourhood: the EUJUST Themis rule of law 
mission to Georgia, the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and 
Ukraine (EUBAM) and the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) to Georgia. 
 
Drawing on rational-choice assumptions and recent academic contributions to the Eastern 
Neighbourhood literature, this thesis starts from the premise that the sine qua non 
condition for effective cooperation between CSDP missions and incumbent regimes in 
the Eastern Neighbourhood is the compatibility between EU objectives and the 
incumbent regimes’ intrinsic preference for gaining and/or maintaining political power. 
Defined as preferential fit, the ‘match’ between the goals of EU missions – as highlighted 
by their mandates – and the political agendas of national governments in ENP countries 
emerges as the necessary condition that facilitates effective EU-ENP cooperation. In 
addition to confirming the centrality of the agency-oriented concept of ‘preferential fit’ 
for the development of effective cooperation between the EU and its Eastern neighbours, 
the findings outlined in the four empirical-analytical chapters also identify the conditions 
which shape the cost-benefit calculations of national governments: 1. The competing 
strategies of domestic veto players; 2. The potential for alternative coalitions (Russia, US 
other international organisations); 3. The cost-effectiveness of threats and side-payments 
(i.e. EU policy-specific conditionality; and EU capacity-building).  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction  
The last two decades have seen momentous progress in the development of the 
European Union’s foreign policy (EFP). The EU has evolved tremendously as an 
international actor, from an entity with only a loose mechanism of coordinating national 
foreign policies to an actor able to perform activities across a wide range of foreign 
policy areas, including diplomatic mediation, civilian and military missions as well as 
trade and association agreements and development aid. The EU’s recently acquired 
importance in international politics is most visible in the rising number and scope of 
operations under its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) which is an integral 
part of the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Civilian missions 
under the CSDP are generally considered among the main tools the EU has at its disposal 
to engage in crisis management and security governance, as opposed to military missions 
which have been deployed on a much smaller scale.
1
  
The EU’s approach to crisis management is shaped by the development of a 
comprehensive concept of security which underlines the necessity of addressing all 
conflict phases - from conflict settlement to conflict transformation. In practice this 
means that CSDP missions do more than enforce ceasefires and protect civilians in the 
aftermath of conflicts, which are traditionally the types of activities associated with crisis 
interventions. In addition, they work with host countries to reform their governance 
structures with a view to eradicating the root causes of conflicts. Thus, CSDP missions 
are involved in efforts to reform a variety of policy sectors and bring them in line with 
European best practice, from changing police laws in Bosnia and Herzegovina to 
supporting Libya in strengthening its border services. Given the ambitious scope of 
CSDP interventions with regard to generating domestic change in host countries, the 
effectiveness and potential impact of EU missions depends to a large extent on their 
ability to cooperate effectively with local regimes. The inextricable link between EU 
                                                 
1
 Laure Delcour, ‘The European Union, a security provider in the eastern neighbourhood?’ European 
Security 19:4 (2010), 538. 
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foreign policy and the external environment within which the Union operates as an 
international actor, has been broadly acknowledged. There is a significant body of 
literature connecting EU foreign policy shortcomings with its inability to act according to 
the preferences and expectations of partner countries.
2
 In addition, the EU itself 
acknowledges the need for EU operations to be ‘adaptive to the needs of specific 
situations’ and ‘to respond with the expertise required to meet the challenge of each 
unique crisis situation’.3 The Union has advocated for a needs-oriented approach which, 
apart from internal coordination, requires external coordination with other relevant actors 
on the ground and a greater understanding of the local political context.
4  
 But, despite the acknowledgement on the part of both the academic community 
and the EU itself of the importance of the external environment for the success of EU 
foreign policy initiatives,  a discussion of the role of external actors and their preferences  
has been largely absent from EFP debates. On one hand, the EU’s ability to cooperate 
effectively with third countries has long been neglected in favour of analyses of internal 
developments. Specifically, studies of the CSDP have predominantly been preoccupied 
with explaining the emergence of a common security and defence policy at the EU level 
and the internal decision making-processes involved, rather than exploring the conditions 
which foster successful EU cooperation with countries at the receiving end of the CSDP. 
Where the question of CSDP engagement on the ground  was raised, it typically resulted 
in ad hoc exercises in assessing mission performance, without any regard for a systematic 
analysis of the extent to which and the conditions under which CSDP missions could 
bring local actors on board in support of their mandates. At present there is no study that 
explores in a structured fashion whether and how CSDP missions succeed in cooperating 
effectively with their countries of deployment and under what conditions incumbent 
regimes in third countries can be persuaded to buy in to the EU’s policy agenda. As far as 
                                                 
2
 Christopher Hill, ‘The Capability‐Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role’, 
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 31:3 (1993); Esther Barbé, Balancing Europe's eastern and 
southern dimensions (Florence: European University Institute, 1997); Karen E. Smith, European Union 
foreign policy in a changing world (Cambridge: Polity; Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub, 2003); Federica 
Bicchi, European foreign policy making toward the Mediterranean (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2007).  
3
 Agnieszka Nowak, ‘Civilian crisis management within ESDP’. In A. Nowak (ed). Civilian crisis 
management: the EU way. Chaillot Paper No. 90, (EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2006), 29. 
4
 Nowak, ‘Civilian crisis management within ESDP’, 36. 
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the role of external factors in shaping EU foreign policy outcomes is concerned, the 
literature is almost non-existent. As already noted, with very few exceptions the EFP 
literature is EU-centric and tends to investigate the foreign policy-making process from 
within rather than focus on the interactions between EU foreign policy instruments and 
external recipients. This is a regrettable omission which fails to consider an important 
aspect of the EU’s effectiveness and legitimacy as an international actor. Exploring the 
role of the EU’s external environment in facilitating or constraining the accomplishment 
of EU foreign policy objectives is a crucial piece of the ‘EU as an international actor’ 
puzzle. 
In establishing whether and under what circumstances CSDP missions 
successfully cooperate with third country governments by inducing the acceptance of and 
adherence to their mandates, this thesis reclaims a focus on the local dimension of EU 
partner countries. The aim is to explore the extent to which domestic stakeholders display 
agency in their relations with the EU and are able to constrain and/or facilitate its foreign 
policy. The EU’s increasing prominence as an international actor through the 
development of a Common Security and Defence Policy, as well as a more intense 
engagement with domestic actors in partner countries in the context of CSDP operations 
makes the investigation of the role of local actors a compelling endeavour. As the EU 
faces growing challenges on the international arena and its voice becomes more assertive 
in international affairs, European foreign policy cannot continue to look inwards. Its 
shape and direction depends as much on outsiders’ preferences as on internal 
developments. This thesis aims to fill the gap in the literature by enquiring into the 
conditions under which incumbent regimes in third countries engage in effective 
cooperation with CSDP missions by subscribing to their goals and adopting their 
suggested policies and reforms. It thus asks: under what conditions do incumbent regimes 
in host countries embrace EU-driven strategies and reforms? The next section challenges 
the neglect of the topic by the EFP literature by spelling out why the study of the role of 
those at the receiving end of EU foreign policy is crucial for understanding the scope and 
indeed the success of the EU as an international actor. 
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1.1. The external environment of CSDP missions and the 
‘recipients’ 
Exploring what motivates third country governments to engage in cooperation 
with the EU in areas such as the security and justice sectors is an essential step in 
understanding the EU’s stature as an international actor. While an overwhelming 
proportion of studies researching ‘the EU’s role in the world’ have focused on 
institutional and operational capabilities as proxies for how the EU performs on the 
international arena, a growing number of contributions highlight the importance of the 
Union’s external environment. This understanding of the EU’s role as an international 
actor stems from an acknowledgement of the co-constitutive rapport between the EU and 
the outside world. The demand-side of EU foreign policy literature is concerned with the 
output of CFSP and its impact ‘as a presence or as an actor, on the structure, processes 
and issue-areas of world politics’.5 Compared to those studies which investigate what the 
EU as an international actor is and what it does, the literature which explores whether and 
how EU foreign policies, and in particular the CSDP, successfully engage with  the 
outside world, represents a small proportion of EU studies. As Menon notes, there is a 
lacuna in the literature when it comes to explaining the substantive outcomes of CSDP 
instruments.
6
 Of those contributions which do take an interest in CSDP outcomes the 
majority focus on the impact of CSDP on EU developments, rather than on the external 
environment. This is partly explained by the fact that ‘students of ESDP have themselves 
displayed an obsessive preoccupation […] with the nature of the mechanism […] rather 
than the environment in which it resides’, as one scholar notes.7 It is also a consequence 
of the CSDP’s relative novelty and the necessity to understand first and foremost how 
this new policy affects the Union, institutionally and organizationally, as well as the role 
it plays in the European integration process. The result of this neglect to investigate the 
role of the external environment in the EU’s external relations has been ‘a largely 
                                                 
5
 Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite, ‘Introduction. The European Union in International Security 
Affairs’, in Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite European Security and Defence Policy: An 
Implementation Perspective, eds. Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite (London: Routledge, 2008), 1. 
6
 Anand Menon, ‘Power, Institutions and the CSDP: The Promise of Institutionalist Theory’, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 49:1 (2011), 92. 
7
 Julian Lindley-French, ‘In the Shade of Locarno? Why European Defence is Failing’, International 
Affairs, 78:4 (2002), 790. 
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introspective EU foreign policy’.8 Not only have analyses of EU foreign policy impact 
been few and far between, but those which have taken up the challenge of assessing 
CSDP effectiveness have done so out of a concern with the internal dynamics of policy-
making. 
It is argued here that investigating the drivers behind successful cooperation 
between CSDP missions and host countries is of crucial importance for a better 
understanding of the EU’s role in the world. Firstly, it cannot be denied that the EU’s 
status as a relevant actor in international politics is inextricably related to its foreign 
policy actions and their effects on EU partner countries. Smith suggests that ‘debates 
about whether the EU is or is not a civilian power, a normative power, a superpower and 
so on, are not really leading us anywhere right now. (…) We should instead engage in a 
debate about what the EU does and why it does it and with what effect, rather than what 
it is’.9 For Ginsberg, external political impact provides the EU with ‘international 
influence and legitimacy as well as internal and external confidence’ and ultimately 
‘squares the circle of EFP decision-making’.10 Moreover, research on the extent to which 
the EU can fruitfully engage with its external environment (be it the international system, 
individual states, international organizations or NGOs) is crucial in order to provide 
substance to studies on the EU’s role in the world. As Smith notes, ‘too often, we lapse 
into assertions that the EU has either considerable or little influence, without the backing 
of clear, substantial evidence for such influence. “Proving” the EU has influence (or not, 
and what sort and why) requires considerable empirical research (…) - but unless we try 
to get to the bottom of this, we are left with unsubstantiated assertions about the EU’s 
place/role/influence” - and, one needs to add, “power” - in the world’.11 Investigations 
into how the EU can exercise such influence on the ground and the role of third country 
actors in facilitating or constraining it are greatly needed in order to inform debates about 
the EU’s performance as an international actor.  
                                                 
8
 Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués, ‘The decline of the EU’s “magnetic attraction”? The European Union in the 
eyes of neighbouring Arab countries and Russia’, Working Paper No. 2011/1 (European Foreign Policy 
Unit, London School of Economics, 2011), 3. 
9
 Karen E. Smith, ‘The EU in the world: future research agendas’, Working Paper No. 2008/1 (European 
Foreign Policy Unit, London School of Economics, 2008), 23.  
10
 Roy H. Ginsberg, The European Union in international politics: Baptism by fire (Lanham, MD: Rowman 
& Littlefield, 2001), 2. 
11
 Smith, ‘The EU in the world’, 22-23. 
16 
 
Secondly, understanding why and when third countries decide to cooperate with 
the EU contributes to better EU foreign policy-making through feedback mechanisms and 
organizational and institutional learning. As Ginsberg explains, if the EU critically 
investigates the reception of its actions and identifies and applies lessons, it can improve 
future policies and their implementation.
12
 If the EU foreign policy decision-making 
system is conceived of as a dynamic process in which EU foreign policy output  is 
converted into policy input through a feedback loop, then exploring the way in which 
outcomes are shaped by EU-third country interactions  is crucial for the EU’s internal 
learning and improvement.
13
 An understanding of the interplay between its foreign policy 
actions and the external environment will also provide the EU with a clear picture of how 
the outside world perceives its role as an international security actor. This is important 
because the perceptions and acceptance of other international actors (be they global 
powers like the US, regional actors like Russia, other international security organisations 
like NATO or host countries where the EU deploys its foreign policy instruments) shape 
the possibilities and limits for EU external action. The literature concurs on the fact that, 
apart from good planning and appropriate resources, the effectiveness of CSDP 
operations is a function of how they ‘connect with local leaders and public opinion in the 
field…the ‘narrative’ associated with each mission is a critical dimension of its political 
profile and visibility in the eyes of local interlocutors, potential spoilers and other crisis 
management partners’.14 Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, examining how EU 
foreign policy can be effective on the ground is indispensable for understanding the EU’s 
contribution to international and human security and democratic developments. As 
Ginsberg and Penska point out, it makes little sense for the Union to invest in developing 
a fully-fledged common security and defence policy if it ‘cannot add value to the security 
of host states and to other actors who either contribute to security or are affected by 
insecurity’.15 
  
                                                 
12
 Roy H. Ginsberg and Susan E. Penska, The European Union in global security: the politics of impact, 
(Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 40. 
13
 Ginsberg, The European Union in international politics, 23. 
14
 Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane, ‘Conclusion: the next steps for ESDP’. In  G. Grevi, 
D. Helly and D. Keohane (eds). European Security and Defence Policy: the first ten years (1999-2009) (EU 
Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2009), 411. 
15
 Ginsberg and Penska, The European Union in global security, 54. 
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1.2. The case studies 
While there is a general suggestion in the EFP literature that domestic actors in 
third countries influence the scope, content and methods of the EU’s foreign policy 
activities, the argument is nowhere more compelling than in the case of the Union’s 
Neighbourhood Policy. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was conceived as a 
demand-driven framework and the EU’s influence in the neighbourhood countries hinges 
upon their taking ownership of proposed policies and reforms. It has been argued that, 
while the enlargement process relies on the fulfillment of pre-designed criteria within an 
established timeframe, neighbourhood policies are put into motion by the partner 
countries’ ownership of self-defined reforms.16 This is because, in the absence of a 
membership perspective, the EU must be able to persuade third countries to comply with 
its norms and values, which involves a readiness to adapt its policy to the perception of 
neighbouring countries (and implicitly allow these to shape the policy outputs).
17
 
The neighbourhood provides fertile ground for local forces to shape EU policy. 
The Action Plans on which the ENP is based are not unilaterally enforced by the EU 
according to its acquis (as in the case of candidate countries), but are negotiated with 
partner countries and rest on the principle of ‘joint ownership’. However, in reality the 
ENP has not consisted in jointly agreed reform agendas and the development of policy 
and institutional frameworks that respond to the particular needs of ENP countries. On 
the contrary, it has to a large extent replicated the rule transfer mechanisms at the heart of 
the enlargement process with the significant difference that it did not offer a membership 
perspective. This, it is argued by the ENP literature, has resulted in considerable limits on 
the EU’s potential to have impact in the neighbourhood. Domestic actors have typically 
resisted EU reforms because of the high costs involved and the absence of the big ‘carrot’ 
of membership. To the extent that enlargement had been identified as the most successful 
EU foreign policy due to its ability to export EU rules through conditionality, the ENP 
                                                 
16
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only replicated that success to a very limited degree.
18
 At best, it contributed to enabling 
and strengthening incipient domestic reform processes, but did not make a difference in 
areas where there was no genuine domestic desire for change.
19
 Illustrating this finding, 
Maier and Schimmelfennig concluded in 2007 that ‘the EU has had no significant 
positive impact on the overall political and human rights situation in its neighbouring 
non-candidate countries.’20  
The ENP is considered to be a weak and inconsistent framework for rule transfer 
and even more so for conflict mediation. It was conceived as a ‘lite’ version of the 
enlargement policy which retained the logic of rewards in exchange for reforms, but had 
little to offer. The ENP had specifically proclaimed that what it offered was ‘everything 
but institutions’, thus ruling out the perspective of membership for the ENP partners. The 
envisaged relationship between the EU and its neighbours was one of functional 
cooperation in areas of mutual interest and a gradual movement of the ENP countries 
towards the EU’s regulatory standards and political values. However, limited rewards 
often failed to generate the kind of domestic changes that the EU was pressing for. This 
was partly because conditionality was weak and lacked credibility, with the EU failing to 
clearly draw the link between demands and rewards and often being ambiguous about its 
own requirements. On the other hand, the incentives were not considered significant 
enough to mitigate for the high costs of adopting wide-ranging reforms. The high costs of 
EU approximation were mostly related to political and economic costs incurred by 
business and governmental elites, the poor local capacity of countries in the 
neighbourhood and the lack of compatibility between EU and domestic policies, politics 
and polities. In the absence of the ‘carrot’ of membership these costs were prohibitive 
and restricted the EU’s potential to have impact beyond its borders. Thus, it was 
maintained, given the lack of a membership perspective, poor governance, weak local 
capacities and a poor fit with EU structures, it was highly unlikely that the EU could have 
                                                 
18
 Esther Barbé, Oriol Costa, Anna Herranz, Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués, Michal Natorski and Maria 
Sabiote, ‘Drawing the Neighbours Closer … to What?’ Cooperation and Conflict 44:4 (2009), 380. 
19
 Antonio Missiroli, ‘The ENP in future perspective’. In R. Whitman and S. Wolff. The European 
neighbourhood policy in perspective: Context, implementation and impact (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), 263.  
20
 Sylvia Maier and Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘Shared values: democracy and human rights’. In K. Weber, 
M.E. Smith, Michael and M.J. Baun, Governing Europe's neighbourhood: Partners or 
periphery? Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 56. 
19 
 
substantial impact in its neighbourhood. The EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy 
suffers from the same shortcomings as the broader ENP, despite CSDP missions being 
the most prominent EU foreign policy instruments. While CSDP operations were 
designed to operate at the political level, most missions fail to draw significantly on the 
CFSP policy framework. As a result, they are conceived as ‘apolitical and technical’ and 
can hardly be linked to broader conflict resolution frameworks.
21
 Instead, they function in 
a similar way to the EU’s other technical policy instruments which are part of the ENP 
framework. 
The combination of high costs of EU-driven domestic change for the Eastern 
Neighbourhood partners and the limitations of the ENP and the CSDP as policy and 
institutional frameworks have led scholars to assume that, in the absence of substantial 
incentives such as membership conditionality, domestic actors in neighbourhood 
countries will resist EU influence given their cost averseness.
22
 To the extent that the role 
of domestic actors in the EU’s neighbourhood is considered, the default assumption tends 
to be that they are negatively inclined to comply with the EU’s policy requirements 
because of the high costs involved and inadequate rewards. Nonetheless, empirical 
analyses of EU policy transfer in the Eastern Neighbourhood find that domestic actors are 
not merely cost averse, but can also support EU-driven domestic change despite the lack 
of a membership perspective.
23
 This is puzzling in light of the findings of the 
Europeanisation and external governance literatures. On one hand, the Europeanisation 
scholarship finds that the EU’s most successful rule transfer mechanism is membership 
conditionality. On the other hand, the external governance body of literature argues that, 
in the absence of a membership perspective, the EU succeeds to export rules through 
horizontal transnational networks, bypassing governmental actors. What, then, explains 
the fact that governments in the Eastern Neighbourhood have occasionally supported EU-
driven domestic change?  
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In trying to address this puzzle, the thesis explores the conditions under which 
incumbent regimes in the Eastern Neighbourhood cooperate effectively with CSDP 
missions by adhering to and adopting the objectives set out by their mandates. The 
missions specifically examined here are: the EUJUST Themis rule of law mission to 
Georgia, the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine 
(EUBAM) and the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) to Georgia. In addition 
to the Eastern Neighbourhood providing opportunities for incumbent regime  to shape the 
scope of CSDP engagement on the ground, the three missions studied here present a wide 
diversity of mandates, allowing for a comprehensive analysis of the EU’s main types of 
activities under the CSDP, identified here as confidence-building and rule transfer. Thus, 
the analysis is structured according to the type of activity the missions are engaged in, 
rather than investigating each mission mandate in part. It is important to introduce this 
analytical distinction because confidence-building activities tackle conflict issues directly 
whereas rule transfer aims to create an environment conducive to conflict resolution. As a 
result, the policy processes involve different sets of actors and are driven by distinct 
dynamics. Later in the chapter the two dimensions will be examined in more detail.  
EUJUST Themis was deployed in Georgia in 2004 with a mandate to support the 
Georgian authorities in their efforts to reform the criminal justice system. While being a 
small scale mission, Themis’s rule transfer mandate was significant because it was the 
EU’s first rule of law operation, as well as the first ever mission to be deployed in the 
post-Soviet space. The mission lasted for only 12 months and reflected to a certain extent 
the ESDP’s (at the time) early days when the deployment of missions was an exercise in 
improving foreign policy capabilities. EUBAM followed shortly, being deployed in 2005 
with a border management mandate at the Moldovan-Ukrainian border. The mission is 
still on the ground with a broad mandate that includes the reform of Moldova’s and 
Ukraine’s border guard and customs services, as well as contributing to the settlement of 
the Transnistrian conflict. As such, EUBAM’s activities encompass both a confidence-
building and a rule transfer dimension, which will be analysed separately. Finally, the 
EUMM emerged as a result of the EU’s involvement in mediating the Russia-Georgia 
war of August 2008 and was tasked with monitoring the ceasefire agreement facilitated 
by the French Presidency, contributing to the stabilisation and normalisation of the 
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security situation on the ground and facilitating confidence-building between conflict 
parties.  
EUJUST Themis, EUBAM and the EUMM have been critically evaluated as 
‘reactive and ad hoc, hindered by institutional incoherence, the lack of a broad strategic 
vision for the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood and the inability of Member States to agree on 
how to engage with Russia, a key strategic partner for the EU in that region’, in addition 
to having vague and overambitious mandates beyond their capabilities.
24
 While this thesis 
does not dispute the fact that the three missions have had and some continue to have 
significant shortcomings, it challenges those assessments which attribute their inability to 
fulfil their mandates solely to inadequate capabilities and a lack of coherence and 
coordination. This research argues that an agency-focused perspective which examines 
the role of incumbent regimes in Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia has the potential of 
revealing the conditions under which CSDP missions in the Eastern Neighbourhood can 
successfully fulfil their mandates through effective cooperation with host countries, 
beyond accounts of mission capabilities. The following section unpacks the notions of 
strategic interaction and effective cooperation in the context of the EU’s foreign policy in 
order to clarify the focus of the thesis. 
1.3. Strategic EU-ENP interactions and effective cooperation  
 
This thesis explores the conditions under which incumbent regimes in third 
countries engage in effective cooperation with CSDP missions by subscribing to their 
goals and adopting their suggested policies and reforms. To a certain extent, the inquiry 
touches upon issues of EU ‘impact’, ‘effectiveness’, ‘influence’ and ‘power’ by 
underlining how the EU’s success (variously conceived) is dependent on the preferences 
of incumbent regimes in third countries and their match with EU objectives. However, 
the focus of this study is much narrower. While EU ‘impact’, ‘effectiveness’, ‘influence’ 
and ‘power’ are complex indicators of the way in which the EU performs as an 
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international actor and would require the analysis of a wide range of variables, this thesis 
is specifically interested in investigating why and when third countries in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood decide to cooperate with the EU in the context of CSDP missions. The 
EU’s ability to get third country governments on board when it comes to mandates of 
CSDP missions is a crucial part of the EU’s success in international affairs, but it is only 
a piece of the puzzle. However, in order for the puzzle to be coherently and 
comprehensively assembled, each piece must be thoroughly understood and researched 
and its place in the bigger picture established through careful analysis. Thus, this research 
is essentially preoccupied with an instance of international cooperation, itself shaped by 
the interaction of what can be referred to as a demand and supply function
25
: the 
preferences of incumbent regimes in host countries and the strategic opportunities offered 
by CSDP mandates and the broader strategic environment.  
As will be expanded further in Chapter 2, this thesis takes political individual and 
group actors as the unit of analysis and, by embracing a thick rationality assumption, 
posits that effective cooperation in the context of CSDP missions is a function of the 
interaction between CSDP mandates and the way in which the missions’ resulting 
demands cater to the incumbent regimes’ fixed preferences for political survival and 
power. By framing this interaction in terms of ‘effective cooperation’, this thesis elevates 
the status of third country governments as co-equals with the EU in determining the 
success of ENP-EU relations. In order to accomplish their objectives - as defined by their 
mandates – CSDP missions must co-opt ENP governments into cooperation towards the 
achievement of those goals. Indeed, the buy-in of national governments is of crucial 
importance for the ability of CSDP missions to pursue their mandate. If the operations 
deployed on the ground fail to respond to the preferences of partner countries or are at 
odds with the political agendas of incumbent regimes, they are likely to face significant 
obstacles in achieving their goals. Depending on the remit of each mission, their activities 
could affect institutions, bureaucracies, individual actors, policies, as well as relations 
between conflict parties (in the context of conflict settlement processes) and broader 
reform efforts. These will have to be analysed separately for each CSDP mission in light 
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of their individual and highly distinctive mandates. The mandates of the missions are 
therefore the most important reference point for assessing CSDP external impact and they 
represent the benchmark that this thesis will rely on in order to explore the policy 
objectives of CSDP missions. 
In terms of their mandates, CSDP missions have several mechanisms at their 
disposal to engage host countries. As an ‘institutionalized attempt on the part of European 
Union Member States to respond to the security challenges they confront’26, the EU’s 
Common Security and Defence Policy aims to tackle key threats such as terrorism, 
regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. It does this by using its institutional 
and policy mechanisms to provide platforms for cooperation and to promote the transfer 
of EU rules to host countries. The CSDP is unique in its versatility among EU external 
policy instruments, drawing on both foreign policy tools such as conflict management 
and Europeanisation/external governance strategies consisting of the transfer of EU rules, 
norms, practices etc to host countries. This thesis thus distinguishes between these two 
functions typically fulfilled by CSDP missions - the confidence-building function and the 
rule transfer function. 
Confidence-building measures (CBMs) are designed to foster interaction and 
cooperation between conflict parties. In the case of secessionist conflicts, this implies the 
participation not only of the legitimate authorities in host countries, but also of the de 
facto governments of the separatist entities. Thus, the confidence-building measures 
proposed by EU missions are more likely to achieve their goals if there is preferential fit 
between not only the leadership of ENP states and EU policy objectives, but also between 
the political elites of the secessionist entities (Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia) 
and EU-driven confidence-building measures. It is presumed that if the de facto 
authorities of these entities perceive their participation in confidence-building 
mechanisms as profitable for their political survival, they will be more inclined to have a 
constructive attitude towards such fora of negotiation. Albert, Diez and Stetter refer to 
this mechanism of EU influence as ‘enabling impact’ arguing that it ‘relies on specific 
actors within conflict parties to link their political agendas with the EU’ and thus justify 
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conciliatory moves which would not have been considered legitimate otherwise.
27
 More 
broadly, the conflict mediation literature also acknowledges the importance of the 
perceived relationship between the outcome of mediation and the survival of conflict 
parties as one of the crucial factors affecting mediation interventions.
28
   
Confidence-building measures work towards bringing conflict parties together 
and creating an atmosphere of mutual trust and stable expectations which reduces the 
chances of renewed violence and paves the way for a long-term political settlement. More 
concretely, CBMs facilitate cooperation between conflict parties on a variety of low key, 
practical issues which otherwise could be blocked by the lack of progress in political 
negotiations. Confidence-building measures have been defined as ‘promoting 
institutionalised cooperation and stable expectations in a system of competitive nation-
states’.29 It is important to underline that, while closely intertwined with the broader 
conflict mediation framework, they are distinct from political negotiations between 
conflict parties. This is because CBMs aim to encourage cooperation over technical 
issues, rather than the highly political grievances which are often at the heart of conflicts, 
such as control over secessionist territories. Political disagreements tend to be protracted, 
with progress advancing slowly and frequently beleaguered by spoilers. As an 
intermediary stage in the conflict resolution process, confidence-building initiatives can 
precede the onset of political negotiations or can run in parallel with them, depending on 
how advanced cooperation between conflict parties is. As far as the CSDP is concerned, 
despite being formally embedded in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in 
practice CSDP missions have had low political profiles. In light of the functions CBMs 
are expected to fulfil, the focus in this thesis will be on the ability of CSDP missions to 
facilitate communication between conflict parties, as well as support them in resolving 
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EUBAM’s confidence-building activities are subsumed under the broad umbrella of the 
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5+2 negotiation process for the Transnistrian conflict. The mission is involved with the 
working group covering trade, customs and transport issues, focusing particularly on 
enhancing cooperation between Chisinau and Tiraspol in these areas, as well as 
facilitating the restoration of international transport corridors across Transnistria. On the 
other hand, the EUMM’s mandate operates in close cooperation with the Geneva talks for 
the settlement of Georgia’s territorial conflicts, while at the same time trying to dissociate 
the confidence-building platforms it works with on the ground from the broader 
settlement talks which are often politicised. The mission has developed regular 
cooperation mechanisms through which the Georgian government and the de facto 
Abkhazian, South Ossetian and Russian authorities can exchange information in order to 
prevent violent incidents from escalating, as well as work towards the normalisation of 
the security situation at the de facto border.                     
In addition to confidence-building measures, CSDP missions contribute to 
eradicating the root causes of conflicts by becoming involved in efforts to reform a 
variety of policy sectors in host countries and bring them in line with European and 
international standards. By contrast to confidence-building measures, rule transfer works 
indirectly by inducing the incumbent governments of host countries (but not necessarily 
the de facto secessionist regimes) to embrace EU or international rules, norms and 
practices. The reasoning behind this strategy, which lies at the heart of Europeanisation 
and external governance processes, is that policies and institutions which fulfil 
democratic and efficiency requirements enhance structural stability and thus prevent 
violent conflict in the long term. The external governance literature points out that the 
rules promoted by the EU to non-candidate countries are much broader than strictly the 
Union’s acquis communautaire. While still very keen to encourage third countries to 
adopt its own rules, outside the accession process the EU is more flexible and promotes 
policy convergence on the basis of international, as well as bilateral rules. As Barbé et al 
find, the EU and third countries can work together in order to establish new rules or the 
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EU can facilitate the adoption of international rules, which while not exclusive to the 
Union are typically shared by member states.
30
  
These observations are particularly relevant to the activities of CSDP missions 
which rarely operate in policy fields regulated under the acquis communautaire but more 
often than not promote internationally recognised standards with respect to the rule of 
law, border management, security sector reform etc. As a result, this thesis will address 
the rule transfer function of CSDP missions on the understanding that the rules promoted 
are not limited to narrowly defined EU rules, but include international and even 
bilaterally agreed rules. Another clarification that must be made at this stage is that by 
‘rules’ this thesis refers generically to norms, procedures, standards, practices etc, that 
can include, but are not limited to, ‘rules for regulation and distribution in specific policy 
areas, rules of political, administrative, and judicial process, and rules for the setup and 
competences of state and sub-state organizations’.31 Finally, in investigating the extent to 
which incumbent regimes in host countries are willing to embrace EU rules, this thesis 
encompasses the various stages of rule transfer as operationalised by Europeanisation and 
external governance studies: rule selection, adoption and application stages
32
, without 
necessarily distinguishing between them for the purpose of the analysis. This is because 
this thesis is not primarily concerned with ‘measuring’ third countries’ compliance with 
external rules. EUJUST Themis’s rule transfer mandate aimed to support the Georgian 
authorities in the reform of the criminal justice system but since there are no common EU 
norms with respect to this particular policy area, the mission’s recommendations revolved 
broadly around European/continental rule of law standards. EUBAM’s activity spans a 
much wider range of activities which include both international rules, such as customs 
legislation and practice which follow World Customs Organization (WCO) guidelines, 
and EU acquis, such as the implementation of the Union’s trade acquis required under the 
DCFTA.  
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1.4. Methodology: research design and data sources 
 
As already noted, this thesis examines two CSDP functions – rule transfer and 
confidence-building – across three CSDP missions in the Eastern Neighbourhood. Given 
the particular nature of their mandates, EUJUST Themis, EUBAM and EUMM display 
an interesting variety of activities among their tasks; however their distribution is not 
equivalent across each operation, meaning that some of the missions perform only one 
function (EUJUST Themis: rule transfer; EUMM: confidence-building) while others 
perform both (EUBAM). While the resulting analysis is not symmetrical in the sense of 
allowing for an investigation of how each mission performs on each of the identified 
CSDP dimensions, in light of the overarching Eastern Neighbourhood focus of this thesis, 
depth of analysis and comprehensiveness were chosen over comparative rigour. 
Therefore, this research undertakes a two-by-two analysis of the rule transfer CSDP 
function (EUJUST Themis and EUBAM) and the confidence-building function (EUBAM 
and EUMM). By exploring all three missions and their mandates across the dimensions 
that are relevant to each of them, this thesis aims to provide an in-depth study of how 
incumbent regimes in the Eastern Neighbourhood can successfully engage with and 
embrace CSDP-mandated policy initiatives and reforms.  
This research relies extensively on primary sources and thus makes a substantial 
original contribution to the Eastern Neighbourhood literature. Firstly, the thesis draws 
extensively on EU official reports, as well as progress reports and press releases of each 
individual mission. In addition, 23 semi-structured interviews were conducted by the 
author with mission staff, as well as EU and national officials. The interviews were 
conducted both as part of on-the-ground fieldwork in Brussels, Moldova, Ukraine and 
Georgia, as well as a number of other locations (i.e Warsaw), and via Skype. Finally, the 
research has made significant use of classified US cables which have proved to be a 
valuable source of information. While the use of Wikileaks as a data source for academic 
research is yet to permeate the mainstream methodological approaches in international 
relations and political science, this thesis argues that the US diplomatic cables represent a 
valuable and legitimate source for policy-oriented research, despite their contentious 
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provenance. Not only is the information contained in the cables likely to be unobtainable 
through other means, but it may well be more frank and unbiased than information 
produced for public consumption.
33
 As such, Wikileaks cables represent a rich repository 
of primary sources which can provide unique insights into political relationships and 
strategies and, by corroboration with other sources, have the potential of shaping new 
debates in international relations, as well as re-evaluating old concepts and theories.  
On the other hand, the use of Wikileaks raises a number of justified legal, ethical 
and methodological questions which should be explored as part of the due process which 
every scholarly work must undergo with respect to its research design and 
methodology.
34
 Legally and ethically, the charge most frequently levelled against leaked 
information of the type found in the Wikileaks cables is that it was obtained illegally. 
However, while this may be relevant for those actually committing the act of leaking 
classified information and even for those deciding its publication, there is no reason to 
believe that using this information for academic research purposes could be either legally 
or ethically objectionable. Once the information is publically available, it can be hardly 
argued that a particular piece of research has seriously harmed national security or that it 
has caused harm to individuals, organisations or governments. Research merely interprets 
and applies information readily made public as part of Wikileaks cables and is thus not 
responsible for the repercussions of their publication, since access to such information 
could be obtained independently of the scholarly work itself. This why this thesis draws 
on un-censored cables, directly citing from them and avoiding to redact the names of 
individuals identified – in addition to the fact that the identities of particular individuals 
are relevant for establishing the nature of relations and interests at the heart of strategic 
interactions between political actors, this exercise would have been largely futile given 
that a simple Internet search could have easily revealed the redacted information. Finally, 
a methodological concern which should not be easily discarded is data quality. In light of 
the nature of the information contained in Wikileaks cables, how can a researcher be sure 
of its authenticity and reliability? While surely legitimate, this concern applies to much of 
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the data researchers use in their studies, regardless of whether it has been procured 
through formalised methods. Interviews are regarded as some of the sources most likely 
to provide original, first-hand information, and yet how can the interviewer ensure that 
the interviewee provides truthful, authentic information? This is, however, not enough 
reason to reject the usefulness of sources such as leaked classified cables or interviews, 
but rather underlines the necessity to always corroborate information generated by these 
sources with accounts provided by alternative sources. This thesis endeavours to do this 
to the utmost possible extent by seeking to back up (or contradict) information obtained 
from Wikileaks cables with insights from interviews, as well as other sources such as 
media accounts and official EU and national documents.  
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Chapter 2 
Explaining EU-host country effective cooperation: what 
role for domestic stakeholders? 
This chapter outlines the theoretical framework of the thesis. It starts by 
reviewing two broad strands of literature that speak to the issue of EU cooperation with 
third countries: the eclectic literature on the EU as an international actor and the 
academic scholarship on Europeanisation and external governance. Despite their claim of 
addressing issues of EU foreign policy impact, effectiveness and/or success, these bodies 
of literature are characterised by considerable shortcomings which limit their ability to 
explain the conditions under which the EU can effectively cooperate with countries in its 
neighbourhood without either completely neglecting the Union’s external environment or 
treating it as a structural, mediating variable that filters the adaptive pressures of 
Europeanisation. Having clarified the inadequacy of these scholarly contributions for 
providing an explanation of EU foreign policy cooperation that accounts for the agency 
of actors in recipient countries, the rest of the chapter presents the theoretical framework 
proposed by this thesis. Drawing on assumptions derived from rational-choice theory and 
recent academic contributions to the Eastern Neighbourhood literature, the framework 
endorsed by this research claims that the intrinsic motivation of national governments in 
host countries to gain and/or maintain political power is key to understanding the 
opportunities for and limits of the adoption of EU-driven strategies and reforms.  
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2.1. The EU as an international actor: actorness, presence, 
capabilities 
As Jørgensen observes while pondering which works on European foreign policy 
to take to the proverbial desert island, the study of European Foreign Policy is a 
‘seductive yet deliberately chosen ambiguous’ rich field encompassing a broad range of 
subject areas.
35
 One way to structure this seemingly large and not entirely coherent body 
of literature is through the lens of Hill and Smith’s three complementary perspectives 
which provide a wide-ranging picture of the EU’s role in the international system and can 
also be used to helpfully order the literature addressing the EU’s international relations 
and/or foreign policy. Thus, the EU can be thought of as: 1. a subsystem of international 
relations; 2. part of the wider processes of international relations; 3. a major power 
impacting on contemporary international relations.
36
 
The scholarly contributions concerned with the EU as a subsystem of 
international relations are particularly interested in how member states and other EU 
institutional actors succeed in coordinating their preferences in order to produce foreign 
policy outcomes.
37
 This focus was slow to emerge, being largely overshadowed by 
ontological concerns over whether and to what extent the EU could be considered an 
international actor
38
 and an overarching empirical preoccupation with the content of the 
EU’s external relations. Hill was among the first to note this limitation in the literature 
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and advocate for the study of the role of national foreign policies in producing collective 
action at European level.
39
 The findings of studies concerned with the role of member 
states within the broader architecture of EU foreign policy point to decision-making 
dynamics being primarily driven by national governments, and in particular the large 
member states
40, but at the same time there are indications that, while the ‘national 
context remains paramount, the organizational context cannot be neglected’.41 Thus, the 
Europeanisation of member states’ foreign policies and actors has been of considerable 
interest in the literature. The issue has been approached either at a theoretical and 
methodological level
42
 or by tracing processes of socialization of foreign policy actors.
43
 
In addition, contributions on the EU as a subsystem of international relations are 
concerned with the ideas that member states feed into the notion of the EU as an 
international actor, with different conceptions of ‘power’ as the most common expression 
of the member states’ vision for a European foreign policy. Analyses of the EU as a 
‘civilian’44, normative45, transformative46 or ethical47 power, reveal a preoccupation with 
the ideational dimension of the EU’s international role and the principles that underpin its 
external action. Studies exploring the drivers behind the EU’s Common Security and 
Defence Policy have identified a wide variety of factors accounting for why the EU 
decides to deploy civilian and military operations, including the national interests and 
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domestic political considerations of member states
48
, the spillover effect of the 
neofunctionalist logic of integration
49
 and international power structures
50
. In substantive 
terms, studies of the EU as an international security provider have investigated the norms 
and/or interests that drive the EU when responding to conflicts (i.e. human security 
versus utility-driven policy).
51
 
A distinct strand of literature which could be subsumed under the ‘EU as a 
subsystem of international relations’ category is represented by historical accounts of the 
evolution of EU foreign policy processes and structure.
52
 These works cover a wide range 
of aspects that marked the transition from the EPC to the CFSP through to the changes 
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty: the increasing legalization of foreign policy 
cooperation;
53
 the growing institutionalization of the policy-making structures 
underpinning the CFSP;
54
 the emerging communitarisation of foreign policy.
55
 The 
largest part of the literature addressing the EU’s role in the world and the operation of its 
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foreign policy is, however, preoccupied with the extent to which the Union can act as part 
of the wider processes of international relations. As such, the predominant focus is on the 
EU’s capabilities to perform foreign policy functions, which have typically been assessed 
as sub-optimal. The EU’s inability to act successfully on the international arena can be 
attributed to a number of factors which have been explored at length in the literature. The 
absence of a genuinely ‘European’ identity56 and the lack of democratic control over the 
CFSP
57
 have been found to undermine the EU’s public legitimacy and its quest for 
international actorness. The issues of coherence (the EU’s ability to speak with one voice 
and/or its ability to harmonise its various sectoral foreign policies) and consistency (the 
EU’s ability to make purposeful collective decisions and stick to them) come up regularly 
in analyses of EU international performance which variously draw attention to the 
disjuncture between formal calls for greater coherence and foreign policy 
implementation,
58
 the doubtful relationship between greater institutionalisation of the 
CFSP and policy coherence and effectiveness
59
 and even the lack of correlation between 
coherence and effectiveness.
60
 Empirical studies of the EU’s involvement in different 
policy areas reveal that the EU more often than not struggles to act coherently and 
consistently across policy sectors such as migration
61
, crisis management
62
, and 
democracy promotion.
63
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The development of EU institutions and policy instruments that can support 
foreign policy action is of particular interest in the literature, with assessments generally 
pointing to a positive trend in this area,
64
 but at the same time underlining the challenges 
of consensus-based decision-making mechanisms
65
 and the difficulty of establishing 
effective cooperation in sensitive policy areas, as illustrated by the European Defence 
Agency.
66
 Studies concerned with particular foreign policy instruments typically explore 
their evolution, often from a neofunctionalist perspective
67
 or their effectiveness and/or 
success.
68
 The literature dedicated to the EU’s capabilities in the context of its Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is, without a doubt, the most prolific. Civilian and 
military missions represent the most prominent foreign policy instruments the EU can 
resort to in order to intervene in high-intensity conflict situations, as well as post-conflict 
stabilisation and reconstruction. The versatility of CSDP missions has meant that they 
have been successfully deployed across a variety of regions and policy areas. However, 
while their number, scope, range and seemingly beneficial impact has been positively 
assessed,
69
 EU operations have also been widely criticised for their limited scale, failure 
to enhance the Union’s military capabilities,70 lack of flexibility and autonomy on the 
ground
71
 and the absence of a coherent strategic vision,
72
 among others. 
By comparison to studies preoccupied with the nature of the EU as an 
international actor and the way in which it acts in the context of the wider processes of 
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international relations, the literature which explores the impact of the EU on the 
international system is limited in scope. Hill and Smith’s third perspective thus - of the 
EU as a major power impacting on contemporary international relations – is sparsely 
represented in the literature. While there is now a significant body of works on the impact 
of the EU’s foreign policy, it is primarily concerned with either how decision-making 
processes and policies reflect back on the EU’s ability to learn and improve its 
performance as an international actor
73
 or with Europeanisation processes. Scholarly 
contributions which focus on the impact of the EU on the international system are few 
and far between and fall short of providing analytically sound analyses of impact, 
examining instead expected (rather than actual) impact
74
 or placing the emphasis on the 
elusive concepts of performance, effectiveness or success rather than the extent to which 
the EU makes a difference in international politics. As such, some of the literature which 
claims to address issues of impact would more appropriately belong to the second 
category discussed above, given its concern with processes rather than outcomes. While 
studies of EU impact on international politics encounter the difficulty of grasping large-
scale dynamics such as the shifting global balance of power and the associated challenge 
of identifying the EU’s role within such a complex systemic phenomenon, there has been 
a certain interest in the literature in looking at the impact of the EU’s foreign policy on 
other international actors (i.e. international organisations, regional powers). Nonetheless, 
with very few exceptions,
75
 this body of literature also conflates the study of impact with 
assessments of foreign policy performance, effectiveness, evaluations of achievements 
and shortcomings, to the point of not making the difference between impact (a change in 
the behaviour or characteristics of the international actors the EU interacts with) and the 
factors driving that change.
76
 This is apparent particularly in analyses of CSDP impact on 
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third countries, which are typically ad hoc exercises in assessing mission effectiveness 
and tend to be relegated to the final section of descriptive mission overviews.
77
  
While this review is useful for the purpose of situating the EU foreign policy 
literature within the broader context of IR studies, the overwhelming trend among 
scholarly contributions dealing with the EU’s role in international affairs is to inquire into 
the nature of the Union as an international actor.
78
 The interest in the ontology of the EU 
leaves little room for integrating EU foreign policy studies within the IR discipline, by 
affirming a sui generis, non-generalisable identity, and promoting an inward-looking 
perspective. As a result, with very few exceptions,
79
 the main focus of scholarly 
contributions has been the EU’s internal actorness and power.80 This is largely explained 
by the EU’s relatively new and unique identity on the international stage, which 
prompted questions primarily related to the degree to which EU international activities 
were the output of an autonomous and effective international actor and thus whether the 
EU could be considered a full-fledged actor in global politics. Interest in the EU’s 
actorness is closely related to debates regarding the EU as a power in international 
relations, and an overarching focus on EU internal processes. The assumption of most 
studies is that the EU, far from being a traditional international actor, possesses sui 
generis qualities that represent the key to understanding the effectiveness and success of 
its external policies. The most notable of these qualities has been identified as the 
Union’s ability to export its own model of stability and prosperity through economic and 
political rather than military means, which has won the EU the title of ‘civilian’, but also 
‘normative’, ‘ethical’ and ‘civilising’ power.   
The implicit point of reference in some of the early accounts of EU foreign policy 
has been the unitary state, resulting in assessments which investigated the extent to which 
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the EU acted as a state in international politics and its acceptance as a legitimate and 
relevant actor by the other international players. The concept of ‘presence’ has been 
variously employed as an alternative to the notion of ‘actor’, most famously by Allen and 
Smith. They claimed that Western Europe had a ‘variable and multidimensional 
presence’ in international affairs, an argument that aimed to highlight both its failure to 
act as a unified actor and its significant salience and cohesive impact despite this 
shortcoming.
81
  
Bretherton and Vogler envisage actorness as the locus of interaction between 
three elements: opportunity, presence and capability, whereby opportunity represents the 
structural environment within which the EU acts; presence represents the ability to 
project external influence and shape the understandings, expectations and behaviour of 
others; and capability is composed of structural prerequisites of an international actor and 
the actual performance of actor behavior. The international context, or opportunity in 
Bretherton and Vogler’s terminology, influences both the European Union itself and the 
external demands for it to act, and is one of the crucial factors in explaining the Union’s 
external behaviour. ‘Presence’ represents the ability to project external influence and 
shape the understandings, expectations and behaviour of others. The importance attached 
to the EU by third actors is determined by two sets of factors: the character and identity 
of the EU, where character refers to the Union’s political system composed of the 
member states and the common EU institutions and identity refers to shared 
understandings about what the EU is and what it does; and the external, unexpected 
consequences of the Union’s internal priorities.82 Presence thus situates itself at the 
frontier between the inside and the outside by telling a story about how the EU, by virtue 
of its existence (and not purposive action) exerts influence beyond its borders. On the 
contrary, an actor’s capability is ‘a measure of the autonomous unit’s capacity to behave 
actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system’.83 
Capability is composed of structural prerequisites of an international actor (reflecting its 
potential capacity –social, institutional - to perform as an actor) and the actual 
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performance of actor behaviour. For Hill, the European Community’s capabilities can be 
conceived of in terms of its ability to agree, its resources and the instruments at its 
disposal.
84
 Drawing on Sjöstedt’s work, Bretherton and Vogler propose four requirements 
for actorness: a shared commitment to a set of common values; domestic legitimation of 
external policies, actions and priorities; the ability to identify priorities and formulate 
policies, reflected by the concepts of consistency and coherence; and the availability of, 
and capacity to utilize, policy instruments such as diplomacy, economic and military 
tools.
85
 
The conception of actorness outlined by these contributions stands out as 
constructed through the interplay of internal and external factors. Thus, one of the core 
contentions of the literature addressing the EU’s role as an international actor is that the 
EU’s potential to act effectively in the international arena is shaped both by the functions 
fulfilled and the capabilities possessed by the Union itself, on one hand, and the 
perceptions held of its role by third parties, on the other hand. In line with the notion that 
actorness is shaped by the interaction of internal and external factors, Hill argued in 1993 
that the EU’s international performance was characterised by a ‘capability-expectations 
gap’ between what the Union could deliver as an international actor and what outsiders 
expected of it. This was presumably the result of overstated hopes vested in the EU’s 
future power on the international scene which had talked up EU capabilities, to the point 
where a significant capability-expectations gap developed. This discrepancy, it was 
argued, could potentially generate ‘debates over false possibilities both within the EU and 
between the EU and external supplicants’.86 Hill aimed to use the ‘capability-expectations 
gap’ as a conceptual tool for applying systems theory to European foreign policy, where 
the CFSP is seen as a sub-system of the broader international system, characterized by 
both internal dynamics and external influence. Indeed, the capability-expectations gap is 
seen as providing a conceptualisation of the interactions between: 1. Internal and external 
factors; 2. Agency and structure; 3. The imagined and the real.
87
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The conceptualisation of internal and external factors as jointly shaping the EU’s 
international actorness was a significant development in EU foreign policy studies, but 
contributed little to providing an understanding of how CSDP missions could cooperate 
effectively with host countries. While it was acknowledged that the expectations of 
domestic actors affected the potential effectiveness of the EU’s foreign policies, the pre-
theoretical nature of these arguments meant that they offered no insights into the 
mechanisms of this process. The relationship between opportunity, presence and 
capabilities, and between capability and expectations, was merely assumed as mutually 
constitutive without any specification of mechanisms of influence. This is hardly 
surprising given that the EU’s external environment remained underdeveloped as a 
concept. Bretherton and Vogler’s ‘opportunity’ and Hill’s ‘expectations’ are under-
specified and abstract notions and do not provide an understanding of how external 
factors can affect the EU’s role as a global actor. The literature on the EU as an 
international actor was never meant to address the issue of EU foreign policy impact, 
since its main concern was with the ‘nature of the beast’ rather than the effects of its 
foreign policies. Its focus was thus ontological, rather than teleological, which is what 
studies of impact would have been preoccupied with. Nonetheless, the findings of this 
body of literature have informed assessments of the EU’s performance and effectiveness 
as an international actor and the criteria used to investigate EU actorness were broadly 
incorporated in analyses of EU impact. This has resulted in a distinct body of analyses 
which identified EU foreign policy capabilities as one of the main factors accounting for 
the success or lack thereof of the EU’s common security and defence policy. 
The proliferation of descriptive works on CSDP capabilities has been partly the 
consequence of the defining role of capabilities for the existence of EU foreign policy. 
From its very beginning, the CSDP was perceived not only as a policy in its own right, 
but also as a means to enhance member states’ capabilities, particularly the military ones, 
and bolster the EU’s power and actorness.88 As a result, explanations of the CSDP’s 
effectiveness were framed as a function of capabilities, while largely ignoring the role of 
the external environment and the importance of domestic actors in host countries. Policy 
recommendations identified the necessity for the EU to improve its resources in terms of 
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personnel, hardware and financial resources, as well as enhance its institutional and 
policy instruments and strengthen internal coherence. While providing a great deal of 
useful empirical detail on the working of CSDP missions, these studies remain 
descriptive accounts which merely point out the strengths and weaknesses of CSDP tools 
without, however, comprehensively analysing whether and how effective cooperation 
between CSDP missions and host countries can take place. 
The potential relevance of the literature on the EU as an international actor for the 
study of cooperation between CSDP missions and host countries is related to an 
undertsanding  of actorness as shaped by the interaction of EU  internal and external 
factors. Particularly relevant in this context is the suggestion that the EU’s potential to act 
effectively in the international arena is shaped both by the functions fulfilled and the 
capabilities possessed by the Union itself, on one hand, and the perceptions held of its 
role by third parties, on the other hand. However, the literature has overwhelmingly 
focused on the role of internal factors, with a particular focus on EU foreign policy 
capabilities, while failing to develop an understanding of the role of external factors. It is 
difficult to see how a conceptual approach that fails to provide an understanding of the 
external environment within which CSDP missions operate would be appropriate for 
investigating cooperation between CSDP missions and host countries. The literature on 
the EU as an international actor - with its focus on CSDP capabilities - does not provide 
the necessary conceptual and theoretical tools to analyse the extent to which host 
countries effectively participate in and cooperate with EU missions. The concept of 
‘actorness’ captures the EU’s ability to agree on, adopt and implement foreign policies 
but has no explanatory power when it comes to the effects of these policies on the 
ground. CSDP capabilities do influence performance and effectiveness in the field but an 
exclusive focus on them glosses over what is undoubtedly a necessary condition for 
CSDP success: the buy-in of the host countries. It is the domestic structures and actors in 
these countries which emerge as crucial in explaining effective EU-host country 
cooperation, but notions such as ‘opportunity’ and ‘expectations’ fail to provide the 
analytical insight that would allow for an investigation of effective cooperation between 
EU missions and host countries. The next section explores the potential of a better-suited 
body of literature – Europeanisation – to shed light on this issue.  
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2.2. Europeanisation: An institutionalist perspective on EU 
impact on third countries 
One of the most relevant strands of literature exploring the engagement of the 
European Union with third countries is represented by research on Europeanisation. 
While the first decades of the EU’s existence were dedicated to efforts at explaining the 
process of European integration and the dynamics of European policy-making, the mid-
1990’s brought about an interest in whether and how the EU impacts ‘upon policy 
changes, institutional transformations or…even identity changes – and under what 
conditions’.89 This research initially focused on domestic change in the member states but 
soon expanded its area of interest to cover candidate states, associated countries (Norway, 
Switzerland) and neighbours. The EU arguably had the potential to affect domestic 
change beyond its borders across a wide range of dimensions and through a variety of 
mechanisms which became the focus of the newly-developing Europeanisation literature. 
In one of the most widely-cited definitions of Europeanisation, Ladrech describes it as ‘a 
process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and 
economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and 
policy-making’.90 For Europeanisation scholars the relationship between the EU and third 
countries is not one of cooperation between partners, but one of rule transmission from a 
provider (EU) to recipients (third countries). This literature on EU impact on rather than 
cooperation with third countries conceives of the Union as a system of governance rather 
than an international actor. Nonetheless, it is the comprehensive account of the domestic 
environment of third countries provided by Europeanisation studies that makes this body 
of literature particularly relevant for this thesis. This is a dimension which is largely 
unexplored by IR studies of the EU as an international actor, preoccupied as they are with 
the macro dynamics of international politics.  
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The Europeanisation scholarship has often been ‘placed within some type of 
institutional perspective’, as Featherstone points out.91 This is why attempts at explaining 
Europeanisation often start with the ‘goodness of fit’ argument, according to which the 
extent of the ‘misfit’ between European and domestic policies, processes and institutions 
determines the scope for domestic change: the wider the gap between domestic and 
European-level structures, the greater the scope for domestic change.
92
 This hypothesis 
relies on the assumption that the emergence of distinct structures of governance at 
European level is not sufficient for generating domestic change. Europeanisation 
processes must be accompanied by adaptational pressures on domestic structures. While 
low adaptational pressure as a result of compatible EU and domestic structures removes 
the need for domestic change, high adaptational pressure in response to sharp differences 
between EU and national structures is likely to produce inertia rather than change, given 
the challenge of ‘digesting’ and ‘metabolising’ European standards. Domestic change is 
likely to be significant, it has been argued, ‘when adaptational pressure falls between the 
two extremes’.93  
The existence of ‘misfit’ between domestic and European structures followed by 
the exercise of adaptional pressure, are nonetheless only part of the explanatory 
framework of Europeanisation. As Bӧrzel and Risse explain, they conceptualise the 
‘goodness of fit’ argument as ‘an enabling condition for the domestic impact of Europe, a 
starting point without much weight in and of itself’.94 Whether adaptional pressure can 
generate concrete domestic change depends on a set of mediating/intervening factors. The 
most common conceptualisation of domestic adaptational processes as a result of 
Europeanisation draws on two strands of the ‘new institutionalism’ in political science: 
rational choice (or rationalist) institutionalism and sociological (or constructivist) 
institutionalism.
95
 These perspectives postulate that there are two distinct ‘logics’ to the 
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way institutions work: a logic of consequentialism (or consequences) and a logic of 
appropriateness. 
 
2.2.1. Rational choice institutionalism – EU impact through 
reinforcement by reward? 
According to rational choice institutionalism, actors follow a ‘logic of 
consequences’, which affects the structure of opportunities and constraints within 
institutions and thus the distribution of power.
96
 This is because rational, goal-oriented 
and purposeful actors act instrumentally in order to maximise their preferences by 
drawing on the resources at their disposal. They thus engage in resource exchange which 
results in a redistribution of resources, empowering some over others.
97
 In the context of 
Europeanisation processes, the misfit between European and domestic structures provides 
societal and/or political actors with new opportunities and constraints to pursue their 
interests.
98
 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier’s external incentives model is a rationalist, 
actor-centred bargaining model which works through conditionality and which, in the 
authors’ opinion holds the greatest explanatory value for Europeanisation in Central and 
Eastern European candidate countries. According to rational choice institutionalism, 
actors behave instrumentally in order to maximise the attainment of their preferences and 
that requires a highly strategic behaviour including cost-benefit calculations.
99
 Thus, 
membership conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe was effective because domestic 
actors evaluated the benefits of EU membership as exceeding the costs involved by the 
adoption of the required reforms.  
Given the prominence of institutions in channelling strategic behaviour within the 
rational choice institutionalist model of Europeanisation, there are several intervening 
factors which mediate the ability of domestic actors to exploit opportunities and avoid 
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constraints presented by Europeanisation processes. Bӧrzel and Risse identify two 
intervening factors: the existence of multiple veto points in domestic institutions 
empower actors to resist adaptational pressures from the EU, while the existence of 
enabling formal institutions provides material and ideational resources that actors can use 
to exploit EU opportunities.
100
 The importance of multiple veto points and formal 
institutions is also underlined by Rise et al (2001) who argue that these are structural 
factors which shape the way policy-making structures respond to adaptational pressures 
by defining opportunity structures and redefining interests (differential empowerment of 
actors). Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier find that, in addition to veto players, 
characteristics related to how conditionality is applied are also relevant, specifically the 
determinacy of conditions, the credibility of conditionality and the size and speed of 
rewards.
101
 Thus, the ‘logic of consequences’ put forward by rational choice 
institutionalism suggests that Europeanisation generates domestic change by creating the 
conditions for a reconfiguration of the distribution of resources at the domestic level 
which in turn empowers actors differentially.
102
  
The conclusions of the Europeanisation literature regarding the potential for the 
EU to generate domestic change in third countries highlight the greater scope for 
domestic change in candidate countries, as compared to member states.
103
 The reason is, 
of course, the accession process and its associated conditionality mechanism. By relying 
on reinforcement by reward, rather than persuasion, the EU has been more effective in 
producing impact. Thus, Moravcsik and Vachudova have shed light on the dynamics of 
enlargement and the strict conditionality mechanism underpinning it by explaining why 
candidate countries accept to comply with the drastic conditions of the accession process. 
According to them ‘East European states take part in the laborious accession process 
because EU membership brings tremendous economic and geopolitical benefits’ and 
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because ‘the basic asymmetry of interdependence and thus power is evident’.104 While 
candidate countries have little to offer to the EU, given their small economies, and little 
bargaining advantage due to the strong desire of political elites and societies to join the 
European bloc, the Union holds the promise of membership, trade and aid which allows it 
to set the rules of the game.
105
 As Sedelmeier emphasises, most Europeanisation studies 
find that the EU has been more successful in exporting its rules through conditionality 
rather than normative persuasion and socialisation, thus confirming the premises of 
rational choice institutionalism.
106
  
2.2.2. Sociological institutionalism: EU impact through normative 
persuasion? 
Sociological institutionalism predisposes actors to internalising institutional 
norms and becoming persuaded by their legitimacy, thus acting in accordance with a 
‘logic of appropriateness’ This Europeanisation mechanism is described by Knill and 
Lehmkuhl as ‘framing integration’ since domestic change takes place as a result of the 
EU altering the beliefs and preferences of domestic actors through socialisation 
processes.
107
 Radaelli also refers to horizontal or ‘framing’ Europeanisation as involving 
a dynamic based on the market and/or socialisation processes. In this case domestic 
change takes place not through a superimposition of a pre-defined EU model on domestic 
structures, but through consumer choice and the diffusion of ideas.
108
 This mechanism 
reflects Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier’s social learning model which assumes that 
Europeanisation is determined by perceptions of appropriateness rather than by external 
incentives.
109
  
Given its distinct understanding of social action, the logic of appropriateness 
assumes different types of intervening factors which mediate the internalisation of EU 
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rules than the logic of consequences. Thus, whether third countries internalise new norms 
and develop new identities depends in Bӧrzel and Risse’s view on two mediating factors: 
the existence of norm entrepreneurs at the domestic level who persuade others to redefine 
their interests and identities and the existence of a political culture and other informal 
institutions which are conducive to consensus-building and cost-sharing.
110
 When these 
two factors are present, the ‘logic of appropriateness’ suggests that Europeanisation will 
produce domestic change through socialisation and collective learning processes.
111
 
Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier agree that the existence of a compatible political 
culture (a factor which they refer to as ‘resonance’) is highly important, but add that the 
legitimacy of rules and process and the compatibility between EU and domestic identities 
can also play a significant role in determining Europeanisation. Risse at al also point out 
to the significance of political and organisational cultures and learning for shaping the 
way policy-making structures respond to adaptational pressures by redefining 
identities.
112
  
2.3. Beyond membership: EU foreign policy impact as a result 
of external governance? 
While Europeanisation had been able to explain the EU’s impact on the policies, 
polities and politics of member states and candidate countries, the framework 
encountered difficulties capturing the EU’s relations with countries which were not 
offered or did not seek membership. The scholarly response to this dilemma was the EU 
external governance literature which sought to explain the expansion of the EU’s legal 
boundary - its acquis communautaire - beyond the circle of member states and accession 
candidates. The external governance literature assumed that, given the absence of strong 
incentives in the form of membership conditionality, domestic change in the 
neighbourhood (and other non-candidate countries) takes place mainly through 
mechanisms of persuasion and socialisation shaped by the legitimacy and legalisation of 
EU norms. The external governance approach provided a framework for exploring the 
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conditions under which the EU’s transfer of rules to third countries is effective, focusing 
on functional, horizontal, mechanisms of rule export through transgovernmental networks 
rather than the top-down mechanism of membership conditionality. Thus, the most 
germane explanation for the impact of external governance has been identified at the 
institutional level and assumes that impact derives from institutional processes of norm 
diffusion and policy transfer.
113
  
This structural understanding of EU rule transfer processes posits that EU external 
behaviour is primarily shaped by internal EU modes of governance and hence subject to 
institutional path-dependency.
114
 Confirming this assumption, Lavenex, Lehmkuhl and 
Wichmann show that, rather than reflecting the macro-structures of foreign policy 
frameworks such as the EEA or the ENP, EU external governance modes are consistent 
with internal sectoral dynamics. For instance, while the ENP represents a weakly 
legalized framework in which the EU and partner countries have a formally symmetrical 
relationship, the sectoral commitments of member states tend to showcase a higher 
degree of obligation than the macro-institutional level would indicate.
115
 As a result, it 
was assumed that the likelihood of effective external governance increases with the 
degree of institutionalisation of a specific policy at EU level as well as with the degree of 
legalisation and legitimacy of EU rules.
116
 External governance would thus presumably 
have a stronger impact in policy sectors under Community competence or which are 
subject to a high degree of EU regulation as opposed to policy sectors outside the acquis.  
In addition to the degree of institutionalisation of a particular policy, which is 
claimed to hold the greatest explanatory potential, the external governance literature has 
acknowledged that there are other factors which affect external governance, such as the 
domestic structures of third countries.
117
 The domestic structure explanation relies on the 
same institutional logic that underpins external governance approaches broadly, therefore 
hypothesising that the impact of governance depends on the compatibility between 
institutional structures at the domestic and EU level. Specifically, the effectiveness of 
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external governance is believed to increase with the resonance of EU rules and the EU 
compatibility of domestic institutions.
118
 Unlike enlargement Europeanisation which 
found that rational choice institutionalism explains domestic change through the 
mechanism of conditionality, external governance largely confirms assumptions which 
resonate with a sociological approach to historical institutionalism. In the absence of 
conditionality, the best predictor for domestic change is the degree of legalisation and 
legitimacy of EU rules.
119
  
Unlike the literature on the EU as an international actor, the Europeanisation and 
external governance approaches provide a comprehensive conceptualisation of the 
domestic environment of third countries. By drawing on new institutionalist approaches, 
they are also theoretically well equipped to explore the issue of EU impact. The 
overarching argument advanced by the so-called ‘misfit’ model is that the scope of EU 
impact is shaped by the structural gap between EU and national policies and the resulting 
adaptive pressures from the supranational onto the national level. Europeanisation thus is 
a function of the EU’s institutional framework of rules, norms, procedures, etc, and its 
relation to domestic institutional structures. The ‘fit’ or ‘misfit’ between EU-level and 
national institutions affects the behaviour of actors by providing strategic or cognitive 
templates for interpretation and action.
120
 However, the exclusive focus on institutional 
constraints has limited the explanatory potential of these approaches. One of the 
implications of the dominant institutionalist perspective on EU impact is that policy 
actors are reduced to ‘mediating’ factors and deprived of any significant degree of 
agency.
121
 This becomes particularly relevant in the context of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, which is a weakly institutionalised framework. If in the case of 
candidate countries the adaptive pressures encompassed by the accession process were 
compelling enough to assume the unquestionable support of domestic actors for the 
enlargement agenda, the preferences of ENP partners cannot be taken for granted to the 
same extent. Given the absence of a membership perspective, it is more likely that 
national governments will engage selectively in cooperation with the EU, depending on 
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their political agendas. Thus, the agency of domestic political actors in the 
neighbourhood emerges as crucial for an analysis of the EU’s impact in the region. 
Consequently, this thesis removes the analysis of EU impact from the overarching 
institutionalist frameworks employed by the Europeanisation and external governance 
literatures, thus ceasing to assume that the behaviour of actors in response to EU inputs is 
necessarily shaped by institutional constraints. Instead, it is argued that institutions are 
only one of the possible constraints on actor behaviour, in addition to other factors that 
form the broader strategic environment, such as technology or the strategic choices of 
other actors. As such, the approach taken here takes as its primary focus the individual 
agency of national governments in ENP countries and the extent to which the preferences 
of political elites and the strategic setting surrounding them shape the scope for effective 
cooperation with the EU by influencing actors’ choices. This is essentially a rational-
choice approach which relies on rationalist assumptions about the characteristics of actors 
and their social interactions. However, as it will be shown later in the chapter, rational-
choice theory is a general methodological approach whose theoretical assumptions need 
to be substantiated with specific insights provided by mid-range theories that operate at a 
greater level of empirical detail.  
 
The next section presents the theoretical framework of this thesis which draws on 
rational-choice theory complemented by the domain-specific insights of a recent strand of 
literature on the EU’s impact on the Eastern Neighbourhood, itself borrowing from 
Europeanisation and external governance studies. 
2.4. The role of external agency in shaping EU host country 
effective cooperation: a theoretical framework 
The relatively new body of literature which attempts to account for the distinct 
dynamics in the EU’s relationship with the Eastern Neighbourhood takes a more agency-
focused approach, in contrast to typical institutionalist Europeanisation and external 
governance approaches. Thus, while drawing on scholarly contributions to these 
literatures in order to explain domestic changes driven by the EU in the region, the recent 
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analyses re-evaluate many of their assumptions. The result has been a revision, rather 
than a complete overhaul of the understanding and conceptualisation of EU impact. The 
factors previously identified as relevant for explaining EU impact by Europeanisation and 
external governance perspectives were tested against policy developments in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood and the resulting findings emphasised the particularities of the ENP 
context. Among the factors found to hold explanatory power for EU impact in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood are the political preferences of domestic governments
122
, domestic veto 
players
123
, interdependence with Russia
124
 and policy-specific conditionality.
125
 Through 
its focus on the role of the strategic calculations of domestic actors, this strand of 
literature moves away from the structural understanding of EU influence and emphasises 
the role of domestic governmental preferences, thus rebuffing some of the claims made 
by earlier analyses of EU impact.  
For instance, the external governance core institutionalist assumption, according 
to which EU impact is more likely in highly institutionalised and legalised policy areas, 
has been qualified by the recent contributions to the ENP literature. In countering the 
argument that the institutional continuity between the EU’s internal and external norms is 
crucial for effective governance, these studies point at empirical findings which fail to 
confirm the institutional hypothesis. Thus, Dimitrova and Dragneva (2013) show that a 
highly institutionalised area such as the EU’s state-aid policy displays a lower degree of 
convergence by Ukraine than foreign policy, which is a distinctly intergovernmental 
policy sector. In addition, scholars also found some diversity within equally 
institutionalised policy sectors, such as telecommunications and food safety
126
  and the 
EU’s environmental acquis.127 As far as the adoption of EU technical rules by Ukraine is 
concerned, Langbein and Wolczuk find no correlation between strong codification of EU 
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rules and strong rule adoption.
128
 The conclusion that emerges from these analyses is that 
policy-specific factors that merely take account of institutional density and legalisation 
cannot explain the highly selective import of EU governance in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood. The strong hierarchical organisational structures typical of state 
administrations and governmental agencies in former Soviet states makes external 
governance via horizontal and network channels a far-fetched possibility.
129
 This is 
certainly the case for those institutions which EUJUST Themis, EUBAM and EUMM 
work with, such as Georgian rule of law institutions (Ministry of Justice, General 
Prosecutor’s Office, Supreme Court), the Moldovan and Ukrainian border guard and 
customs service, as well as those institutions with security and conflict settlement 
responsibilities (Georgia’s Ministries of Interior and Defence). Instead, authors point to 
the role of domestic preferences and their interplay with external pressures and incentives 
as more relevant factors for explaining the EU’s impact in the Eastern Neighbourhood.  
Despite identifying a number of relevant explanatory factors for EU-driven policy 
change in the region, these analyses fail to clearly specify the theoretical assumptions 
they rely on, as well as the relationship between the different variables. As such, all the 
factors identified are assumed to operate at the same level and to have the potential to 
facilitate or hinder EU impact to the same extent. Thus, the preferences of national 
governments and their compatibility with EU policy objectives – a variable referred to as 
preferential fit – is assumed to influence EU impact in a manner similar to policy-specific 
conditionality or the provision of incentives in the form of capacity-building. As far as 
the theoretical premises of these contributions are concerned, the failure to make them 
explicit has resulted in a confusing combination of assumptions which are not always 
consistent with each other. Thus, despite the advocated emphasis on ‘domestic agency 
and its preferences for change’130 in explicit contrast to the institutionalist-focused 
category of policy misfit, most studies maintain an understanding of the EU-driven policy 
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change processes in the Eastern Neighbourhood as the result of structural adaptation 
pressures.
131
 This thesis aims to be more explicit in its theoretical assumptions. 
To begin with, the approach taken here is not embedded in an institutionalist 
understanding of EU impact, but draws on a rational-choice framework by positing that 
whether and to what extent CSDP missions successfully cooperate with their local 
counterparts depends on the strategic choices of incumbent governments, themselves 
shaped by the interaction between governmental preferences and the broader strategic 
environment. While rational-choice theory acknowledges that both domestic and 
international institutions can partly define the strategic setting within which actors 
interact, it also recognises that there are a variety of other constraints on the actors’ 
ability to make decisions. One of these is without a doubt the strategic choices of other 
actors that populate a given environment. In order to advance their interests and achieve 
their goals actors engage in strategic interactions with other actors, often negotiating or 
bargaining over the terms of cooperation and conflict. In a very encompassing 
enumeration, Moravcsik highlights a large number of factors that can potentially affect 
the outcome of bargaining processes and which can be grouped in three categories: 1. 
Institutional factors such as the institutional setting of an interaction; 2. Information-
related factors such as the level and symmetry of information and the extent of 
communication; 3. Factors related to the other actors in the game such as the relative 
preferences, risk-acceptance, impatience and skill of the negotiating parties; the cost-
effectiveness of threats and side-payments; the cost-effectiveness of alternative policies 
and coalitions.
132
 It is this latter category that this thesis finds as particularly relevant in 
explaining why, given their preferences, domestic governments decide to engage in 
cooperation with CSDP missions or not. The strategic moves of other relevant actors – 
domestic or external – shape the cost-benefit calculations of incumbent regimes in ENP 
countries and thus have a direct influence on the governments’ decisions to cooperate 
with the EU or not. The rest of this section discusses in detail the rational-choice 
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premises that this thesis relies upon and, taking these as a starting point, proceeds to 
outline the thesis’ theoretical framework, including the specification of hypotheses.  
 
2.4.1. Rational-choice theory 
The rational-choice approach has been characterised as a ‘second order’ - or meta 
- theory which advances a set of core assumptions about social actors and their behaviour 
without, however, substantiating these with issue-specific insights that would allow for 
the direct application of the theoretical postulations to the study of particular social 
phenomena, such as European integration or enlargement.
133
 The implication of the 
general character of the assumptions is that rational-choice is ‘wide open in terms of 
specific substantive content’.134 Put differently, rational-choice can be thought of as a 
methodological approach which needs a high degree of specification with regards to its 
unit of analysis and the endogenous, as well as exogenous, elements of the theory before 
it can usefully be employed as an analytical framework. 
The first thing to be clarified when embarking on an analysis embedded in 
rational-choice assumptions is the appropriate unit of analysis, that is: who are the 
relevant actors? As an agency-oriented approach, rational-choice takes the individual as 
the primary actor in society.
135
 This is not to say that aggregate actors such as organized 
groups cannot be subjects of rational-choice analyses, but that ‘it is the purposive, 
intentional, self-propelled behaviour of individuals that aggregate into outcomes: 
structures neither constitute this behaviour nor constitute the actors’.136 To the extent that 
the methodological individualism at the heart of rational-choice theory assumes that an 
analysis should always be able to reduce outcomes to individual actors, structural IR 
theories – such as neorealism – problematically aggregate individual actors at the state 
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level. While the state-as-actor assumption provides scholars with a practical way of 
exploring international relations dynamics, it remains contentious for its ability to ‘black-
box’ domestic developments. IR research has responded to this criticism not by 
abandoning the notion of states as aggregate actors – as problematic as this is for rational-
choice – but by expanding and qualifying it through unpacking ‘states’ into domestic 
components.
137
 In the framework of theories of EU integration, Moravcsik’s 
intergovernmentalism strikes this uneasy balance between treating states as unitary actors 
in their external behavior while acknowledging that internally ‘contention among 
domestic political groups’ is defining for how states behave vis-à-vis other states.138 As a 
result, Moravcsik can maintain that ‘the fundamental actors in international politics are 
individuals and groups’139 while at the same time claiming that ‘political institutions 
permit governments, even if disaggregated, to act “as if” they were unitary.140 This thesis 
subscribes to this position but, given its much more restricted focus than Moravcsik’s 
three-pronged rationalist framework comprising complementary theories of state 
preferences, interstate bargaining and institutional choice, it takes political individual and 
group actors as its unit of analysis without reaching the state-level of aggregation. This is 
because this thesis is preoccupied with the role of domestic actors and their preferences in 
shaping the possibilities for EU influence in the Eastern Neighbourhood.  
This brings into focus a further essential element of rational-choice approaches - 
that of actor preferences. Unlike structural theories which assume that outcomes reflect 
systemic imperatives rather than actors’ motives and intentions, rational-choice 
approaches take actors’ preferences as the cornerstone of explaining behaviour. Thus, 
Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism is based on a conviction that ‘variation in ends, 
not means, matters most’, itself derived from a conception of actor behavior as being 
primarily a function of preferences, not capabilities.
141
 Underpinning the conception of 
the individual actor is the rationality assumption which postulates that actors act 
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according to a goal-seeking and/or utility-maximization logic.
142
 MacDonald breaks 
down the rationality assumption into three components, arguing that: 1. Actors are 
purposeful and goal-oriented agents, in contrast to acting on the basis of social norms and 
expectations; 2. Actors act according to preferences which are consistent, transitive and 
invariant; 3. Actors are driven by a utility-maximization logic which ensures that, in 
choosing between alternative courses of action, they opt for the one that provides the 
greatest benefits.
143
 In addition to these general propositions, rational-choice also makes 
assumptions with regards to the nature of actor preferences, which are typically claimed 
to be material and self-interested.
144
 
The rationality assumption at the basis of rational-choice approaches has long 
been criticised for its rigidity, particularly with regards to the related issues of the self-
interested and material nature of preferences, on one hand, and their exogenous and thus 
fixed character, on the other hand. As far as the former is concerned, it has been argued 
that individual goal-seeking behavior is not limited to ‘self-regarding or material interests 
but can include other-regarding and normative or ideational goals’.145 This broadening of 
the understanding of ‘rational behaviour’ is to be understood in the context of a wider 
range of developments in rational-choice theory which sought to acknowledge the 
shortcomings of the theory in light of indisputable empirical evidence. As such, it was 
admitted that actors do not always seek to maximize their preferences; that institutions 
and culture shape preferences, interests and strategic choices; and that purposeful 
behaviour does not necessarily amount to self-interested behaviour. The notions of thick 
and thin rationality were introduced to distinguish between fixed, self-interested material 
preferences (thick rationality) and a more flexible conception of preferences which 
maintained their stable and transitive character, but abandoned the self-interested material 
character (thin rationality).
146
 While addressing long-standing criticisms that had been 
leveled against the theory, these intellectual adjustments were seen by some as 
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weakening the theoretical foundation of rational-choice and reducing it to the 
specification of a tautological relationship between preferences and behaviour.
147
 Indeed, 
it is difficult to see how one could proceed with the analysis of actor behaviour once 
preferences cease to be conceived of as exogenous: if preferences themselves are shaped 
by behaviour, how can the circular causal argument be broken? Constructivists claim that 
the co-constitutive rapport between structure and agency makes this positivist analysis 
impossible and even undesirable, while rationalist analyses such as Moravcsik’s 
explanation of European integration simply reject fixed preferences in favour of a liberal 
argument of domestically-shaped preferences, without addressing the tautological 
predicament. 
This thesis maintains the thick rationality assumption, as well as rational-choice’s 
original assumption of fixed, exogenous preferences, for purposes of theoretical 
parsimony but also because of the particular focus of its inquiry. Thus, while it is argued 
here that some actor preferences can be endogenous, shaped by identity, institutions or 
cultural practices, it must also be acknowledged that there is a stronger, invariant, type of 
preference – that for survival. This has been variously interpreted as a state’s national 
interest for preserving and/or augmenting wealth, security and power, or, in the case of 
political leaders, the inexorable preference for gaining and maintaining political office.
148
 
Indeed, it is widely accepted that the primary concern of political leaders – overriding 
any other secondary preferences – is survival.149 In subscribing to the thick rationality 
assumption this research makes a necessary concession in admitting the limitations of 
material self-interested and power-driven preferences and the fact that they work better in 
some contexts than in others.
150
 Having said that, this thesis considers that the potential 
for effective cooperation between the EU and Eastern neighbourhood countries comes 
down to the survival strategies of ENP political leaders and is, as such embedded in a 
thick rationality conception.  
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So far it has been established that actors are goal-oriented and that they primarily 
pursue self-regarding material interests. If their preference for political survival is fixed - 
as it is assumed here - and thus cannot factor in any potential explanation of collective 
outcomes, how can these be explained then? In addition to positing methodological 
individualism and goal-seeking behaviour, rational-choice also claims that actors pursue 
their interests under constraints. The environmental constraints imposed on actors’ 
behaviour can be institutional or strategic, but can also result from incomplete 
information.
151
 Rational-choice institutionalism emphasises that both formal and informal 
institutions can constrain individual choice, while game theory underlines the importance 
of strategic interdependencies whereby individual payoffs depend on the choices made by 
others. At the same time, incomplete information can be the result of technological 
constraints. Thus, while maintaining actors and their preferences stable, rational-choice 
seeks to explain outcomes through the existence of constraints.
152
 
Actors’ preferences, together with the environmental constraints they face, shape 
the strategies they adopt in order to achieve previously identified goals. As such, 
purposeful actors act strategically by attempting to come as close as possible to the 
preferred outcome. According to Frieden, it is crucial to distinguish between preferences 
and strategies since actors only have preferences over outcomes (i.e. wealth, preservation 
of territory or sovereignty, political survival), but they do not have independent 
preferences over the means to achieve these.
153
 Strategies follow from preferences but in 
ways that are contingent on the environment.
154
 This thesis conceives of governments’ 
preferences over outcomes as being defined by their domestic motivation to gain and/or 
maintain political power. As such, the preference for political survival is exogenously 
given and cannot be altered by changes in the strategic environment. What the broader 
setting does have the potential to influence however, are the strategies that governments 
adopt in order to ensure the maximisation of their political power. It is assumed here that 
any action that a government pursues – be it a policy proposal, the signing of an 
international treaty or the decision to go to war – is assessed against the objective of 
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maintaining political power. If particular courses of action undermine the regime’s 
political survival, the government can engage in bargaining processes in order to identify 
and negotiate the adoption of those strategies which are most likely to strengthen its grip 
on power.  
 
This thesis identifies three factors that are likely to affect the strategies which 
governments in the Eastern Neighbourhood adopt in order to achieve their fundamental 
goal of preserving political power: 1. the competing strategies of domestic veto players; 
2. the potential for alternative coalitions (Russia, US, other international organisations); 
3. the cost-effectiveness of threats and side-payments.  
 
The rest of this chapter explores the key notion of preferential fit – denoting the 
compatibility between the preference of ENP governments for maintaining political 
power and EU policies - and the conditions under which the three above-mentioned 
factors can shift the strategic calculations of incumbent regimes.   
 
2.4.2. Preferential fit 
As previously indicated, this thesis takes an actor-centred perspective by 
highlighting the crucial role of the preferences of political elites in facilitating or limiting 
the scope of EU foreign policy impact in the Eastern Neighbourhood. The core premise 
of the thesis is that the degree of compatibility between governmental preferences and 
EU policy objectives - the so-called preferential fit directly influences the potential for 
effective cooperation in the context of CSDP missions. The consistent and transitive 
nature of actors’ preferences, as well as the utility maximisation logic implied in the 
rationality assumption at the heart of rational-choice approaches means that decision-
makers are expected to rank preferences ‘according to the degree of satisfaction of 
achieving these goals and objectives’.155 Thus, in light of governments’ preference for 
maintaining political power, their willingness to subscribe to EU policy goals and 
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strategies can be ranked as: high if that policy course is calculated as likely to contribute 
to the regime’s hold on power or even increase it; neutral if the chosen strategy is 
assessed as neither providing benefits (gaining/strengthening power) nor incurring costs 
(weakened/losing power); and low if a particular course of action is calculated as 
detrimental to the governments’ goal of maintaining power. As such, we can speak of 
strong, passive or weak preferential fit between incumbent regimes’ preferences and EU 
policy objectives.  
The importance of compatibility between the EU and domestic environments is 
well-documented, although only from a structural-institutional perspective. As already 
noted, both the Europeanisation and the external governance literatures emphasise the 
importance of ‘resonance’ or ‘compatibility between EU rules and domestic policy, 
institutional, cultural and organisational arrangements.
156
 However, recent contributions 
to the literature exploring EU policy transfer in the Eastern Neighbourhood have 
challenged the thesis of the so-called policy and institutional misfit, which claims that the 
likelihood of successful policy transfer increases with the degree of compatibility 
between EU and domestic structures.
157
 Thus, it has been argued that focusing on 
institutional and policy compatibility is of limited use in explaining EU influence in the 
Eastern Neighbourhood, since all of the Eastern neighbours display a high degree of 
misfit between national policy practices and institutional arrangements and those 
prevalent in the EU, and yet they still experience EU-driven policy change, albeit 
selectively.
158
 Indeed, the Eastern neighbours are notoriously characterised by domestic 
structures that bear the legacy of their Soviet past, rather than reflecting their European 
aspirations. But while this has led scholars to conclude that there is a large gap between 
Eastern Neighbourhood and EU policy practices and institutional arrangements
159
, the 
Eastern governance literature finds that even in the absence of such ‘fit’, EU-driven 
domestic change can still take place provided the political agendas of incumbent regimes 
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are compatible with EU practices and norms in a particular policy area. This is referred to 
in the literature as ‘preferential fit’.160  
Unlike ‘resonance’ which works according to the ‘logic of appropriateness’ and 
assumes that the impact of Europeanisation is mediated by domestic factors that facilitate 
or inhibit persuasion, ‘preferential fit’ responds to the rationalist ‘logic of consequences’. 
Rather than being a result of EU persuasion mechanisms and incumbent governments’ 
perceptions of appropriateness, the potential for effective cooperation between the EU 
and Eastern Neighbourhood regimes is in fact shaped by the cost-benefit assessments of 
ENP governments with regard to specific EU policy objectives. By contrast, the 
institutional and policy misfit perspective fails to take account of ‘domestic agency and 
its preferences for change’, as well as the propensity of domestic actors to also have 
‘positive’ preferences for change rather than simply be cost averse.161 Under 
circumstances of high degree of misfit with regard to institutions and policies, but 
compatibility between the political agendas of incumbent regimes and EU practices and 
institutional arrangements, it is possible to speak of preferential fit, which facilitates 
cooperation with the EU.
162
 Thus, if the political leadership of a host country calculates 
that supporting EU rule transfer in a field such as customs reform will bring political 
benefits (i.e. because it will facilitate a visa-free travel regime with the EU which is one 
of the government’s electoral promises), it will support EU-demanded reforms in that 
field; this would qualify as a case of strong preferential fit This can happen despite 
compliance costs related to the lack of compatibility between EU and domestic policies, 
politics and polities, showing that political benefits surpass structural costs.
163
 
Nonetheless, factors such as the competing strategies of other actors, notably domestic 
veto players, and the existence of alternative coalitions to the EU, can change the cost-
benefit assessment on which perceptions of strong preferential fit are based, potentially 
converting it into weak preferential fit if the new costs introduced are found to be 
prohibitive.  Passive preferential fit can also be effective, as when sector-specific reforms 
correlate with the overall governmental agenda, despite not bringing significant political 
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gains, as long as they do not incur costs. Although weak preferential fit would normally 
indicate a disinclination to adopt EU policy objectives, side-payments can make the 
difference between non-engagement and cooperation with the EU because they have the 
potential of altering the cost-benefit calculations of governments, for example 
transforming weak preferential fit into passive preferential fit by mitigating some of the 
costs of cooperation. The next section explores in detail how the degree of preferential fit 
between incumbent regimes in the Eastern neighbourhood and EU foreign policy goals – 
and implicitly the potential for successful cooperation – is affected by a number of 
intervening factors. 
To return to the key notion of preferential fit, the concept is defined here as ‘a fit 
of preferences over policy outcomes’ which draws on the motivation of incumbent elites 
to stay in power.
164
 Governments in power will pursue the EU’s preferred policy and 
institutional choices if this is seen as advancing their own political agenda or if it 
provides a way of gaining the upper hand over veto players. One of the most important 
considerations shaping the preferential fit of Eastern Neighbourhood governments is the 
strategic alignment of ENP governments with the EU, on one hand, or with Russia (or, 
less frequently, other international actors), on the other hand, because this can affect 
which decisions are the most beneficial or costly in terms of the incumbent regimes’ 
strategies for political survival and power maximisation. Political competition in the 
Eastern Neighbourhood has typically been defined by the strategic alignment of political 
parties and coalitions with the ‘Western’ vector encompassing the EU and the US, or the 
‘Russian’ vector. The Western/Russian political cleavage has grown into more than a 
debate over foreign policy orientation, defining the very dilemmas and conflicts within 
Eastern European societies. Thus, the West/East (or Russian) cleavage is as much about 
foreign policy as it is about the rule of law, economic policy and civil rights and 
freedoms, and defines the identity and policy positions of political actors to a greater 
extent than the traditional right/left or liberal/conservative cleavages. Therefore, in 
assessing the preferential fit of Eastern Neighbourhood governments with the objectives 
of CSDP missions, it will be important to consider the strategic alignment of the regime 
in question with either the West/EU or with Russia. 
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The way in which preferential fit facilitates the impact of EU institutional and 
policy frameworks reflects the mechanism of differential empowerment of domestic 
actors, long identified by the enlargement literature as the main indirect mechanism of 
incentive-based Europeanisation models (in addition to top-down direct 
intergovernmental bargaining). According to the domestic empowerment argument, the 
adoption of EU-inspired reforms can provide different domestic actors with independent 
incentives – such as increasing their power and influence in the political arena – thus, 
changing the domestic opportunity structure in their favour and strengthening their 
bargaining power vis-à-vis their opponents.
165
 However, the EU struggles to empower 
reform-oriented coalitions that aim to challenge governments in power in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood, due to the weakness of civil society, limitations on civil and political 
rights and pervasive corruption within state administrations.
166
 As a result, domestic 
empowerment in the Eastern Neighbourhood does not work through a top-down process 
in which EU reforms represent an institutional framework that exerts pressures and 
creates incentives. Rather, it is the governments who are in the best position to self-
empower themselves by selectively engaging in cooperation with the EU.
167
 Börzel and 
Pamuk illustrate this process with regard to the fight against corruption in the Southern 
Caucasus, showing that in the absence of liberal reform coalitions, the incumbent regimes 
in the region instrumentalise the EU and selectively implement anti-corruption policies to 
the extent that this helps them gain and consolidate political power.
168
  
This thesis assumes that the preferential fit between the preference for political 
power of Eastern Neighbourhood governments and the goals pursued by EU civilian 
missions is crucial in explaining successful cooperation in the context of CSDP missions. 
This is because the preferences of incumbent regimes are fixed, exogenous and therefore 
cannot be changed. Thus, the decision to cooperate with CSDP missions on the ground 
and to take on board their policy recommendations will inevitably be measured against 
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the governments’ intrinsic motivation to gain and/or maintain political power. While this 
fundamental preference cannot be altered, several factors can affect the governments’ 
cost-benefit calculations, that is, their choice of strategies. The next section examines the 
intervening variables which have the potential of modifying the strategic calculations of 
incumbent regimes with respect to the EU missions’ confidence-building and rule 
transfer functions. Drawing on rational-choice theory and recent contributions to the 
Eastern neighbourhood literature, this thesis identifies three factors likely to affect the 
strategies which governments in the Eastern Neighbourhood adopt in order to achieve 
their fundamental goal of preserving political power: 1. the competing strategies of 
domestic veto players; 2. the potential for alternative coalitions; 3. the use of EU threats 
and/or side-payments. These factors have been singled out for their ability to affect the 
cost-benefit calculations of governments with respect to the impact of cooperation with 
the EU on the incumbent regimes’ goal to acquire, maintain and strengthen political 
power.  
Rational-choice theory assumes that actors are aware of the alternative strategies 
available to them and the likely consequences of their choices and, as such, will opt for 
the alternative providing the highest expected utility.
169
 In trying to make a utility-
maximising decision, governments will compare the costs and benefits derived from each 
of the three intervening factors against each other. Thus, are the costs incurred by the 
competing strategies of domestic veto players higher than the costs of external threats 
and/or pressures? If they are, then governments are likely to undertake the course of 
action preferred by domestic veto players rather than the one advocated by external 
actors. The extent to which each of the identified factors is able to influence the strategies 
of incumbent regimes therefore depends on how it compares against the other factors in 
terms of costs vs benefits. This relationship will be captured by the hypotheses developed 
in the following sections which postulate the conditions under which each of the factors 
is likely to influence governments’ strategies. 
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2.4.3.  Choosing strategies:  bringing together preferences and strategic 
settings  
2.4.3.1. The competing strategies of domestic veto players 
Rational-choice approaches place special emphasis on the role of individual 
preferences, assuming that outcomes reflect the nature and intensity of actor preferences, 
but at the same time acknowledge that behaviour is necessarily constrained by the 
broader environment. Among others, the strategies that actors choose to pursue in order 
to achieve their goals (preferences) are constrained by the choices of other actors. This is 
due to the fact that ‘an actor cannot simply choose a course of action that produces its 
preferred outcome because the choices of others also affect that final result’, therefore a 
particular strategy is selected ‘both for its direct effect on the outcome and its indirect 
effect on the actions of others’.170 When it comes to the strategic choices of governments, 
there are a number of actors whose actions and decisions have the potential of influencing 
outcomes and who therefore play an important role in the governments’ decision-making 
process. Referred to in the literature as veto players, they represent ‘individual or 
collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change to the status quo.’171 
Originating in the notion of ‘checks and balances’, the veto player concept has been 
applied to institutional actors such as the President and the bicameral legislature, partisan 
actors ‘generated by the political game’172, but also informal veto players such as 
business networks. Although typically confined within national boundaries, veto players 
can also originate from the ranks of international actors, especially if the envisaged 
change has broader geopolitical reverberations.  
 The literature on the Eastern Neighbourhood has identified the existence of 
multiple veto players (both formal and informal) as a crucial factor affecting EU external 
                                                 
170
 James D. Morrow, ‘The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment and Negotiation in 
International Politics’ in D.A. Lake and R. Powell (eds) Strategic Choice and International Relations 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 77. 
171
 George Tsebelis, Veto players: How political institutions work (Princeton, N.J.; Woodstock: Princeton 
University Press, 2002), 19. 
172
 Tsebelis, Veto players, 19.  
66 
 
governance.
173
 The enlargement Europeanisation scholarship had already highlighted the 
important role played by multiple veto points in domestic structures in mediating the 
transfer of EU rules.
174
 Nonetheless, in the Eastern Neighbourhood veto players emerge 
also as influential informal actors who exert pressure on the governments in power not 
necessarily through constitutional or even political channels. . It has been argued that 
veto players are even more relevant in explaining the scope of EU-driven reforms in the 
Eastern Neighbourhood countries than in the former Central and Eastern European 
accession candidates due to ‘low democratic quality, weak administrative capacities and 
prevalent corruption and clientelism’.175 The fact that the EU’s ‘near abroad’ is afflicted 
by weak rule of law systems, slow democratic reforms and pervasive corruption, as well 
as by the prevalence of state capture by business interests, contributes to  poor 
governance. As a result, the concept of veto players in the neighbourhood must be 
expanded to include a wide range of relevant actors cutting across constitutional, 
institutional, political, economic and regional spheres. It is broadly accepted that EU-
driven reforms can only produce domestic change if the interests of powerful economic 
elites and state authorities are not negatively affected.
176
 
The control exerted by powerful entrepreneurs - the so-called winners of 
economic reform – on post-communist political systems is well documented177 and shows 
the wide reach of these business networks which have the power to block reform efforts 
in order to maintain a status quo that is beneficial to them. These groups are able to exert 
a considerable level of influence on formal state structures where they often hold 
prominent governmental and parliamentary positions, but also by putting informal 
pressure on officials in positions of power. This has been a particularly salient issue in 
Ukraine where oligarchic clans have managed to penetrate the political system to an 
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extraordinary degree and have continued to influence decision-making well beyond the 
country’s initial transition period. An increasing number of scholarly contributions have 
examined the role of veto players in constraining EU-inspired policy change in Ukraine, 
particularly after the 2010 elections which brought pro-Russian President Yanukovych to 
power. Thus, the extensive state capture by powerful business interests in Ukraine 
explains the selective adoption and application of EU rules in the field of technical 
regulation, despite preferential fit between the EU and the Ukrainian government, policy-
specific conditionality and the empowerment by the EU of domestic pro-reform 
constituencies.
178
 The analyses of other policy sectors reveal a similar picture. The 
limited progress in convergence and compliance with EU state aid rules reflects the 
opposition of oligarchic groups and their allies in parliament who would have incurred 
losses as a result of policy change. The reversal in Ukraine’s convergence with EU 
foreign policy decisions after 2010 can be understood in the context of the coming to 
power of Yanukovych and the return of the informal veto players who supported him.
179
 
Finally, the adoption of EU environmental norms by Kiev has been highly selective in 
light of opposition from key veto players in the construction and industrial development 
sectors.
180
 
  Whether influential veto players are able to affect governments’ strategic 
calculations is a matter of the delicate domestic political balance and will have to be 
investigated on a case-by-case basis. So far analyses have shown that rent-seeking elites 
in the Eastern Neighbourhood keenly attempt to maintain control over the political 
system and manage to limit the impact of EU reforms if these threaten their ability to 
exercise such control, even when policy-specific benefits are on the table.
181
 This could 
suggest that policy-specific conditionality may not be able to surpass the overarching 
influence of veto players who have penetrated deeply into the political and economic 
structures of post-Soviet states. On the other hand, if the specific benefits offered by the 
EU are considered attractive enough by the government in power and its overall 
preferences are compatible with the proposed policies, the obstructive role of veto players 
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can be minimised. This is likely to happen at the beginning of a new political mandate 
when the new political leadership is trying to consolidate power and might try to reduce 
the influence of veto players that do not share its preferences, or before elections when 
the incumbent regime might regard compliance with EU-demanded reforms as a 
necessary condition for reelection. 
Veto players are also important when it comes to the confidence-building aspects 
of EU missions. While EU civilian missions are typically involved in confidence-building 
measures that are limited to the technical aspects of conflict resolution, these are 
nonetheless difficult to isolate from the broader political implications of peace processes. 
The existence of various actors who obstruct peace processes because a comprehensive 
agreement would not be in their interest has long been identified as one of the most 
significant sources of peace-making failures.
182
 Peace studies label these actors as 
‘spoilers’ rather than veto players, but the term designates the same core feature 
identified by the Europeanisation and external governance literatures: an incompatibility 
between their interests and the changes brought about by EU-driven reforms or, in this 
case, a peace negotiation process. The literature on the EU’s role in conflict management 
also identifies obstructive local actors as one of the elements of the conflict context which 
is likely to affect the effectiveness of the Union’s ability to be a comprehensive security 
provider. There are, thus, good reasons to expect that domestic veto players will 
indirectly influence the prospect for successful cooperation between EU civilian missions 
and host countries in the Eastern Neighbourhood. Veto players are likely to be one of the 
factors that shape the strategies of incumbent regimes both with respect to the rule 
transfer and confidence-building functions. As EUJUST Themis, EUBAM and EUMM 
all operate in politically sensitive policy areas – rule of law, border management and 
conflict prevention and mediation – it is expected that a high number of veto players have 
been affected by the activities of the missions.  It is therefore hypothesized here that: 
 
H1: The ability of domestic veto players to alter the strategies of incumbent 
regimes decreases with:  
i. the existence and cost-effectiveness of alternative coalitions to the EU 
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ii. the cost-effectiveness of EU threats and side-payments  
2.4.3.2.  The potential for alternative coalitions  
In the context of international cooperation actors inevitably assess the costs and 
benefits of engaging in cooperation with party A as opposed to party B, if the alternative 
is on the table and if the two options are mutually exclusive. This is part of the rational 
utility maximizing behaviour of decision-makers who want to ensure that the chosen 
strategy (cooperating with party A or B) is the most cost-effective way of achieving their 
goals. Keohane and Nye argue in their book ‘Power and Interdependence’ that 
international cooperation reflects patterns of ‘asymmetrical interdependence’, whereby 
countries better integrated in the international trade system and thus more 
‘interdependent’ are expected to make more concessions during interstate bargaining.183  
This is because they stand to benefit more from liberalizing markets and are willing to 
pay a higher price for long-term gains. Similarly, Hirschman offers the example of two 
countries engaged in trade with each other which must stop their business interactions. In 
this situation, if the countries do not value the benefits from trade to the same extent, the 
one which values them more is in a weaker bargaining position and thus has less power.   
Contributions to the literature on the EU’s external governance in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood have acknowledged the importance of the Eastern neighbours’ 
asymmetric interdependence vis-à-vis the EU as compared to their asymmetric 
interdependence with respect to Russia.
184
 If the ENP countries are more dependent on 
Russia than on the EU in a particular policy sector, EU attempts at generating domestic 
change in that sector are unlikely to succeed. Thus, while showing that the EU’s modes 
of external governance are mainly shaped by internal institutional patterns, Lavenex, 
Lehmkuhl and Wichmann point out that when it comes to the EU’s neighbours, 
‘asymmetric interdependence matters’ and power is pervasive in neighbourhood 
relations.
185
  In a similar vein, Dimitrova and Dragneva find that the effectiveness of EU 
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external governance in Ukraine is affected by patterns of interdependence between 
Ukraine and Russia: in trade, where Ukraine is increasingly dependent on the EU but has 
diminishing interdependence with Russia, the EU encounters small barriers to rule 
transfer; in foreign and security policy, where Ukraine’s geopolitical interdependence 
with Russia is significant, there is a clash between the EU’s governance approach and 
Russia’s power politics approach; finally, when it comes to energy, Ukraine’s large 
dependency on Russia, both infrastructural and economic, represents an important 
obstacle for EU governance in this field.
186
 These conclusions, thus, seem to suggest that 
asymmetric interdependence and the power relations that result from it play a particularly 
important role in the EU’s relations with its Eastern neighbours. 
In trying to capitalize on the asymmetric interdependence in its favour, Russia has 
typically used the economic and energy dependence of Eastern European countries in 
order to pressure them into resisting the EU’s influence. Thus, it has been argued that 
Russia is able to interfere with the EU’s external governance in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood by taking advantage of the high interdependence with the former Soviet 
republics and using its leverage to extract policy outcomes that suit its interests.
187
 In 
contrast with this rather simplistic view,  recent scholarly contributions have challenged 
the unqualified assumption that the higher the interdependence between ENP countries 
and Russia, the greater the limitations on the EU’s ability to transfer rules to Eastern 
Europe by showing that asymmetric interdependence in Russia’s favour only undermines 
EU governance under a specific set of circumstances.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Thus, Hagemann finds that Moldova’s customs reform in accordance with EU standards 
was successful despite coercive interference from Russia.
188
 Langbein also shows that 
high interdependence with Russia and Russian strong-armed behaviour does not always 
undermine convergence with EU standards, as illustrated by Moscow’s import ban on 
Ukrainian dairy products which subsequently incentivised Ukrainian producers to adopt 
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EU food standards in order to gain access to the EU market.
189
 In order to explain this 
puzzle, Ademmer draws on Keohane and Nye’s concept of interdependence and 
identifies the specific conditions under which interdependence with Russia restricts or, on 
the contrary, enables EU policy transfer. Following Keohane and Nye’s distinction 
between sensitivity and vulnerability interdependence, the argument made is that ENP 
countries are likely to embark on EU-driven reform processes if they are highly sensitive 
but not vulnerable to Russia.
190
 Sensitivity interdependence refers to the extent to which a 
state is affected by its linkages to the outside world, without changing existing policies. 
On the contrary, high vulnerability interdependence with Russia is likely to undermine 
EU policy transfer.
191
 This is because vulnerability interdependence is a measure of ‘an 
actor’s liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been 
altered’192 and measures the costliness of policy alternatives. Asymmetric 
interdependence, thus, is only relevant to the extent that it can affect the cost-benefit 
calculations of governments when it comes to choosing between cooperation with 
coalition A versus cooperation with coalition B. 
The implication of these findings for the topic explored here is that the potential 
for effective cooperation between CSDP missions and the host countries in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood can be hindered by the latter’s high degree of asymmetric 
interdependence with Russia under a specific set of circumstances. First of all, 
asymmetric interdependence of ENP countries with Russia will only pose a problem for 
civilian missions if their activities are perceived by Moscow as encroaching on its ‘sphere 
of influence’. Russia has typically put pressure on those policy sectors in which it 
benefits from high sensitivity interdependence. In an attempt to raise the costs of the 
missions’ activities for ENP countries, Moscow is thus likely to alter trade and energy 
cross-border flows through rising energy prices and imposing trade embargoes. Under 
these circumstances, the potential for EU civilian missions to successfully cooperate  
ENP governments  will depend on two factors: firstly, the availability of alternative 
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policy choices in the area targeted by Russia, which is the condition which determines 
whether a particular situation is characterised merely by sensitivity interdependence or 
vulnerability interdependence; and secondly, the costliness of adopting alternative 
policies.  
Russia represents the obvious alternative coalition to the EU in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood given its perception of the region as pertaining to its ‘sphere of influence’ 
and its zero-sum foreign policy approach. However, a number of other international 
actors – great powers, international organisations, but also NGOs and other transnational 
groups – can also position themselves as alternative coalitions to the EU if their 
approaches with respect to particular issues in the Eastern Neighbourhood diverge. 
Depending on the specific issue being addressed, the domestic environments of Eastern 
Partnership members can be crowded by a multitude of NGOs, governmental agencies 
and international donors, each with their distinct agendas and approaches to reform 
processes. The demands for assistance from Eastern Neighbourhood governments have 
intensified over the years and so has the participation of a growing number of donors. In 
order to cope with the increasing demand, the EU has taken the lead in organizing 
international donors’ coordination meetings in countries like Moldova, Ukraine and 
Georgia, bringing all the donors on the ground around the table and trying to coordinate 
assistance efforts. While these meetings can be useful in helping to avoid duplication and 
ensure that critical needs are met, a lack of transparency on both the donors’ and the ENP 
countries’ side has meant that coordination has often been limited to the rhetorical level 
and a division of labour has failed to take place in practice. Also, sharing confidence-
building efforts between different donors works only when there is a commonality of 
purpose regarding the precise substance of reforms in a given policy sector. If different 
international organisations disagree regarding the direction and/or content of reforms 
their initiatives inevitably end up being at cross purposes. 
It is perfectly in line with the argument of this thesis to maintain that alternative 
coalitions to the EU will only be considered if they prove to be cost-effective. But what 
shapes the cost-effectiveness of alternative coalitions to the extent that they can influence 
the strategic choices of decision-makers? As already pointed out, the influence of each of 
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the identified factors on the cost-benefit calculations of governments is relative to the 
influence of the other two factors.  It is thus hypothesised that:  
 
H2: The ability of alternative coalitions to the EU to alter the strategic calculations of 
incumbent regimes decreases with: 
i. the cost-effectiveness of EU threats and side-payments 
ii. the number of veto players who support the alternative coalition 
2.4.3.3. The use of EU threats and side-payments  
As strategic utility-maximizers, actors engage in the ‘exchange of information, 
threats and promises’193 during bargaining processes in order to ensure that the 
negotiation outcome reflects their preferences. Coercive strategies that make use of 
threats and aim to pressure negotiating parties by warning against non-cooperation and 
sanctions can be equally effective as supportive strategies that aim to increase the 
benefits available or offset certain costs by offering side-payments. Thus, although the 
EU rarely engages in coercive behaviour, the use of threats or at least persistent pressures 
can be effective if the cost of the expected consequences exceeds the benefit of non-
cooperation. Conversely, if the issue under negotiation is likely to impose considerable 
losses on the host government then the offer of EU side-payments can help alter the 
regime’s cost-benefit assessment and persuade it to engage in cooperation with the EU.  
Given the vagueness that often characterizes the EU’s offer of rewards outside an 
enlargement framework, one of the side-payments that the Union can make use of in the 
Eastern Neighbourhood is policy-specific conditionality. The Europeanisation literature 
exploring the accession of the Central and Eastern European countries is unambiguous 
about the role of membership conditionality in the adoption of the acquis communautaire. 
Numerous studies have shown that EU accession conditionality had been the key 
mechanism through which the Union promoted domestic change during the enlargement 
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negotiations.
194
 At the same time, the lack of a membership perspective was blamed for 
the limited ability of the EU to export its policy and institutional models in the 
neighbourhood.
195
 It was argued that, since accession conditionality had been successful 
in inducing EU-driven changes in Central and Eastern European candidate countries, the 
missing accession perspective for the Eastern neighbours was a crucial factor in their 
weak approximation of EU rules and standards.
196
 Echoing this perspective, 
Schimmelfennig claims that, despite the multitude of factors that predisposes ENP 
countries to weak Europeanisation impact, it is the prospect of membership which 
appears to be an indispensable condition for Europeanisation.
197
 Whitman and Wolff 
agree that it is the absence of substantial benefits coupled with the policy’s focus on 
short-term objectives that erode the credibility of the ENP and deprive it of effective 
leverage.
198
 While the ENP attempts to replicate the success achieved by the enlargement 
policy through conditionality, the modest benefits it offers are not enough to foster the 
costly reforms demanded by the EU. Thus, the almost unanimous scholarly conclusion 
regarding the potential success of the ENP has been that the policy is unlikely to have 
significant external impact in the absence of conditionality backed by a membership 
perspective. 
The external governance approach is predicated on the fact that, in the absence of 
a membership perspective and the associated conditionality mechanism, the EU engages 
in rule transfer beyond its borders through multilateral forms of functional cooperation. 
But the Eastern Neighbourhood literature argues that while membership is not on offer, 
the EU still relies on policy-specific conditionality in order to incentivize ENP partners to 
engage in reforms.
199
 Thus, recent contributions have found that EU conditionality works 
even in the absence of a membership offer, through policy-specific incentives that 
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provide enough benefits for ENP partners to be willing to adopt certain reforms, albeit in 
a selective manner. Policy-specific conditionality links policy-specific rewards such as 
market access and visa liberalisation to the fulfilment of EU reform requirements. By 
pursuing a quid pro quo strategy with respect to policy-specific change, the impact of this 
type of conditionality is understandably more limited than the offer of the ‘big carrot’ of 
accession. But while it is acknowledged that a concrete membership perspective adds a 
‘critical edge’ to EU conditionality processes and facilitates wide ranging reforms, as 
opposed to sector-specific ones, targeted conditionality can be successful in triggering 
domestic change in certain policy sectors.
200
 This is because, in the absence of the 
prospect of membership, ENP governments have different incentives to comply with EU 
demands in various policy fields, depending on the perceived implications of EU-driven 
changes on their own goals (preferential fit). One of the most enticing sector-specific 
rewards that the EU can offer is visa liberalisation, a ‘carrot’ which Eastern neighbours 
highly value and which can bring significant political capital to the incumbent 
government who achieves it.  
In addition to policy-specific conditionality, capacity-building has been identified 
as an important factor in explaining the EU’s impact on candidate and associate 
countries, due to its versatility as a Europeanisation instrument. Schimmelfenning and 
Sedelmeier (2005) argue that the size and speed of rewards is one of the main factors on 
which the cost-benefit balance of Europeanisation depends. Thus, the reward of 
membership is more likely to result in successful Europeanisation than that of 
association, as is a closer date to accession as opposed to a distant membership 
perspective. However, when the membership prospect is ambiguous or long-term, 
intermediate rewards in the form, for example, of trade and cooperation agreements, but 
also pre-accession support, are likely to facilitate domestic change.
201
 In the case of the 
Eastern Neighbourhood, this translates into policy-specific conditionality and capacity-
building. Thus, the EU can mitigate the adaptational costs faced by Eastern neighbours 
when adopting and implementing EU-demanded reforms through policy-specific 
conditionality and the provision of policy-specific capacity building. The two facilitating 
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factors can also support domestic change through an incentive-based mechanism. Just as 
policy-specific conditionality creates external incentives by providing its Eastern partners 
with specific rewards in exchange for reforms, capacity-building can offer financial and 
technical assistance in order to reinforce support for EU policies and differentially 
empower domestic actors.
202
 Thus, capacity-building can work through reinforcement by 
reward and support, by differentially empowering domestic actors who are emboldened 
to support EU-driven reforms as a result to gaining access to additional resources.
203
 
 
The third hypothesis therefore postulates that: 
 
H3: The ability of EU threats and side-payments to alter the strategic calculations of 
incumbent regimes decreases with: 
 
i. the number of veto players who oppose cooperation with the EU 
ii. the existence and cost-effectiveness of alternative coalitions 
 
 
Having outlined the theoretical framework of the thesis, the next chapter provides a 
discussion of the background to the deployment of the three missions examined here. 
This is meant to set the scene for the next four chapters which test the hypotheses 
identified in this chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
The deployment of EU civilian missions in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood: local context and early beginnings 
This chapter provides a discussion of the EU’s involvement in Moldova, Ukraine 
and Georgia prior to the deployment of EUBAM, EUJUST Themis and EUMM, followed 
by an account of the missions’ early stages. The European Union’s use of CSDP 
instruments in the Eastern Neighbourhood is to be understood in the context of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP), but also 
against the background of momentous political developments in the region. EUBAM and 
EUJUST Themis were launched in 2005 and 2004 respectively, in the aftermath of the 
so-called ‘colour revolutions’ in Eastern Europe which brought to power pro-European, 
reform-minded governments. The EUMM was the result of an equally groundbreaking, 
though far from positive, event in the region: the August 2008 war between Russia and 
Georgia. The EU’s three civilian missions in the Eastern Neighbourhood – the only ones 
until the launch of EUAM Ukraine in July 2014 – reflected the Union’s difficulty in 
addressing security challenges at its Eastern border. The region is a source of instability 
given the presence of long-simmering secessionist conflicts and significant levels of 
organized crime, trafficking and illegal migration. Through its CSDP operations the EU 
has tried to address these issues by contributing directly to confidence-building between 
conflict parties, as well as by exporting EU and international regulatory frameworks and 
institutional templates meant to reform domestic institutions in Moldova, Ukraine and 
Georgia.  
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3.1. Background to EUBAM: The EU’s involvement in 
Moldova and Ukraine 
In order to fully grasp the role of the EU’s engagement in Moldova, it is important 
to understand the historical and political context that characterised the country’s 
emergence as an independent state from the Soviet Union. In the second half of the 
1980’s, under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union began a reform 
process which envisaged the country’s gradual opening up (‘glasnost’) and restructuring 
(‘perestroika’). The effect of these democratisation policies in ethnically divided societies 
such as Georgia and Moldova was to give rise to nationalist mobilisations. The Moldovan 
Popular Front’s increasing popularity and its perceived campaign of ‘Romanianisation’ 
and possible unification with Romania triggered the dissatisfaction of non-
Moldovan/Romanian speaking minorities of Moldova.
204
 As a result, both the Gagauz 
Union Republic and the Dnestr Moldovan Republic proclaimed independence in 1990. 
But while order was shortly restored in Gagauzia, in Transnistria the situation developed 
into an episode of considerable violence. A ceasefire facilitated by Russia was concluded 
in July 1992, however, subsequent attempts to negotiate a settlement of the conflict 
invariably reached a deadlock. The conflict parties failed to come to a mutually 
acceptable agreement and international efforts stopped short of achieving a breakthrough, 
all of this resulting in virtually all the proposals made so far being vetoed by one of the 
parties.
205
 
By 2000, it appeared that both sides were largely in favour of creating a ‘common 
state,’ but lacked a shared understanding of the concept. A significant development was 
the commitment by Russia at the OSCE summit in Istanbul in 1999 to withdraw its troops 
and equipment from Moldova and the enlargement of the OSCE mandate in 2002 to 
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supervise this process. Perhaps the most controversial proposal to date has been the so-
called ‘Kozak Memorandum,’ a settlement plan developed unilaterally by Russia and 
presented in November 2003, which ‘would have opened the way to a Russian military 
presence until 2020 and Transnistria’s de facto domination of the whole Moldova’.206 In 
the absence of support from Western countries, the plan was rejected by Moldova’s 
President Vladimir Voronin. This episode marked a major turning point in Moldova’s 
foreign policy, which turned away from Moscow and swung toward the West. Partly 
owing to these internal changes, the negotiations format which included Russia, Ukraine 
and the OSCE as mediators, in addition to the conflict parties, was widened in 2005 to 
include the EU and the U.S. as observers.  
On the background of these developments, the EU’s involvement in the 
Transnistrian conflict was gradually stepped up. The enlargement process set to bring 
Moldova to the EU’s borders, the EU’s increased capability to contribute to stabilisation 
through the CFSP and CSDP and the Orange revolution in Ukraine, all contributed to 
encouraging more EU involvement in the conflict settlement process.
207
 In an attempt to 
put pressure on the Transnistrian leadership, the EU imposed in February 2003 a travel 
ban against 17 Transnistrian leaders allegedly responsible for undermining the conflict 
settlement process.
208
 While pressures through sanctions seemed to have an immediate 
effect, as Transnistria agreed to participate in a Joint Constitutional Commission 
established with the aim of drafting constitutional arrangements for a reunified Moldova, 
this was not long-lived – in 2004 the ban was extended to another 10 officials responsible 
for trying to close down Romanian language schools in Transnistria.
209
 A significant step 
forward was, however, achieved in May 2003, when the European Commission initiated 
and mediated an agreement between Moldova and Ukraine on customs and border 
controls along the Transnistrian section of the Moldovan-Ukrainian frontier.
210
 Also in 
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2003 the EU became an observer to the Joint Constitutional Commission, despite 
requests from the Moldovan government for a stronger involvement and the replacement 
of Russia’s 14th army by an EU peacekeeping force.211 This was the first time the EU 
participated officially in negotiations on the status of Transnistria and, while the initiative 
was not a success, it marked a symbolic change in the Union’s willingness to be part of 
the conflict resolution process. The end of the same year brought what is often considered 
‘the most dramatic instance of EU involvement’ in the development of negotiations, 
namely the intervention by EU High Representative Javier Solana advising President 
Voronin to dismiss the Kozak memorandum.
212
  
Moldova was the first country of the newly-introduced European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) to finalize negotiations on the three-year Action Plan (AP) in February 
2005
213
, followed shortly by Ukraine. The ENP can be seen as a progressive advance 
from the initial Partnership and Cooperation Agreements that defined the relations 
between the EU and the former Soviet republics in the 1990s towards contractual 
relationships which come closer to the pre-accession policy used for Central and Eastern 
European states or the stabilisation and association process in the Western Balkans. The 
Action Plans for Moldova and Ukraine both featured comprehensive lists of priorities 
which included common areas of concern related to democratic standards such as 
strengthening the stability and effectiveness of institutions guaranteeing democracy and 
the rule of law, democratic elections, freedom of the media and freedom of expression. It 
is important to note that both Action Plans raised the necessity for enhanced efforts 
towards achieving a viable solution to the Transnistrian conflict, as well as the need for 
improving border management standards and fighting corruption and that all of these 
objectives were subsequently included in EUBAM’s mandate.214  
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The differences in priorities, on the other hand, reflected the distinct 
circumstances of the two countries. Ukraine was clearly more advanced in its relationship 
with the EU and already preparing for the gradual removal of restrictions and non-tariff 
barriers, establishing dialogue on visa facilitation and the approximation of national 
legislation, norms and standards with those of the European Union.
215
 Interestingly, 
following the Orange Revolution, the EU had been reluctant to renegotiate the AP for 
fear it might be perceived as an opening for a membership perspective. Instead, the Union 
added ‘Ten Points’ to the Action Plan to emphasise its support for Ukraine’s choice to 
pursue wide-ranging reforms.
216
 Ukraine would eventually become the first ENP country 
to start negotiations with the EU on an Association Agreement reflecting the progress 
made by Kiev as well as a deepened relationship with Brussels.
217
 Ukraine’s Association 
Agreement would ultimately become a model for the rest of the ENP partners.  
Following the inclusion of Moldova into the ENP in 2004 and the signing of the 
AP in February 2005, the EU sought to increase its profile in the Transnistrian conflict 
and enhance the coherence of its policy. The Union appointed an EU Special 
Representative to Moldova with a mandate for conflict resolution and the opening of a 
European Commission delegation in Chisinau. The EUSR was invested with three key 
tasks: multilateral diplomacy, representation and mediation and a policy-making role; 
moreover, as a clear sign that the priorities of the EUSR and those of the ENP broadly 
coincided, the EUSR was given the mandate ‘to maintain an overview of all European 
Union activities, notably the relevant aspects of the ENP Action Plan’.218 The first EUSR 
to Moldova was Dutch diplomat Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged, who had previously been 
the special envoy on Transnistria of the 2003 OSCE Dutch Chairman in Office. Among 
the achievements of his mandate are the development of an extensive, high-level network 
in the field and the support for the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in terms of 
contributing to the political direction of the mission and enhancing the implementation of 
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EUBAM’s mandate.219 His succesor, Kalman Mizsei carried forward these diplomatic 
efforts, initiated in 2005, and succeeded in facilitating several important meetings, such 
as the first meeting in seven years between Moldova’s and Transnistria’s parliamentary 
speakers, and a meeting between the Moldovan and Russian Prime Ministers.
220
 At the 
end of 2005 the EU decided to launch EUBAM, a mission which, though not undertaken 
strictly in the context of the CSDP, was meant to ‘play an important role in building 
preconditions for seeking a peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict’ by ‘reducing 
the risk of criminal activities such as trafficking in persons, smuggling, proliferation of 
weapons and customs fraud’.221 In addition, EUBAM was tasked with supporting 
Moldova and Ukraine in approximating EU border management standards. 
3.1.1. Ready, steady, go: the complexities of getting EUBAM off the 
ground 
EUBAM, similarly to EUJUST Themis, is to be regarded as a novelty in the EU’s 
civilian crisis management toolbox. At the time of its deployment it not only had an 
innovative mandate merging border monitoring and capacity-building, but represented a 
unique case of a mission that was neither a distinct CSDP mission (although the EU 
Council exercises political oversight), nor an exclusively EC-managed operation (due to 
the participation of EU Member States).
222
 The idea of a border monitoring mission goes 
back to Moldova’s attempts at persuading Ukrainian authorities to only recognise official 
Moldovan customs documents (as opposed to Transnistrian ones) and the proposal to 
hold joint checks on the Ukrainian side of the border sector under Transnistrian control, 
where Chisinau did not have access.
223
 Having failed to convince the Ukrainian side to 
cease its indirect support for the illicit cross-border activities on this border segment, 
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Moldova turned to the European Commission, leading the latter to facilitate a trilateral 
meeting on 11 March 2003 in Brussels. The meeting resulted in a Protocol being signed 
between the Customs Services of Moldova and Ukraine in Kiev on 15 May 2003 on 
‘Mutual recognition of shipping, commercial and customs documents supply’ in which 
Ukraine undertook to recognise solely goods or cargo bearing Moldovan stamps.
224
 
As with EUJUST Themis, in the case of EUBAM the competitive relationship 
between the Council and the Commission was evident from the early stages of the 
mission. Thus, there are competing accounts of the mission’s institutional origin. On one 
hand, sources in the Council Secretariat claim that the initial plan was for EUBAM to be 
a wholly CSDP operation, whereas Commission sources argue that the mission was the 
result of an OSCE request dating back to 2003 which was eventually resurrected by a 
desk-officer in DG Relex in the context of the Orange Revolution.
225
 Ultimately it would 
be a request from the two countries that initiated the actual planning of the mission. On 2 
June 2005 the Presidents of Moldova and Ukraine addressed a joint letter to High 
Representative Javier Solana and President of the EC Jose Manuel Barroso requesting 
assistance in capacity building for border management on the entire Moldovan-Ukrainian 
border. Specifically, assistance was requested in order to establish an ‘international 
customs control arrangement and an effective border monitoring mechanism on the 
Transnistrian segment of the Moldovan-Ukrainian State border’.226 There was agreement 
at the Commission level and among the member states to respond positively to what was 
considered a ‘unique request’. As a consequence a joint EU Council 
Secretariat/Commission Fact-Finding Mission was sent to Moldova and Ukraine between 
23 and 29 August 2005.
227
 The mission found that accounts of arms trafficking and major 
illegal migration routes were most likely overstated but that vehicle trafficking and 
smuggling of goods were overwhelmingly present.
228
 It recommended that the EUSR’s 
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team be enhanced with border control experts and strongly supported the Commission’s 
earlier proposal to establish a border assistance mission as an EC project. In light of the 
necessity to ensure complementarity between various EU instruments on the ground, it 
was decided that the Head of Mission will also be accredited as Senior Political Advisor 
to the EUSR. Moreover, this move would act as a reassurance to the PSC that it retained 
the political oversight of the overall EU engagement. A further issue highlighted by the 
fact-finding mission was that in order for EUBAM to be deployed, a formal agreement 
between the Moldovan and Ukrainian authorities on the mission’s mandate and tasks was 
necessary.
229
 This took the form of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the 
European Commission and the governments of Moldova and Ukraine which was signed 
on 7 October 2005 by Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner and the respective 
Moldovan and Ukrainian foreign ministers. 
According to the MoU, the overall objectives of the mission were: contributing to 
the implementation of the EU ENP Plans with Moldova and Ukraine and the Council 
decisions on Moldova and Ukraine; developing appropriate operational and institutional 
capacity in both countries in order to provide for effective border control and 
surveillance; contributing to the resolution of the Transnistria conflict by reducing the 
risk of illicit activities and security threats; improving transnational cooperation on 
border management.
230
 On 7 November 2005 Council Joint Action 2005/776/CFSP was 
adopted amending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative for 
Moldova. Accordingly, he was tasked ‘to enhance the effectiveness of border and 
customs controls and border surveillance activities in Moldova and Ukraine along their 
common border, with a particular focus on the Transnistrian section, notably through an 
EU Border Mission’. He was also made accountable, through a support team led by the 
double-hatted Head of the Mission/Senior Political Adviser to the EUSR, for: assuring 
political overview of activities related to the Moldovan-Ukrainian border; analysing 
Moldova’s and Ukraine’s commitment to improving border management; promoting 
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cooperation between Moldova and Ukraine on border issues, with a view to the 
settlement of the Transnistrian conflict.
231
  
EUBAM was launched on 30 November 2005 with an initial mandate for two 
years. For the first six months the mission was financed by the European Commission 
through the RRM (with a total budget of €4 million), in addition to co-financing in kind 
from member states who provided the majority of personnel through the secondment of 
border guards and customs officials.
232
 Initially 69 EU experts were deployed to work 
alongside 40 local staff.
233
 Subsequent phases of the mission saw both an increase in the 
number of personnel and an enhanced budget. In January 2008 the mission comprised 
233 staff, of which 122 were international staff and 111 local staff, and by November 
2009 the budget had been increased to approximately €44.2 million (comprised of €4 
million RRM financing, roughly €16 million provided under the TACIS programme and 
€24 million ENPI financing).234 Following this period of growth, the mission was 
subsequently restructured and streamlined with a confirmed budget of €14.8 million for 
the period 2015-2017 and 80 international staff from 13 EU member States, and 116 
national staff from Moldova and Ukraine.
235
  
The MoU emphasised the advisory nature of EUBAM by making it clear that the 
mission’s staff will not have the authority to enforce the laws of Moldova and Ukraine 
and thus lack any executive powers. Their competences, as laid out in the MoU, included: 
the right to make unannounced visits to any location on the Ukrainian-Moldovan border, 
to be present and to observe customs clearance in progress, to examine and to copy 
customs import documents and supporting commercial records, and to review official 
books and records that do not include state secrets.
236
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EUBAM’s headquarters are in Odessa and the mission has six field offices on the 
Moldovan-Ukrainian border (at Otaci, Chisinau, Basarabeasca, Kuchurhan and Kotovsk) 
and in Odessa Port.
237
 The external management of the mission was entrusted to DG 
RELEX, which initially cooperated closely with the EuropeAid Co-operation Office and 
the EC Delegations in Kiev and Chisinau. The oversight of the programme would 
subsequently be devolved to the EC Delegation in Kiev in order to ensure a smooth 
transition between the RRM and TACIS. Since EUBAM is a Commission-run operation 
and the EC lacks operational capacities, an implementing partner had to be contracted in 
order to technically implement the mission and provide all administrative functions. The 
obvious choice for this role was the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
which has developed something of a ‘symbiotic’ relationship working with the EC on 
similar projects in the region.
238
 The UNDP has significant experience with large and 
logistically complex operations, has public law status, has had a presence in both 
countries and, in addition, has implemented comparable EC TACIS projects (such as the 
Border Management Programme in Central Asia – BOMCA and Belarus-Ukraine-
Moldova Action on Drugs – BUMAD). Nonetheless, as EUBAM grew increasingly 
discontent with UNDP’s costs and rules over recent years, the prospect of changing the 
implementing partner was raised. In addition to being expensive – according to 
EUBAM’s leadership 10% of the mission’s budget was used on UNDP-related costs – 
the UN programme also started displaying less flexibility.
239
 This situation incentivised 
EUBAM to look for a new implementing partner and, as of the end of 2013, the 
International Organisation for Migration (IOM) replaced UNDP. 
Over its lifetime, EUBAM has had 3 Heads of Mission. Hungarian national 
Major-General Mr Ferenc Banfi was nominated as the first Head of Mission and acted in 
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this post until 31 December 2009 when he resigned. He was succeeded by Mr Udo 
Burkholder, a German national with 30 years of experience within the Border Guard and 
Federal Police of Germany, who served as acting Head of Mission from 1 January 2010 
until 18 May 2010 when he assumed the full position of Head of Mission. The current 
HoM, Mr Francesco Bastagli, had a long United Nations career, serving as Assistant 
Secretary-General (2005-2006), Special Representative of Kofi Annan for Western 
Sahara and Deputy Head of the UN Mission in Kosovo (2002-2005), among others. 
EUBAM’s mandate has been extended several times with the current mandate expiring 
on 30 November 2017.  
3.2. Background to EUJUST Themis and EUMM: The EU’s 
engagement in Georgia 
Similarly to Moldova, Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost policies had a 
considerable impact on Georgia in the late 1980s. As Moscow was loosening its grip over 
the Soviet Union’s republics, Georgian nationalism materialised into a series of measures 
that threatened to weaken the autonomous status enjoyed by communities such as the 
South Ossetians and Abkhazians up to that point.
240
 In August 1989 Georgian was 
declared the sole official language of the country and in April 1991 Georgia declared 
independence.
241
 Subsequent decisions such as cancelling the autonomous status of South 
Ossetia and the restoration of the pre-Soviet Constitution of 1921 – which failed to 
specify Abkhazia’s autonomy – triggered armed hostilities in both provinces. While 
ceasefires put an end to violence by 1994, the status of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
still remains unresolved.  
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Conflicts have occasionally re-erupted since the mid-1990s, but it was in the wake 
of the Rose Revolution that tensions intensified.
242
 The relatively stable status quo was 
upset as Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze lost the presidential election to 
Mikhail Saakashvili in 2003 and a series of domestic changes ensued.
243
 The new 
leadership embarked on a state-building and conflict resolution effort which, while 
bringing significant contributions to reforming and strengthening state capacities, did not 
bring about a more democratic polity and to an even lesser degree a solution to the 
conflicts. On the contrary, President Saakashvili’s nationalist agenda of remilitarisation 
and pushing for the reintegration of the secessionist regions led to renewed violence and 
instability in the two break-away territories. Besides intensifying tensions with South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia Georgia was also experiencing deteriorating relations with Russia, 
which worsened after Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008 
and Russia’s subsequent steps towards de facto annexation of these two regions.244 It was 
against this tense background that Georgia tried to forcefully reintegrate South Ossetia by 
sending troops to Tskhinvali in August 2008 and setting off a five-day war with Russia. 
The EU responded promptly and, under the leadership of French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy, brokered a ceasefire within days of the outbreak of the war. While the 
agreement successfully ended the war and Moscow formally withdrew from Georgia in 
October 2009, 3.700 Russian troops each remained in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and 
Russia declared it would keep warships in Abkhazia permanently.
245
  
Prior to the 2003 Rose Revolution, the EU’s engagement in Georgia was 
essentially technical and economic, lacking completely a CFSP dimension which was felt 
would have clashed with Russia’s influence which loomed large over the region.246 
Between 1992 and 2002 the EU’s main instrument for political and economic reform in 
Georgia was the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States 
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(TACIS) programme.
247
 However, in the wake of the positive developments triggered by 
the Rose Revolution and as a result of the EU Security Strategy, which called for a more 
active interest in the region, an EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus was 
appointed in 2003. The mandate of the first EUSR for the South Caucasus, Heikki 
Talvitie, was merely one of ‘assisting in conflict resolution’ and supporting the efforts of 
other actors such as the UN Secretary General and his Special Representative, and the 
OSCE; it also included developing contacts with local actors, strengthening EU dialogue 
with other international actors and assisting the Council in further elaborating a policy 
towards the region.
248
 Despite its limited mandate, this ‘travelling’ EUSR was 
significantly involved in mediation efforts between Tbilisi and the separatist authorities 
of the Adjara region and also contributed to negotiations over the crisis in South Ossetia 
in 2004.
249
 The following years saw the development of a more prominent role of the EU 
in Georgia through the deployment of the first ever rule of law mission in the CSDP 
framework, EUJUST Themis, and the progressive expansion of the EUSR’s mandate. 
In 2004 the three South Caucasian countries (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) 
were included in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Through its Action Plans, 
the ENP provides a framework for integration into European economic and social 
structures by embracing a wide range of issues, its underlying rationale being that of 
promoting political, economic and institutional reforms. The priorities of Georgia’s 
Action Plan are: strengthening rule of law, democratic institutions, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms; improving the business and investment climate through 
a transparent privatisation process and fight against corruption; encouraging economic 
development, poverty reduction, social cohesion and the protection of environment; 
enhancing cooperation in the field of justice, freedom and security; strengthening 
regional cooperation; promoting peaceful resolution of internal conflicts; cooperation on 
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foreign and security policy; cooperation in the areas of energy and transport.
250
 All these 
objectives aim to draw Georgia closer into the EU legislative and regulatory framework 
and at the same time to address what the Union understands as the root causes of 
protracted conflicts: poor governance, economic underdevelopment, poverty and 
perceptions of ‘otherness’.251  
The launch of EUJUST Themis, together with the inclusion of the three South 
Caucasian countries in the ENP, contributed to an upgrade of the role of the EUSR. Its 
mandate was extended to incorporate a locally-based support team to follow-up on the 
activities of EUJUST Themis after the end of its operations in the summer of 2005, the 
provision of support to Georgian border guards and a more active role in conflict 
resolution.
252
 The brief war between Georgia and Russia in 2008 provided the context for 
the EU to acquire a conflict manager role in the region. Apart from its decisive 
involvement in achieving a ceasefire, it took several other steps to strengthen its presence 
on the ground: it appointed a special EUSR for the crisis in Georgia, dissociating this 
issue from the mandate of Peter Semneby, the EUSR for the South Caucasus, and 
deployed an EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) whose objectives included monitoring the 
security situation on the ground and implementing the agreements, establishing contacts 
between parties and informing EU policy.
253
 The EUMM made a noteworthy contribution 
to containing hostilities in the post-conflict area through monitoring the resettlement and 
treatment of internally displaced persons (IDPs), the freedom and security of civilians, 
law enforcement, de-mining and the humanitarian situation in the conflict area, among 
others; however, it has been argued that its role was confined to prevention rather than 
positive contribution to conditions conducive to peace.
254
 The 2008 Georgian crisis also 
saw a more politically salient involvement of the EU as the Union became an official co-
chair of the Geneva process, together with the UN and OSCE, in contrast with its 
previous roles in the context of settlement negotiations (observer status in the Joint 
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Control Commission for South Ossetia and participation in the Group of Friends through 
some of the member states in Abkhazia).
255
 
3.2.1. Rocky beginnings: EUJUST Themis’s rationale and its difficult 
inception 
EUJUST Themis represented a premiere in the EU’s conflict resolution repertoire 
from several points of view: it was the first rule-of-law mission deployed by the EU 
under CSDP and the first ever CSDP operation in the post-Soviet space.
256
 Its rationale 
can be understood as responding to both external and internal imperatives of the EU. On 
one hand, it was meant to show the Union’s support for Georgia’s recently embarked 
upon path of reform and democratisation in the aftermath of the Rose Revolution. A 
security argument was also put forward – although Georgia was considered to be stable 
following the Rose Revolution, it was thought that the situation could easily deteriorate 
and consequently undermine regional security, as well as the democratic process; the 
EU’s presence on the ground through a rule of law mission would arguably contribute to 
embedding stability in the region.
257
 On the other hand, it was considered a good test case 
for the EU’s civilian crisis capabilities in the area of rule of law and it was expected that 
the lessons learned during the mission would be ’developed and implemented in other 
possible future ESDP operations’.258 As the first operation in the former Soviet Union, 
Themis was also thought to be a good test for the EU’s relations with Russia.259  
The possibility of deploying a rule of law mission under the CSDP in Georgia 
emerged for the first time as an informal suggestion within the Estonian Permanent 
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Representation to the EU in December 2003.
260
 The proposal was received favourably, 
enjoying the support of the Irish Presidency. The Council thus decided in March 2004 to 
send an exploratory mission to Georgia to identify potential problems in the Georgian 
justice system and assess the need for a rule of law mission. The exploratory team found 
that Georgia’s justice system was in need of international assistance and recommended 
the deployment of a rule of law mission which would focus on reforms targeted at 
rendering the system more coherent and effective, including the reform of the 
penitentiary system.
261
 Following the advice of the Committee for Civilian Aspects of 
Crisis Management (CIVCOM) to the Political and Security Committee (PSC), a proper 
Council fact-finding mission was sent to Georgia between 10 and 21 May 2004. In 
particular, the mission was to pay special attention to: the added value of a rule of law 
mission to the reform of the justice system in Georgia; the need to ensure coherence and 
complementarity with other EU instruments and international actors on the ground; the 
adequacy of the EU’s capabilities for such a mission; the financing procedures; and the 
security of personnel.
262
 
Despite the mission’s solid rationale and the initial enthusiasm that it was 
welcomed with, its nature, form and structure soon became subject to controversy and 
resulted in a difficult inception of the operation. A first issue of contention was whether a 
CSDP mission was the right framework for a rule of law operation in Georgia. The 
‘crisis’ component of the operation signalled an intervention into an already tense 
situation and, while in the aftermath of the Rose Revolution Georgia’s security was yet to 
be consolidated, the country was hardly ‘in crisis’. This was a position typically 
embraced by the European Commission (EC) who had good reasons to desire the 
deployment of EUJUST Themis outside the CSDP framework. Firstly, the Commission 
was already involved in assisting with justice-related reforms in Georgia. Under the 
Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM)
263
 and the policy advice budget line, the EC 
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Delegation to Georgia had assisted the Ministry of Justice in reforming the Prosecutor’s 
office and the penitentiary system and had provided technical assistance and policy 
advice to the Interior Ministry.
264
 Thus, the Commission preferred enhancing and 
expanding these activities rather than launching a ‘civilian crisis management’ operation. 
Secondly, it regarded the deployment of Themis under the CSDP as an encroachment 
upon its area of expertise, since the international promotion of legal reforms had 
traditionally fallen within its remit.
265
  
On the other hand, there were strong arguments for organising the mission under 
the CSDP and outside the Commission’s framework. To begin with, a CSDP operation 
would have ensured the Council had effective control of the mission, whereas the EC 
outsources its international projects to third parties because it lacks operational capacities. 
Moreover, unlike the Commission’s assistance programmes, CSDP operations can be 
launched rapidly and are able to provide the EU with enhanced visibility due to their 
political rather than merely technical character.
266
 The Commission ultimately lost the 
fight against the launching of a CSDP mission but it continued to defend its reform 
portfolio from infringements from EUJUST Themis. Themis ultimately progressed as a 
CSDP operation and the overall political control and strategic direction of the mission 
was provided by the Political and Security Committee, under the responsibility of the 
Council.
267
 Nonetheless, the EC would keep oversight over the penitentiary reform issue, 
which it regarded as its area of expertise.
268
 This is only one example of how inter-
institutional politics has played out in the overall organisation of the mission and is 
certainly one of the positive instances of Commission-Council cooperation. The 
competition between the two institutions has often generated fragmentation of EU 
engagement in Georgia and, it has been argued, a mandate that did not quite respond to 
the country’s needs.269 
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On 28 June 2004 the Council adopted Joint Action 2004/523/CFSP which 
officially established the EU Rule of Law Mission in Georgia, EUJUST Themis. The role 
of EUJUST Themis was ‘to contribute to Georgia’s stability and transition by supporting 
overall coordination of the relevant Georgian authorities in the field of criminal justice 
reform’.270 The mission’s mandate was generous and provided for assistance to the 
Georgian government in reforming the criminal justice sector, particularly: guidance for 
the new criminal justice reform strategy, support for the Georgian authorities in their 
efforts towards judicial reform and anti-corruption, support for the planning of new 
legislation, support for international and regional cooperation in the area of criminal 
justice.
271
 In fulfilling its mandate, Themis had to ensure complementarity with EC 
programmes and other donors’ programmes. The mission’s structure comprised the Head 
Office in Tbilisi, composed of the Head of the Mission and staff, as well as senior legal 
experts co-located in various rule of law institutions and assisted by Georgian legal 
assistants. The Head of the Mission was nominated on 30 June in the person of the 
French judge Sylvie Pantz. She reported to SG/HR Javier Solana through the EU Special 
Representative for the Southern Caucasus, Heikki Talvitie.
272
  
As far as mission experts are concerned, they remained under the authority of the 
member states by which they were seconded. EUJUST Themis was deployed to Georgia 
on 16 July 2004. A total of eight European rule of law experts were co-located with 
Georgian authorities and were given a one-year mandate to assist their local counterparts 
in evaluating the justice system, drafting a criminal justice reform strategy and 
elaborating an implementation plan.
273
 The European experts were co-located at the 
following key positions within the Georgian authorities: the Ministry of Justice, the 
Ministry of Interior, the General Prosecutor’s Office, the Supreme Court of Georgia, the 
High Council of Justice, the Public Defender’s Office, the Court of Appeal Tbilisi and the 
City Prosecutor’s Office Tbilisi.274 The financing made available by the EU to cover the 
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expenditure related to the mission totalled over €2 million.275 EUJUST Themis comprised 
a planning phase to begin by 1 July 2004 and an operational phase to begin by 15 July 
2004. As part of the former, the planning team would draw up an operation plan 
(OPLAN) based on a comprehensive situation assessment, which had to be approved by 
the Council.
276
 The mission’s operative plan envisioned three consecutive phases: an 
assessment phase, a drafting phase and an implementation-planning phase. Each phase 
focused on specific objectives: 1. the comprehensive assessment of the Georgian criminal 
justice system by Themis; 2. the drafting of a reform strategy by a high-level working 
group composed of local and Themis experts; 3. the formulation of a plan for the 
implementation of the reform strategy by a high-level strategy group again made up of 
local and Themis experts.
277
 Apart from setting out an action plan, the mission’s OPLAN 
was also supposed to provide a benchmarking system ‘to enable a systematic evaluation 
of the mission’.278 The next section assesses the mandate of EUJUST Themis with a view 
to establishing the impact of its functional objectives. 
3.2.2. EUMM: the challenges of post-conflict stabilisation  
The European Union Monitoring Mission to Georgia was deployed as a result of 
the EU acquiring a unique conflict mediation role in the Southern Caucasus. The 
Russian-Georgian war of August 2008 provided an opening for the EU under the 
dynamic French Presidency to become actively involved in peace negotiations and the 
subsequent post-conflict security arrangements in Georgia. On 10 August 2008 the EU 
Presidency, in cooperation with the OSCE, launched a negotiation mission, which 
resulted in the signing of the Six Point Ceasefire Agreement by Russia and Georgia.
279
 
The ceasefire agreement, reached on 12 August and signed on 15-16 August, was loosely 
worded and terse in its provisions: (1) no resort to force; (2) a definitive cessation of 
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hostilities; (3) free access to humanitarian assistance; (4) the withdrawal of Georgian 
military to the places of permanent deployment; (5) the return of Russian armed forces on 
the line preceding the start of hostilities; while awaiting an international mechanism, 
Russian peacekeeping forces will implement additional security measures; (6) Opening of 
international discussions on security and stability modalities in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia.
280
 The agreement thus envisaged the deployment of an international mechanism 
to monitor the ceasefire and the initiation, as soon as possible, of international talks 
regarding the post-conflict security and stability arrangements in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia. On 1 September 2008 the French Presidency convened an extraordinary 
European Council meeting in Brussels, which endorsed the six point ceasefire agreement 
and decided on the deployment of a CSDP mission in order to oversee the 
implementation of the plan.  
In preparation for the establishment of the CSDP observer mission the EU 
dispatched a number of exploratory and preparatory teams tasked with gathering 
information, assessing the needs on the ground and defining the potential areas of activity 
of the prospective CSDP operation. Thus, even before the 1 September European Council 
meeting the Council Secretariat had sent two exploratory teams to Georgia in order to 
assess the situation on the ground and reinforce the team of the EUSR for the South 
Caucasus. In parallel, the Commission dispatched a crisis assessment team, in addition to 
the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) team that had already 
been tasked with monitoring the humanitarian situation in Georgia.
281
 A fact-finding 
mission was dispatched following the 1 September European Council with the aim of 
‘defining the modalities for an increased European Union commitment on the ground, 
under the European Security and Defence Policy’.282 Once the tasks of the future CSDP 
mission were broadly defined and its potential responsibilities identified, a joint 
Council/Commission exploratory team was sent to prepare the mission’s concept of 
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operations (CONOPS).
283
 The six-point plan was followed on 8 September by an 
additional implementation agreement concluded by Russia and Georgia, after intense 
diplomatic efforts by Commission President Barroso and French President Sarkozy.
284
 
Finally, the additional measures agreed upon in order to implement the ceasefire plan 
paved the way for the deployment of the EUMM, by stipulating ‘the full withdrawal 
of Russian peacekeeping forces from the zones adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
to pre-conflict lines […] within 10 days after the international mechanism is in place, no 
later than October 1, 2008 […] involving no less than 200 EU observers’.285 As a result, 
the Council Secretariat dispatched an advance team to prepare the deployment on the 
ground and the EC Delegation and the EUSR for the South Caucasus team in Tbilisi 
facilitated and coordinated the various EU actors in the field. 
286
 
The input provided by the multitude of exploratory, fact-finding and preparatory 
teams sent to Georgia prior to the EUMM’s deployment contributed to defining the 
mandate of the mission and the drafting of the Joint Action (JA) which represented its 
legal basis. The EUMM was given a broad mandate to ‘contribute to stabilisation, 
normalisation and confidence building whilst also contributing to informing European 
policy in support of a durable political solution for Georgia’ through civilian monitoring 
of the parties’ actions, including full compliance with the six-point Agreement.287 Over 
200 civilian monitors were tasked with monitoring compliance of the Agreement by all 
sides, mainly through 24h patrols particularly in the areas adjacent to the South Ossetian 
and Abkhazian Administrative Boundary Lines (ABLs), observing the situation on the 
ground and reporting on incidents.  
Within only two weeks of the adoption of the JA the EU was able to deploy the 
EUMM on the ground, enabling monitors to begin patrols on 1 October 2008. The 
mission’s field presence consisted of its Headquarters in Tbilisi and four regional offices 
in Tbilisi, Gori, Kashuri and Zugdidi, although some of these would subsequently be 
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relocated. The monitors initially came from 22 member states (but gradually came to 
cover all EU member states) and consisted largely of police recruits. While this diversity 
had the potential of equipping the mission with a broad range of skills and experience, the 
initial strategy of organising the patrols around national contingents meant that the unique 
skills of robust Italian Carabinieri could not be combined with those of national 
contingents more used to community policing.
288
 As the mission was purely civilian and 
lacked any executive powers, the monitors were unarmed and their prerogatives were 
limited to monitoring and reporting activities rather than the actual provision of security.  
The immediate task of the EUMM was to oversee the withdrawal of Russian 
forces from Georgian territory that they had occupied during the August war. The 
withdrawal process proved to be highly challenging given that, in the aftermath of the 
ceasefire, ‘Russia not only failed to withdraw, it expanded territory under its control 
beyond the pre-war conflict zones’ occupying as many as 51 villages it did not control 
before the war, according to the Georgian government.
289
 In addition, although the 
EUMM was mandated to cover the whole territory of Georgia within the country’s 
internationally recognised borders, Russia and the de facto authorities in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia have so far denied mission representatives access to the breakaway 
territories.
290
 Therefore, the mission is unable to perform monitoring actions on the 
territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, a limitation that reduces its potential impact on 
the security situation around the ABLs. As a result, the six-point agreement has not been 
fully implemented to this day (specifically point 5 remains to be implemented) because of 
Russia’s refusal to withdraw its military personnel and equipment from both South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia.
291
 As far as Moscow’s position on the issue is concerned, it 
considers point 5 of the six-point agreement superseded by its recognition of South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia.
292
  
                                                 
288
 Mary Martin, ‘Crossing boundaries: The European Union Monitoring Mission to Georgia’, In M. Martin 
and M. Kaldor (eds) The European Union and human security (London, New York: Routledge, 2010), 134. 
289
  David L. Phillips, ‘Implementation Review: Six Point Ceasefire Agreement between Russia and 
Georgia’, National Committee on American Foreign Policy and the Institute for the Study of Human 
Rights, August 2011, 10. 
290
 EUMM, available at: http://www.eumm.eu/en/about_eumm, accessed on 30 April 2014. 
291
 European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM), available at: 
http://www.eumm.eu/en/about_eumm, accessed on 30 April 2014.  
292
 Fischer, ‘The European Union Monitoring Mission’, 383. 
99 
 
In addition to its tasks related to the monitoring of security developments, the 
mission also tackles issues related to the normalisation process including the monitoring 
of the resettlement and treatment of internally displaced persons (IDPs), the freedom and 
security of civilians, law enforcement, de-mining and the humanitarian situation in the 
conflict area, among others; however, it has been argued that its role was confined to 
prevention rather than positive contribution to conditions conducive to peace.
293
 The 
mission’s significance is also enhanced by being the only internationally mandated 
presence in Georgia after Russia succeeded in preventing the continued operation of the 
UN and OSCE missions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, respectively.
294
 The EUMM also 
participates in the Geneva talks which include Georgia and Russia, as well as the US, 
UN, OSCE and EU as international mediators. The mission is meant to provide the 
negotiation forum with objective, impartial information regarding security developments 
on the ground, thus providing a factual basis for further discussions. However, the 
Geneva talks have found it difficult to promote confidence-building between conflict 
parties. The constant re-emergence of the issue of ‘recognition’ of the two breakaway 
regions as an irreconcilable difference between Georgia on one hand, and Russia, South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia, on the other hand, has meant that negotiations have not succeeded 
in making significant progress.   
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Chapter 4 
The EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and 
Ukraine: building working relationships through 
confidence-building 
EUBAM does not have a specific mandate to engage directly with the conflict 
parties in the context of confidence-building measures
295
 and its activities in this area 
have been largely ad hoc, depending on the needs and willingness of the Moldovan and 
Transnistrian parties to cooperate. Its contribution to the settlement of the Transnistrian 
conflict, as formulated under the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the 
Moldovan and Ukrainian Presidents in 2005, was envisaged as the indirect result of 
enhanced border control which was expected to curb illegal cross-border activities and 
lead to a subsequent improvement in the regional security situation. However, given its 
vagueness, EUBAM’s mandate has been variously interpreted to accommodate the 
changing circumstances on the ground and to provide the mission with the opportunity to 
engage in those areas where it could be most effective. The mission was believed to be in 
a strong position to provide support to confidence-building measures with regard to the 
Transnistrian conflict given its presence and expertise on the ground, as well as its 
network of contacts at technical level among Moldovan, Transnistrian and Ukrainian 
transport and customs officials. The lack of a formal mandate to cooperate directly with 
the Transnistrian authorities has nonetheless meant that the mission’s confidence-
building initiatives take place in an ad hoc manner rather than being embedded in a well-
structured institutional framework. Thus, EUBAM’s role in this area includes 
establishing contacts between relevant actors, providing practical solutions to customs, 
trade and transportation issues between Moldova and Transnistria and assisting with the 
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implementation of the Joint Declaration which introduced a new customs regime at the 
Moldovan-Ukrainian border in 2006.
296
  
Being a purely advisory mission who lacks executive powers, EUBAM is not 
involved in the political negotiation process under the 5+2 format, but its confidence-
building work is coordinated with the overall political effort to settle the conflict. By 
monitoring the implementation of the Joint Declaration and supporting the Moldovan, 
Transnistrian and Ukrainian parties in their efforts to resolve customs, trade and 
transportation issues, the mission is effectively involved in ‘economic confidence-
building’ which ‘entails a positive policy of assuring economic security and linking the 
adversaries by means of material ties’.297 EUBAM’s role in the conflict settlement 
negotiations consists of providing support to technical confidence-building measures 
between Moldovan, Transnistria and Ukraine , including the organisation of meetings, 
roundtables, trainings and study tours for customs experts and drafting technical 
evaluations and recommendations to address outstanding issues such as railway traffic 
and border demarcation.  
The rest of this chapter explores EUBAM’s two most prominent confidence-
building achievements, outlining the mission’s contribution to the resolution of some of 
the most protracted practical issues that impeded cooperation between Moldova, 
Transnistria and Ukraine – the implementation of a new customs regime at the Ukrainian-
Moldovan border and the resumption of railway traffic through Transnistria. At the same 
time, this chapter will seek to identify the conditions under which cooperation between 
EUBAM and the Moldovan, Transnistrian and Ukrainian parties was possible by 
investigating when relevant parties to a conflict can be expected to participate in 
confidence-building measures. Given the preferential fit assumption, cooperation is 
expected only if EUBAM’s confidence-building recommendations are perceived as 
beneficial, or at the very least as not detrimental, to the Moldovan and Ukrainian 
governments’ and the Transnistrian de facto authorities’ goal of strengthening political 
power. Whether Moldovan, Transnistrian and Ukrainian political elites will choose a 
strategy of cooperation or not will depend on the influence of veto players, alternative 
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coalitions and, EU threats and side-payments on their cost-benefit calculations. The 
chapter establishes whether and under what circumstances these factors alter the 
governments’ strategic calculations in light of their fixed preferences for power. 
 
4.1. The Joint Declaration: implementing the customs regime 
at the Moldovan-Ukrainian border  
EUBAM’s involvement in monitoring the implementation of the Joint Declaration 
(JD) on establishing effective border control on the Moldovan-Ukrainian border 
represents perhaps its highest-profile operational activity.
298
 At the end of 2005, one 
month after the deployment of EUBAM, the Prime Ministers of Moldova and Ukraine 
signed a Joint Declaration on the effective implementation of the customs regime on their 
common border, in a renewed push to curb illegal trade activities from Transnistria. 
Essentially, the JD ‘provides a legal framework for companies based in the Transnistrian 
region of the Republic of Moldova to perform import and export business, while 
maintaining the integrity of the customs territory of Republic of Moldova under the 
control of the Chisinau authorities’.299 Moldova’s attempts at introducing a new customs 
regime at its border with Ukraine had been ongoing for several years, with each initiative 
undermined by vested interests in Ukraine and Transnistria, where considerable profits 
were allegedly being made as a result of smuggling across the Transnistrian segment of 
the border.
300
  
In 2001 Presidents Voronin and Kuchma concluded an agreement on the creation 
of joint customs posts and the withdrawal of old customs stamps by Kiev. However, this 
resulted in nothing more than claims by Ukrainian officials that ‘nothing in international 
and national legislation obliges [them] to block the introduction of Transnistrian goods in 
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the Ukrainian territory without new stamps’.301 Under growing international pressure, a 
further protocol was signed in May 2003 under which Ukraine committed to allow on its 
territory only goods from Transnistria that carried Moldovan customs stamps. But despite 
the formal agreement, Kiev continued to tolerate illegal trade from Transnistria much to 
the exasperated frustration of Chisinau. Efforts at establishing legal trade across the 
Moldovan-Ukrainian border continued after the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, but 
the implementation of the new customs regime only entered into force following 
EUBAM’s deployment and the signing of the Joint Declaration. In effect, the JD does not 
stipulate new regulations but it undertakes to re-implement the previously agreed upon 
customs protocol signed by Moldova and Ukraine in 2003, which had not been enforced 
by Ukraine.  
The implementation of the customs regime is of crucial importance for Moldova. 
By registering with the Moldovan authorities, Transnistrian businesses can operate 
legally, thus contributing to increasing Chisinau’s customs revenues and curbing 
smuggling and illegal cross-border activity. In addition to improving Moldova’s 
oversight of foreign trade activities from Transnistria, the JD has provided Transnistrian 
businesses with significant incentives for operating within the legitimate Moldovan legal 
framework: by adhering to the framework set up by the JD, Transnistrian operators enjoy 
a system of trade preferences such as lower tariffs or duty free on the goods they 
export.
302
 This is because, under these conditions, Transnistrian exporters enjoy the 
Autonomous Trade Preferences (ATP) regime granted to Moldova by the EU. The 
number of Transnistrian companies that have registered with the State Register Chamber 
of Moldova has increased steadily from 380 in 2007 to more than double - 769 - in 
2012.
303
 In 2012 the Moldovan government amended legislation which regulated the 
registration of Transnistrian economic operators and the reimbursement of customs duties 
for imported goods to allow Transnistrian companies which are not registered with 
Moldovan authorities to also clear goods with the Moldovan Customs Services without 
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having to pay customs duty and VAT.
304
 As a result of these sustained measures, almost 
all Transnistrian exporters are currently registered with the Moldovan authorities and 
more than 50% of Transnistrian exports now go to the EU.
305
 The new customs regime 
has thus contributed to a degree of economic integration between Moldova and 
Transnistria, with both of them operating under the same legal framework and displaying 
similar trading patterns. 
Given its non-executive, advisory mandate, EUBAM’s role is limited to 
monitoring the implementation of the Joint Declaration, rather than contributing to its 
enforcement. The mission has provided advice to implementing partners and has 
particularly supported the Moldovan authorities in collecting statistics on the processes of 
registration and reimbursement, providing regular reporting of its findings.
306
 It has also 
provided oversight of foreign trade activities by Transnistrian companies in order to 
ensure compliance with the necessary conditions for the ATP regime, as well as 
increasing the capacity of the Moldovan customs service to verify the origins of goods.
307
 
EUBAM has also brought its own contribution to improving the existing customs regime 
by developing technical proposals meant to facilitate legal trade from and to Transnistria, 
such as in the area of clearance of goods imported by the breakaway region.
308
 The 
mission has been instrumental in monitoring the correct implementation of the terms of 
the Joint Declaration, with EUBAM monitors present at the border in order to observe 
compliance with the agreed procedures and take note of any technical issues that arose, as 
well as offer advice and assistance when appropriate.
309
 As a result, EUBAM has been 
credited with being ‘directly responsible for increasing transparency in trade involving 
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the Transnistrian region’310 and thus making a significant contribution to establishing 
effective border control on the Moldovan-Ukrainian border. 
The presence of the mission has undoubtedly played a crucial role in the 
implementation of the customs regime under the terms defined by the JD, particularly as 
far as Ukraine’s compliance is concerned. Despite previous attempts at enforcing jointly 
agreed customs regulations on the Transnistrian segment of the Moldovan-Ukrainian 
border, Ukraine had always failed to respect its obligations. It was only after EUBAM 
became involved in the implementation process and Kiev came under increasing pressure 
from the international community, that Ukraine observed its responsibility to ensure the 
legality of trade to and from Transnistria. Thus, the mission itself noted that by 2010 ‘the 
UASCS continues to fulfil the provisions of the JD ensuring that the entry of cargo into 
UA [Ukraine] bears the relevant registration, export stamps and customs clearance 
carried out by MDCS’.311  
Through its role in monitoring the implementation of the customs regime between 
Moldova and Ukraine, EUBAM has contributed to confidence-building between the two 
neighbours in a number of ways. The mission has been highly successful in supporting 
Moldova and Ukraine to develop mechanisms for information exchange and joint risk 
analysis.
312
 For the purposes of ensuring that the export and import activities of 
Transnistrian companies take place under Chisinau’s customs authority, effective 
cooperation between Moldova and Ukraine is crucial. The observance of the Joint 
Declaration has achieved its main purpose of bringing as much of the Transnistrian 
business sector as possible under Moldova’s legal framework. As a technical measure, it 
has contributed to a certain degree of economic integration between Moldova and 
Transnistria, however, there can be no genuine re-integration between the two entities in 
the absence of mutual political will. The fact that the JD’s success in determining an 
increasing number of Transnistrian companies to register with the Moldovan authorities 
has taken place in the face of Tiraspol’s fierce opposition means that in reality little 
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confidence has been built between the two parties.  While the Moldovan government was 
keen to return Transnistria’s business activity under its control, Tiraspol strongly opposed 
the measure which would have deprived it of significant revenues from illegal trade.  
 
4.2. Setting the scene: unpacking the political agenda of the 
Ukrainian government 
For the first four years of EUBAM’s operation on the ground, Moldova was led 
by a communist government turned pro-European which was broadly supportive of EU 
integration but did not make significant efforts to advance reforms. In March 2005 
Vladimir Voronin and his Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) 
gained re-election on a pro-European platform, following a previous mandate (2001-
2005) which had been characterised by strong pro-Russian inclinations. One of the 
reasons for the change in foreign policy focus was a strong wave of public discontent 
with the introduction of Russian as a second official language that resulted in large street 
demonstrations between January and April 2002.
313
 But the main development that 
emboldened Voronin to seek a rapprochement with the EU was the failed Kozak 
Memorandum of 2003 which the Moldovan President initially endorsed only to change 
his mind as a result of pressure from the international community.
314
 Understanding the 
change in public mood as well as the political leverage offered by an EU-oriented foreign 
policy, Voronin and a significant part of PCRM 
315
 quickly shifted to advocating for 
closer relations with Brussels and the initiation of a broad reform programme. However, 
despite being enticed by the potential geopolitical benefits of closer integration with the 
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EU, the communist leadership lacked the political commitment to press ahead with 
reforms and its achievements remained modest.
316
  
The support for EUBAM, nonetheless, can be said to stand out as exceptionally 
strong among the political elites in Chisinau
317
 and is to be attributed to Moldova’s hope 
that the presence of the mission on the ground could incentivise Ukraine to comply with 
the jointly agreed customs regime. Being able to control the trade activities of 
Transnistrian businesses was of vital importance for Moldova. Not only did the 
registration of Transnistrian companies with Moldovan authorities enhance Chisinau’s 
customs revenues, but it also consolidated its claim to sovereignty over the separatist 
region, both of which were key objectives of the government.
318
 If Moldova’s adherence 
to the Joint Declaration and support for EUBAM’s role in implementing it were to be 
expected in light of its previous efforts at bringing Transnistrian trade under its authority, 
Ukraine’s acquiescence is more puzzling. Given that Ukraine had previously not only 
agreed but also formally committed to implement the customs regime required by 
Chisinau and failed to do so on a number of occasions, what explains Kiev’s enforcement 
of the Joint Declaration? Consistent with the argument of this thesis, Ukraine’s 
implementation of the JD can be explained by the ability of external pressures to make 
non-cooperation prohibitively costly for the Ukrainian government and thus transform 
weak preferential fit into strong preferential fit. This was possible, on one hand, because 
Russia was not deemed to be a viable alternative and, on the other hand, because the cost 
of ignoring external pressures was assessed as higher than that of not conceding to the 
strategies of veto players. As a result, the acceptance of the conditions of the customs 
regime framework, including EUBAM’s monitoring functions, was the optimal strategy 
for the Ukrainian government given its preference for maximising political power.  
This cost-benefit calculation must be understood in the context of the strategic 
alignment of the incumbent regime vis-à-vis the two competing foreign policy 
alternatives: the West/EU, on one hand, and Russia, on the other hand. A regime that 
came to power on a pro-European platform, such as the Yushchenko government, would 
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most likely suffer politically if it was seen to act against the EU’s policy 
recommendations. At the same time, while the Yanukovych government (as of March 
2006) was not similarly bound by pro-European electoral commitments – on the contrary, 
it had come to power on pledges to mend the relationship with Russia
319
 – the early 
stages of its mandate were characterised by a more balanced approach and a willingness 
to continue close cooperation with the EU.  
The timing of EUBAM’s deployment at the end of 2005 was particularly 
auspicious, coinciding with the aftermath of the Orange Revolution and a re-affirmation 
of pro-EU sentiments across the region. In Ukraine the presidential elections of 
December 2004 brought Viktor Yushchenko to power on a Euro-Atlantic integration 
election platform. In addition to the overall pro-EU orientation of this new leadership, the 
government specifically supported EUBAM and agreed to enforce the re-introduction of 
the new customs regime monitored by the mission. As the rest of this section will show in 
detail, in light of Kiev’s previous hesitation to cooperate with Moldova on the 
management of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border, the new leadership was keen to improve 
its international image and show that it was a committed partner in the conflict resolution 
process in Transnistria. Although Ukraine was to experience a long period of political 
turmoil and instability, the country maintained its pro-Western course during 
Yushchenko’s presidency. The new political elites were fully aware of how, in President 
Yushchenko’s words, Ukraine ‘was stretched Christ-like on a cross, crucified between 
West and East’, but it was the pro-EU choice that ensured the political survival of the 
new leadership and EUBAM was part of this.
320
 The European strategic choice 
represented a mechanism of legitimation and credibility which validated Yushchenko and 
his political allies in the eyes of the ‘Orange’ electorate. 
This broad pro-European consensus threatened to be upset in the spring of 2006 
when, due to inconclusive parliamentary election results, the leader of the Party of 
Regions Viktor Yanukovych was nominated as Prime Minister. His nomination raised 
fears of a change in Ukraine’s pro-Western orientation and a return to closer relations 
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with Russia. While not signaling a complete turnaround in Kiev’s foreign policy, 
Yanukovych’s premiership and the early stages of his subsequent presidency (from 2010 
onwards) marked a period of difficult attempts to maintain a balance between the 
European and Russian vectors.
321
 As elaborated further in this section, Yanukovych’s 
coming to power shed doubt over Ukraine’s commitment to continue implementing the 
Joint Declaration with Moldova. But while the agreement itself would likely not have 
been signed if Yanukovych had been in power in 2005, by 2010 the facts on the ground 
(i.e. an increasing number of Transnistrian companies registering with the Moldovan 
authorities, the anticipated end of Smirnov’s rule) did not conclusively indicate that a 
change in policy would bring significant political benefits.
322
 
The unique dynamics created by the coming to power of the ‘Orange camp’ 
together with the unprecedented focus of the international community on political 
developments in Ukraine contributed to a context in which a failure to observe the JD 
would have incurred prohibitively high political costs for Yushchenko’s government. 
Viktor Yushchenko came to power in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution on a pro-
Western platform which strongly endorsed an EU and NATO perspective for Ukraine. 
One of the first foreign policy initiatives of the newly elected President was the so-called 
‘Yushchenko plan’ - a comprehensive plan for the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict 
which proposed a special legal status for the Transnistrian region within Moldova and 
envisaged free and fair elections of the Transnistrian Supreme Soviet under international 
monitoring.
323
 It was against this background that Ukraine also welcomed the deployment 
of EUBAM and renewed its commitment to implement the customs regime agreed upon 
with Moldova in 2003.  
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4.2.1. Explaining the implementation of the customs regime at the 
Moldovan-Ukrainian border: costly external pressures 
Despite the seemingly favourable context for cooperation with the EU, the 
enforcement of the JD raised different challenges for the Ukrainian government. To be 
sure, the implementation of the customs regime was a painful measure for Ukraine. The 
country suffered significant financial losses both as a result of diminished and/or more 
costly trade with Transnistria and the reduced profitability of its investments in the 
breakaway region (i.e. the Ribnita metallurgy plant).  The government’s determination to 
enforce the provisions of the Joint Declaration despite its clear disadvantages puzzled 
some of those familiar with the situation, such as Russian Special Envoy for Transnistria 
Valery Nesterushkin who claimed that the only possible explanation was that ‘someone’ 
had made the Ukrainians an ‘offer they could not refuse’.324 But while the economic 
costliness of the new customs regime did not necessarily translate in political costs – 
especially as the government could shield itself behind the EU’s demands – the strong 
opposition from veto players threatened to destabilise even further an already fragile 
governing coalition. As such, the competing strategies of veto players who opposed the 
JD in no ambiguous terms affected the cost-benefit calculations of the government to a 
considerable extent. The diverse political leadership rallied around Yushchenko was 
willing to avoid the implementation of an agreement that had negative repercussions on a 
host of domestic actors (notably those who benefitted from the illegal trade with 
Transnistria) for as long as possible, particularly since the enforcement of the JD did not 
bring any obvious immediate benefits. This strategy of countering a potential backlash 
from domestic veto players by making declaratory commitments but failing to put them 
into practice led to a protracted implementation process.
325
 As a result, Ukraine’s 
commitment to implement the customs regime did not come by easily and a number of 
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attempts at re-introducing the 2003 protocol failed. This was as much a consequence of 
opposition from internal veto players as well as the government’s own hesitations.326 
Having taken steps at enhancing Ukraine’s involvement in the conflict settlement 
process, the Yushchenko government tried to present itself as a balanced mediator giving 
equal consideration to the interests of the Moldovan and Transnistrian parties.  Kiev was 
therefore reluctant to introduce strict border controls for fear of alienating the 
Transnistrians and attempted to postpone the implementation of the new rules as much as 
possible. Despite Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko signing a governmental decision on 
26 May 2005 and two orders stipulating the entry into force of the 2003 protocol within 
45 days, the regime at the border remained unchanged for the next six months and 
Transnistrian goods could still transit without Moldovan custom stamps.
327
 The final 
straw came when, despite having signed the Joint Declaration with Moldova and agreeing 
to re-instate the customs regime on the common border as of 25 January 2006, Kiev 
continued to ignore its obligations.  
The government came under intense criticism from both the EU, who was directly 
involved in the process through EUBAM, and the US. The issue was raised not only by 
diplomats on the ground such as the EUSR to Moldova Adrian Jacobovits de Szeged but 
also at higher political level by EU High Representative for the CSDP Javier Solana and 
US Deputy Secretary of State David Kramer.
328
 In the face of such a resolute reaction 
from the international community and with a few weeks left until the 26 March 2006 
parliamentary elections, the government ultimately caved in and started implementing the 
terms of the Joint Declaration on 3 March 2006.
329
 The border regime continued to be 
challenged by domestic veto players even after the Ukrainian government’s decision to 
implement the customs protocol with Moldova. The Ukrainian border guards and 
customs service opposed the customs agreement and EUBAM’s presence on the border, 
notably because they reduced opportunities for corruption. The UASBGS and UASCS 
reportedly even put pressure on the National Security and Defence Council (NSDC) to 
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‘do away with both EUBAM and the customs agreement.’330 Of the political parties, 
Yanukovych’s opposition Party of Regions was the main voice criticising the customs 
regime, arguing that its provisions were not in line with international trade practice which 
does not require companies to have special registration or export permits and stamps in 
order to export their goods.
331
 In agreeing to enforce these measures, Party of Regions 
representatives argued, Ukraine was merely giving in to Moldova’s unreasonable 
demands.
332
  
The position of the Party of Regions naturally created unease about Ukraine’s 
commitment to the JD when the parliamentary elections of March 2006 delivered an 
inconclusive result, triggering the nomination of Viktor Yanukovych as Prime Minister. 
Yanukovych’s support for the enforcement of the Moldovan-Ukrainian customs protocol 
was at best ambiguous. The new Prime Minister had been Yushchenko’s Orange 
Revolution rival and his image had been badly tarnished by the events in late 2004. With 
a reformed profile and new political goals, Yanukovych was now keen on changing his 
reputation in the EU and US as ‘a pro-Russian, non-democratic oligarch’.333 On the other 
hand, he remained under significant pressure from his own party, as well as Russia and 
Transnistria, to reverse or at least modify the customs regime. When asked by an 
American diplomat whether a Regions-led government would support maintaining the JD 
in force, Yanukovych’s answer was evasive and made his interlocutor ‘nervous’.334 But 
despite the difference in foreign policy views between President Yushchenko and Prime 
Minister Yanukovych, the Ukrainian government did not change its stance on the 
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customs agreement after the latter came to power.
335
 Yanukovych attempted to use his 
leverage to pressure Moldova into agreeing to a so-called ‘Transit Protocol’ sought by the 
Transnistrians and which was a poorly disguised version of a draft previously presented 
by Moscow. However, having failed to obtain this modification of the customs regime, 
the Prime Minister appeared to accept the need to honour the protocol in place. This 
seems to have been the result of his realisation that any unilateral move on Ukraine’s part 
to withdraw from the JD with Moldova would be blamed squarely on him and would 
damage his international and domestic reputation, this time irreparably. 
If internal veto players were not able to shift the strategic choices of Ukraine’s 
incumbent regime, powerful external forces could also have potentially influenced the 
governmental agenda of the Ukrainian, and even Moldovan, leaders. Externally, the main 
actor who strongly opposed the enforcement of the Moldovan-Ukrainian Joint 
Declaration was, predictably, Russia. Moscow felt that the compulsory registration of 
Transnistrian companies with Moldovan authorities undermined its influence in 
Transnistria, by potentially opening the door to a gradual reintegration. A thorough 
implementation of the customs regime could lead to Transnistria’s economy becoming 
more reliant on trade with the EU rather than on Russian subsidies. This perception of the 
customs rules being a threat to its ability to influence political developments in Moldova 
incentivised Russia to oppose them in the strongest terms. Thus, Moscow went to great 
lengths to publicly voice its protest over the measures, starting with a statement by 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov followed by daily statements condemning Ukraine by the 
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to a State Duma declaration and a visit to Tiraspol. 
The new customs rules were characterised as an ‘economic blockade’ on Transnistria and 
it was claimed that ‘Russia’s interests are directly affected’ as well.336 In an attempt to 
regain its veto power, Moscow proposed a revised customs protocol that aimed to roll 
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back the provisions of the JD. Significantly, Russia included itself as a signatory along 
with Moldova, Ukraine and Transnistria, in a move that laid bare its claim to have a say 
in developments at the Moldovan-Ukrainian border.
337
  
In addition to its direct attempts to undermine the customs regime, Russia also 
positioned itself as an alternative coalition to Ukraine’s and Moldova’s cooperation with 
the EU.  In trying to alter the cost-benefit calculations of the Ukrainian and Moldovan 
governments, Moscow aimed  to capitalise on its asymmetric interdependence with 
Moldova and Ukraine by taking advantage of its position as the main destination for 
Chisinau’s and Kiev’s agricultural products. At the time both countries could be said to 
be exposed to high sensitivity interdependence in trade vis-à-vis Russia in general but 
particularly with respect to certain products such as wine, meat and dairy products. Thus, 
in 2006 Moldova’s wine exports to Russia represented approximately 80% of the totality 
of its wine exports, making Chisinau overly reliant on trading with Moscow.
338
 
Moldova’s sensitivity interdependence was augmented by the fact that wine production 
represented circa 25% of its GDP. As far as Ukraine was concerned, in 2005 99.9% of 
meat and 74.9% of dairy exports went to Russia.
339
 By targeting products for which 
Russia was the main market, Moscow aimed to use its leverage in order to undermine the 
new customs regulations. In February 2006 Russia imposed a ban on the import of meat 
and dairy products from Ukraine
340
 and in April 2006 it introduced a wine blockade 
against Moldova.
341
 The decisions were justified on health and sanitary grounds: 
Moldovan wine was claimed to contain dangerous substances such as pesticides and 
Ukrainian meat and dairy had allegedly breached food safety standards due to poor 
veterinary controls. 
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Despite these formal reasons for the bans, there is little doubt that Russia 
deliberately tried to use the asymmetric interdependence between itself and, Moldova and 
Ukraine in the trade sector in order to put pressure on the implementation of the new 
customs regime on the Transnistrian border and EUBAM’s involvement in the process. 
According to analysts, the Moldovan ‘wine-embargo arrived as a result of the EU Border 
Mission set up along the common borders of Ukraine and Moldova’  and the alleged 
‘economic blockade’.342 Elsewhere, Russia’s use of economic sanctions against Moldova 
in the form of trade embargoes, as well as the rise in gas prices, are also seen as an 
attempt to punish Chisinau for extending customs control to Transnistria.
343
 More 
revealing, US diplomats interpreted some of the provisions of the customs protocol 
proposed by Russia to replace the JD as hints ‘at a Russian offer of quid pro quo to the 
Moldovans: this protocol in exchange for a repeal on the ban on imports of Moldovan 
wine’.344 
Nonetheless, as highlighted in a conversation with a US Delegation composed of 
a number of American Senators, despite Russia’s ‘unsubtle hints’ in the form of a gas 
price hike and the meat and dairy ban, Yushchenko was committed to ‘make decisions 
about Ukraine's future solely on the basis of Ukrainian national interests, […] not on the 
narrow interests of certain political forces’.345 The broader view of Ukraine’s government 
was that, in the post-Orange Revolution climate, it was imperative that Kiev honours the 
customs agreement and supports EUBAM because ‘it was not possible to return to the 
Kuchma period when the border was simply a huge smuggling zone’.346 Vladimir 
Voronin, while a member of the Communist party in Moldova and supportive of a 
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broadly pro-Russian foreign policy, became noticeably less inclined to pursue a Moscow-
led policy after rejecting a deal for Transnistria’s autonomy that provided for a significant 
Russian troop presence (the Kozak Memorandum). As a result, after 2003 he stepped up 
Chisinau’s cooperation with the West and the European Union. With regards to Russia’s 
pressures on Moldova in the aftermath of the new customs regime, Voronin qualified 
them as ‘an attempt by Moscow to cause the Moldovan economy to collapse’.347 
However, the benefits derived from the implementation of the customs protocol with 
Ukraine outweighed any costs incurred by the Russian wine ban by far. Moldova had 
long sought Ukraine’s cooperation in enforcing the customs regime and the 
accomplishment of this goal with EUBAM’s support was a considerable achievement for 
the Voronin government.  
In the end, Russia’s attempts to put pressure on Moldova and Ukraine in a sector 
where both countries were sensitive to modifications in cross-border flows (trade) were 
not able to change the strategic calculations of the two countries, and implicitly modify 
their strategy of cooperation with EUBAM on the customs regime issue. According to the 
second hypothesis of this thesis, the ability of alternative coalitions to the EU to alter the 
strategic calculations of incumbent regimes decreases with the cost-effectiveness of EU 
threats and side-payments. The EU’s willingness to offer both Ukraine and Moldova 
access to European markets can be seen as a side-payment designed to lower the costs of 
resisting Russia’s coercive tactics for the two countries. While this was not something 
that could be achieved overnight and involved wide-ranging convergence with EU food 
safety standards, the perception of political leaders that an alternative market existed and 
they could gain access to it contributed to their resilience to withstand Russia’s pressures.  
But while Russia’s attempts at positioning itself as an alternative coalition can be said to 
have been offset by the EU’s offer of market access, there is yet another factor that could 
have contributed to shifting the Ukrainian government’s strategy away from cooperation 
with EUBAM: the competing strategies of domestic veto players. However, despite the 
initial reluctance of the Yushchenko government to enforce the customs regime at the 
Ukrainian-Moldovan border given strong domestic opposition, the regime was ultimately 
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persuaded to implement the Joint Declaration by external pressures from the EU and US. 
According to H1, the ability of veto players to alter governments’ strategies decreases 
with the cost-effectiveness of EU threats and side-payments. It is argued here that the 
factor which ultimately tilted the balance in favour of enforcing the customs regime was 
the EU’s and US’ use of threats (external pressure).  
As previously noted, the potential influence of each of the three factors – veto 
players, alternative coalitions and EU threats and side-payments – depends on the 
perceived cost-effectiveness of the others. Thus, each factor has the potential of altering 
the cost-benefit calculations of governments by increasing or reducing the costs and 
benefits that come with the deal (in this case, cooperation with EUBAM). The decisive 
factor will be the one which is deemed to generate the optimal cost-effective outcome. In 
this case, the enforcement of the JD was opposed by domestic and external veto players 
and was subject to threats and pressures from both the EU and US, and Russia, which 
positioned itself as an alternative coalition. Russia’s threats were cancelled out by the 
EU’s offer of side-payments in the form of market access, leaving domestic veto players 
and EU and US pressures as the competing factors in altering the Ukrainian 
government’s strategy. Given that these two factors were pushing Ukraine in different 
directions (non-cooperation versus cooperation with EUBAM in implementing the JD), 
the Yushchenko regime had to calculate what would be more costly in light of its 
preference for maintaining power: disregarding the demands of the domestic players or 
those of the EU and US? The government’s assessment appears to have been that, despite 
the implementation of the customs regime being opposed by a multitude of veto players, 
the cost that these could have inflicted on the regime’s political survival and power would 
have been lower than the cost of ignoring external pressures from the EU and US. Indeed, 
the role of the US is likely to have been crucial in shaping the outcome of this strategic 
interaction and allows for a specification of the initial hypothesis: EU threats and 
pressures are potentially more effective when backed up by other relevant international 
actors. Particularly when the EU creates common front with the US, the impact of their 
threats and pressures is likely to be significant. This is also related to the existence of 
alternative coalitions: the more international actors join a bloc which aims to put pressure 
on an individual country the less options the latter has in terms of seeking cooperation 
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with alternative coalitions. As a Western-oriented regime, the Yushchenko government 
relied on the EU and the US for international, but also domestic, legitimacy and was 
particularly vulnerable to the costs imposed by these two actors. 
 
4.3. The Moldovan-Transnistrian railway dispute 
 
Following an improvement in the political climate after the election of a more 
open leadership in Tiraspol in 2012, confidence-building measures became increasingly 
accepted by Transnistria’s new President, Yevgeny Shevchuk. EUBAM and its niche 
activity with respect to customs regulations and cross-border transport were well placed 
to coordinate CBMs in this area, as well as become involved in the relevant expert 
working groups within the 5+2 negotiations. Negotiations under the 5+2 format include 
Moldova and Transnistria as parties to the conflict, Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE as 
mediators, and the EU and US as observers. After having been suspended between 2006 
and 2011, formal negotiations resumed in late 2011 in the context of a renewed push for a 
solution generated by the Meseberg process.
348
 Despite initial optimism regarding the 
resumption of negotiations, the developments were disappointing: while some progress 
was achieved in confidence-building measures, the political process continues to be 
deadlocked.
349
 The negotiations under the 5+2 format are structured around three 
‘baskets’ of issues: socio-economic; legal, humanitarian and human rights; and a 
comprehensive settlement (including institutional, political and security issues).
350
 The 
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discussions are further organised in specific working groups, each dealing with 
confidence-building measures on technical issues in various policy sectors.
351
  
Given the suspension of political negotiations between 2006 and 2011, EUBAM’s 
technical confidence-building activities were limited during this period. The few 
confidence-building measures initiated were ad hoc and failed to produce results given 
the difficult political relations between Moldova and Transnistria at the time. One of the 
few significant initiatives before 2011 was EUBAM’s proposed organisation of three 
mutual visits of customs experts to Chisinau, Tiraspol and Odessa in order to ‘encourage 
mutual dialogue and understanding of customs procedures between MDCS and 
“Transnistrian customs officials”’.352 The year 2011 marked an important milestone in 
the resumption of technical cooperation between Chisinau and Tiraspol, with a number of 
bilateral meetings being organised as a result of EUBAM’s mediation efforts. At first the 
mission met separately with representatives from Chisinau and Tiraspol in order to assess 
the positions and concerns of each party and identify potential solutions to outstanding 
customs and railway issues. This was followed by a breakthrough in bilateral cooperation 
in September 2011. With EUBAM’s support, a working group meeting was arranged 
between customs representatives from Chisinau and Tiraspol who had not been officially 
engaged in dialogue since 2001.
353
 Moreover, in November 2011 EUBAM hosted a 
trilateral meeting at its Headquarters in Odessa which brought together Moldovan and 
Transnistrian customs and railway representatives, as well as representatives from Odessa 
railways as observers. The meeting explored possibilities for the full resumption of rail 
freight traffic through Transnistria and examined further areas in which customs 
cooperation between Chisinau and Tiraspol could be enhanced. This meeting marked the 
resumption of the customs dialogue between Moldova and Transnistria and was followed 
by intensified contacts between the two parties. 
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EUBAM has been instrumental in advancing technical cooperation between 
conflict parties from 2011 onwards. Most notably, the mission was a key actor who 
contributed to the full resumption of railway traffic through Transnistria in April 2012. 
The breakthrough came in the context of a positive constellation in political relations 
between Chisinau and Tiraspol, itself a consequence of the change in political leadership 
in Transnistria. EUBAM’s contribution to the process consisted in its preparatory 
technical work, making concrete proposals on technical issues and enhancing contact 
between the Moldovan and Transnistrian customs and railway experts. The mission 
organised a series of expert meetings in January-February 2012 which aimed to involve 
stakeholders in the settlement of customs and railway issues, followed in March 2012 by 
a meeting at the OSCE Headquarters in Chisinau where EUBAM presented its latest 
proposals for the resumption of full-fledged rail freight traffic through Transnistria. The 
proposals contained provisions for a mechanism of joint customs control under the single 
office and one-stop shop concepts.
354
 These meetings provided useful platforms for 
cooperation and communication and were well placed to lay the ground for the agreement 
of a protocol on the joint customs control in April 2012. The protocol was developed by 
experts on both sides and was in line with EUBAM’s technical proposals.355 As a result, 
full railway traffic across Transnistria was resumed on 26 April 2012 after having been 
interrupted for six years.
356
  
This represents the greatest achievement of confidence-building measures with 
regard to the resolution of outstanding technical issues between the Moldovan and 
Transnistrian conflict parties so far. EUBAM’s preliminary work in providing technical 
support and advice and facilitating communication between key stakeholders contributed 
significantly to the success of this agreement. The resumption of railway traffic would 
not have been possible in the absence of the political détente between Chisinau and 
Tiraspol and the political agreement reached just weeks before the customs protocol, on 
30 March 2012. It is important to note that the resumption of railway traffic between 
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Moldova and Transnistria had been previously attempted in 2007 when Moldova’s 
President Voronin put forward a confidence-building proposal that stipulated cooperation 
between Moldovan and Transnistrian experts in order to re-establish the full operation of 
the railway traffic.
357
 However, the intransigence of the former de facto Transnistrian 
President blocked any attempts at rapprochement. Tiraspol counter-proposed an 
arrangement that effectively required the establishment of economic relations between 
two distinct legal and economic entities, thus implying a degree of recognition for the 
secessionist province. The proposal was firmly rejected by Chisinau, revealing the 
difficulty of cooperating on practical issues when there is little political common ground 
to start from. Technical confidence-building cannot achieve significant progress in the 
absence of a political breakthrough, but once communication is re-established at a high-
level, it is crucial that the practical issues can be readily implemented. EUBAM ensured 
that the customs dialogue that had been restored at the end of 2011 achieved significant 
progress in generating consensus between Moldovan and Transnistrian customs and 
railways specialists, which allowed for the railway traffic to be resumed without delay as 
soon as the political conditions were in place. 
In order to pave the way for sustainable cooperation between Chisinau and 
Tiraspol in the customs area, EUBAM built on the successful resolution of the railway 
issue, but also on the effective implementation of the customs regime, and decided to 
initiate joint trainings for Moldovan and Transnistrian customs experts. Thus, in May 
2012 the training initiative ‘Building customs capacity towards modernisation’ 
introduced customs professionals from both banks of the Nistru river to EU best practice 
regarding trade facilitation tools, customs control processes, joint border control, rules of 
origin and the use of risk analysis in the examination of freight.
358
 In March 2013 an 
EUBAM and OSCE confidence-building initiative brought together customs 
representatives from Chisinau and Tiraspol in a joint study visit at the German-Swiss 
border in order to experience first-hand how cooperation at joint customs posts takes 
place and familiarise themselves with joint customs procedures. Following the study visit 
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EUBAM hosted a meeting for customs experts where it presented its proposals for the 
implementation of joint customs posts and joint anti-smuggling operations.  
In addition to the resumption of railway freight traffic, EUBAM raised a number 
of other issues in the context of confidence-building measures between Moldova and 
Transnistria. One of the most pressing concerns is the restoration of international 
transport corridors for passenger and cargo services. At the 5+2 talks in September 2012 
EUBAM presented a technical proposal on potential ways of registering Transnistrian 
number plates which would allow them to join international road traffic.
359
 As a result of 
joint efforts by EUBAM, OSCE and the EU Delegation in Chisinau, some progress was 
achieved and in 2013 Chisinau agreed on a neutral design for the number plates. 
However, the mission’s recommendations regarding the registration of vehicles – 
requiring a special re-registration of Transnistrian vehicles through joint registration and 
technical inspections, as well as exchange of vehicle data by the relevant institutions in 
Chisinau and Tiraspol – have still not led to a compromise solution.360 
EUBAM has to a certain degree been able to foster communication between 
Moldovan and Transnistrian customs and railway experts, but the scale of the interactions 
has been limited. In order for EUBAM’s efforts to bring the two parties together to result 
in improved communication and enhanced trust, the various initiatives such as bilateral 
meetings, joint trainings and study visits must be organised in a more regular and 
systematic fashion. As far as the resolution of outstanding practical issues is concerned, 
the mission has so far only been able to contribute to the resumption of full railway traffic 
between Moldova and Transnistria. As the next section explores in more detail, 
EUBAM’s role in the resumption of railway traffic in 2012 should be regarded as an 
indication that under conditions of strong preferential fit civilian missions can contribute 
to genuine domestic change in host countries. Thus, the successful outcomes of technical 
negotiations hinge on political windows of opportunity, meaning that EUBAM and its 
confidence-building measures would unlikely be able to have concrete impact if the 
political conditions did not allow it. Whether technical progress can lay the foundations 
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for improved political relations and an eventual conflict settlement, as the logic of 
confidence-building measures seems to imply, remains doubtful. In Moldova and 
Transnistria this effect is yet to be observed, as the two parties are not even remotely 
close to a political agreement. While the change of political leadership in Tiraspol has 
allowed for the intensification of technical cooperation, the lack of progress in the 
political negotiations has continued to characterise the 5+2 framework.  
4.4. Explaining the resumption of railway traffic across 
Transnistria: changing leadership, new strategies  
The issue of railway traffic between Moldova and Transnistria aptly illustrates the 
way in which the incumbent regimes’ preferential fit can be shaped by the existence of 
veto players. The origin of the so-called ‘railway war’ lies in Tiraspol’s 2004 abusive 
seizure of the property of ‘Moldova Railways’ on Transnistrian territory - consisting of 
railroad locomotives, cars and administrative facilities – which resulted in the effective 
loss by Chisinau of control over Moldovan national railway assets on the left bank of the 
Nistru river.
361
 In retaliation against the implementation of the new customs regime in 
2006 and the deployment of EUBAM, the Transnistrian authorities went even further and 
suspended railway transport, forcing trains from Moldova to bypass Transnistria by 
taking a circuitous route of almost 400km.
362
 The railway traffic was partially resumed 
after six months when a series of temporary agreements were signed between Moldovan, 
Ukrainian and Russian operators. Nonetheless, rail transportation to and from 
Transnistria remained highly problematic. The conditions of the transport regime made it 
impossible for Transnistrian companies to ship cargo, which incentivised some of them - 
such as Ribnita Steel Plant and Ribnita Cement Plant - to arrange separate deals with 
Moldova Railways. However, using privately owned railway cars to ship their product 
from Transnistria incurred prohibitively high costs on these heavy industry enterprises 
and significantly reduced their profit margins. At the same time, the situation continued 
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to hurt Moldova’s economy as well, given that in order to avoid Transnistria’s 100% 
cargo tax, Chisinau would use an alternative, lengthier, railway line in order to export 
goods through Ukraine. 
In light of the obvious damaging effects of the railway regime on the economies 
of both Moldova and Transnistria, it would have seemed natural for both sides to seek a 
solution to the dispute. Instead, Tiraspol continued to support the status quo which 
greatly benefitted long-time President Igor Smirnov’s inner circle. In Transnistria 
political and economic interests are ‘highly personalised’ and have for a long time been 
concentrated in the hands of the de facto leader.
363
 Smirnov had governed the separatist 
region in authoritarian fashion since its secession from Moldova in the early 1990’s. Over 
the years, Smirnov had succeeded in securing extensive control over governance 
structures in Transnistria by building a wide power network around himself supported 
through profits from privatisations and gas fees – paid by Transnistrian citizens but only 
partially if at all passed on to Russian suppliers.
364
 Due to this intricate web of political 
and economic interests, Smirnov was reluctant to allow cooperation between Transnistria 
and Moldova to evolve significantly.  Economic diversification could in the long term 
lead to political pluralism which threatened to undermine his tight grip on the main levers 
of power in the separatist region. It has been argued that close associates of Smirnov, 
including his daughter-in-law Marina Smirnova, his Deputy Aleksandr Korolyov and 
Security Council Deputy Secretary Yuri Soukhov, owned a number of Odessa-based 
intermediary companies which allowed them to gain significant profits, with minimal 
contributions to the Transnistrian budget.
365
 Korolyov in particular was personally 
invested in maintaining the suspension of railway traffic. The 2004 seizure of Moldova 
Railway assets was allegedly carried out by Korolyov’s militiamen and brought him 
substantial personal profits, which explains ‘his ongoing stance as a hardliner in the 
railway issue’.366 The existence of these influential veto players in Transnistria was 
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without a doubt an important factor which obstructed the resolution of the railway 
dispute.  
Smirnov’s political fate and thus the de facto regime’s preferential misfit with the 
economic openness advocated by the EU and the broader international community was 
increasingly shaped by the government’s ability to maintain Transnistria isolated. 
Smirnov and his ‘Vice President’ Korolyov shared a ‘bunker mentality’ according to 
which Transnistria should preferably remain closed to the outside in order to protect its 
cultural and political identity from hostile neighbours.
367
 Preventing Transnistria from 
economically integrating with Moldova and the EU also served an important self-
preservation purpose for Smirnov’s regime. Despite the dominant political position 
enjoyed by Smirnov and his entourage, economically they had been pushed into a corner 
by Russian asset owners and the Sheriff group.
368
 The difficult financial situation in 
Transnistria forced Smirnov to carry out an extensive programme of privatisation in the 
course of which large parts of heavy industry and the energy sector were acquired by 
Russian businesses, with other sectors of the economy being taken over by the Sheriff 
conglomerate. Both these groups shared an interest in a certain degree of economic 
liberalisation allowing for increased trade and business opportunities. While Sheriff’s 
initial success was largely due to its close collaboration with Smirnov, the limited 
economic growth potential of Transnistria coupled with the de facto President’s 
resistance to change resulted in divergent economic interests between the two. As a 
result, Sheriff placed its interests behind the reform-minded Obnovleniye (Renewal) 
party which aimed to bring about substantial reforms meant to restrict the power of the 
President and enhance the authority of the Parliament. The party won the majority of 
seats in Transnistria’s Supreme Soviet both in 2005 and 2010.369 At the same time, 
Russian investments in Transnistria (Moldova Steel Works in Ribnita is majority owned 
by Alisher Usmanov, a close Kremlin ally) suffered from the trade impediments that 
accompanied Smirnov’s policies, notably the closing of the railway link to Moldova. 
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Thus, limiting Smirnov’s power and ultimately challenging his previously unquestioned 
control over the secessionist territory represented a common vector not only between the 
interests of the Sheriff group and Russian entrepreneurs in Transnistria, but also between 
the higher-level political interests of the Obnovleniye party and Moscow.  
The preferential misfit of the Smirnov regime with respect to re-establishing a 
railway connection with Moldova is to be understood in light of the perceived 
competitive advantage this move would have given its political competitors. Already by 
2007 Smirnov’s power was weakening as a result of Russia severing its financial 
assistance to the separatist region and the de facto President’s own ‘increasingly nervous 
[…] and erratic and irrational behaviour’.370 His ‘uncompromising’ policies vis-à-vis 
Moldova and knee-jerk rejection of Voronin’s confidence-building proposals were 
increasingly opposed by the more flexible de facto Speaker of the Supreme Soviet 
Yevgeny Shevchuk, as well as other members of the executive such as the de facto 
Foreign Minister Valery Litskai.
371
  Aware of his growing political isolation
372
, Smirnov 
clung to his ability to obfuscate cooperation with Moldova and opening up Transnistria’s 
economy for fear that such a policy will empower his political opponents. As a result, the 
railway dispute was not fully resolved until after Smirnov’s 2011 electoral loss and the 
unexpected coming to power of Shevchuk.  
Even before winning the presidential elections of December 2011, Shevchuk had 
gained notoriety as being more responsive to Chisinau’s initiatives than Smirnov, while 
rebuffing the latter’s desperate attempts to tackle a growing budget deficit with increased 
taxes on corporate profits and utility and food prices.
373
 In his position as the Speaker of 
the Transnistrian parliament and Chairman of the Obnovleniye party between 2005 and 
2009, Shevchuk consistently acted as a counterbalance to Smirnov’s policies. While his 
resignation in 2009 as a result of a conflict between Obnovleniye and Smirnov over 
Transnistria’s constitutional reform marginalised him politically, it also enabled him to 
run as an independent for the 2011 presidential election on an anti-corruption and reform 
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platform, winning a solid 38.5% of votes in the first round and a staggering 73.9% in the 
second round.
374
 The overwhelming public support he enjoyed, coupled with his 
relatively weak political position, meant that his leadership had to be focused on 
pragmatic steps to improve the economic climate in the separatist region and the lives of 
Transnistrians. 
Shevchuk seemed to understand that limited cooperation with the EU could 
greatly benefit Tiraspol, while allowing it to maintain deadlock in political 
negotiations.
375
 On one hand, he needed to show that he could improve living conditions 
in Transnistria in order to consolidate his regime, while on the other hand being aware 
that he did not muster the political influence both locally and with Russia to broker a 
political settlement. It is against this background that his ‘personal pragmatism, along 
with a structural predisposition to cooperation’376 has resulted in enhanced dialogue and 
confidence-building measures with Chisinau. He has called for an agenda focused on 
practical issues such as lifting trade restrictions between Transnistria and Moldova and 
restoring transport and communication links such as railway traffic and telephone 
service.
377
 This has marked a move away from the uncooperative policies of the previous 
regime of Igor Smirnov who resisted any substantial cooperation with Moldova and the 
EU. Shevchuk’s preferential fit with the objective of forging closer ties with Moldova, 
albeit limited to low key practical issues, has consequently contributed to reaching a 
number of agreements between Chisinau and Tiraspol, including the resumption of 
railway traffic across Transnistria. It is unlikely that this dispute could have been resolved 
in the absence of a change in Transnistria’s leadership and consequently a change in the 
strategies of the incumbent regime.  
Comparing the Smirnov and Shevchuk regimes, it is clear that they had the same 
fixed preference to acquire and consolidate political power but different strategies to 
achieve this goal. Their diverging strategies must be understood in relation to the broader 
strategic environment – and in particular the three factors identified by this thesis as 
likely to influence the decisions of governments – but without losing sight of the 
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legitimation mechanisms which allow political elites to claim political power in the first 
place. In the case of the de facto authorities of secessionist territories such as Transnistria, 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, this mechanism of legitimation as either aligned with the 
West or with Russia becomes less relevant in light of these entities’ overwhelming 
dependence on Moscow. As far as Transnistria is concerned, Shevchuk never intended to 
portray his leadership as providing an alternative to Tiraspol’s allegiance to Russia, but 
ran his campaign on a promise of economic recovery which was to be achieved through 
increased openness to cooperation with Moldova and the EU. Although this did not 
suggest a substantial change in Transnistria’s position, it meant that Shevchuk’s ability to 
maintain and consolidate power depended on the extent to which he could successfully 
cooperate with Chisinau and improve the living standards of Transnistrians who voted 
him into power. His coming to power removed many of the veto players who had blocked 
any initiative to negotiate the resumption of railway traffic between Moldova and 
Transnistria under Smirnov, thus clearing the way for a potential agreement.  
In the absence of veto players and EU threats and side-payments (which were 
made redundant by the already strong preferential fit between Shevchuk’s goals and 
EUBAM’s policy objectives), only the existence and cost-effectiveness of alternative 
coalitions could have altered the new de facto regime’s strategy of cooperating with 
Moldova. However, Russia does not appear to have played an obstructive role in the 
resolution of the railway dispute. While Moscow is weary of Transnistria forging closer 
ties with Moldova to the extent that a redefinition of the relationship would deprive 
Russia of a veto in Chisinau’s and Tiraspol’s affairs, it has not been wholly opposed to a 
certain degree of reintegration between the two banks of the Nistru river. Fully aware that 
without Transnistria Moldova is likely to drift away from its sphere of influence, Russia 
is keen on sponsoring a settlement plan where Tiraspol would have significant powers 
within a reintegrated Moldova.
378
 Thus, Moscow takes a relaxed attitude to 
rapprochement measures between Chisinau and Tiraspol as long as they do not deprive 
Transnistria of a degree of autonomy that ensures the continued influence of Russia in 
Moldova. This explains why Moscow did not oppose the resumption of railway traffic, 
but on the other hand felt threatened by the enforcement of the new customs regime 
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which effectively brought Transnistrian trade under Moldova’s control. At the same time, 
the restoration of rail connections with Moldova benefitted Russian economic interests in 
Transnistria, which were also negatively affected by the suspension of traffic. The 
asymmetric interdependence between Transnistria and Russia had been unexpectedly 
reduced in 2007 by Moscow’s unilateral decision to sever financial assistance to the 
separatist region. Although such a situation would be expected to lead to an attempt by 
Transnistria to find alternative sources of assistance or compensate for the losses by 
identifying new ways of creating revenue, this is not what Tiraspol did. The resumption 
of railway traffic was one of the measures that would have enabled businesses to expand 
their profits and improve the overall economy which by the end of 2007 was severely 
deteriorating, also due to a record draught over the summer of 2007. But Smirnov found 
himself in a bind, having lost Russia’s support but realising that opening up Transnistria 
would have spelled the end of his leadership. As a result, despite a weakening 
asymmetric interdependence with Russia that could have led to closer relations with 
Moldova and the EU, Smirnov chose to dig his heals in and continue to keep Transnistria 
isolated as the only course of action that could have helped him preserve power.  
The resumption of railway traffic between Moldova and Transnistria shows how 
the strategies adopted by the Smirnov and Shevchuk regimes (to cooperate or not with 
Moldova and the EU) were crucially shaped by the leaders’ attempts to gain and/or 
maintain and consolidate power and their interpretation of the broader trategic 
environment. Smirnov obstinately refused to engage in cooperation because he viewed 
his political survival as depending on Transnistria’s continued isolation. His position was 
reinforced by the existence of a wide network of veto players whose economic interests 
were served by the limited economic opportunities within Transistria. Shevchuk, on the 
other hand, had come to power on a moderate pro-reform platform which relied to a great 
extent on the prospect of opening Transnistria to cooperation with Moldova and the EU. 
He thus had a strong interest in achieving the resumption of railway traffic and his 
strategic calculations were not encumbered by the existence of veto players, EU threats or 
side-payments or the coercive strategies of alternative coalitions (i.e. Russia).  
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4.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has examined EUBAM’s confidence-building mandate by focusing 
on two prominent technical issues that the mission was involved with. The 
implementation of the customs regime at the Moldovan-Ukrainian border and the 
resumption of railway traffic across Transnistria represent two of the most successful 
practical issues that the Moldovan, Transnistrian and Ukrainian parties have been able to 
cooperate on. EUBAM was able to provide a type of specialised technical support on the 
ground which no other international actor could offer and thus created unique 
opportunities for communication between the conflict parties, as well as between 
Moldova and Ukraine.   
The degree of preferential fit between the preferences of the Yushchenko regime 
and the objective of cooperating with EUBAM over the implementation of the customs 
regime was shaped as much by the government’s Euro-Atlantic strategic alignment, as it 
was by the economic costs of the Joint Declaration for Ukraine. This explains the 
ambiguous position of the Ukrainian leadership and its reluctance to press ahead with the 
enforcement of the agreement. The cost-benefit calculations of the government indicated 
that both strategies – implementing the customs regime or merely committing to it but not 
acting on the commitment – incurred costs. On one hand, the pro-European Orange 
electorate could sanction the government for not following through with its promises of 
reform and the fight against corruption. On the other hand, the enforcement of the JD 
would have led to significant economic losses for a number of businesses and diminished 
the profitability of Ukraine’s investments in Transnistria, which could have also harmed 
the government’s popularity. The competing strategies of veto players and Russia’s 
coercive attempts at positioning itself as an alternative coalition increased the costs of 
implementing the customs regime. Yushchenko was subjected to significant pressures 
from domestic veto players and Russia in order to change policy direction on the customs 
regime issue. In addition, Moscow was able to inflict considerable economic damage on 
Ukraine through its exploitation of the asymmetric interdependence between the two 
countries. Competing pressures – pushing for the enforcement of the customs agreement 
– were exerted by the EU jointly with the US. This was, in a nutshell, the strategic 
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environment that constrained the behaviour of the Ukrainian government. The decision to 
concede to international pressures and implement the JD can be explained by an 
assessment of the costs of continuing to tolerate illegal Transnistrian trade in the face of 
Western opposition as exceeding the costs inflicted by the behaviour of veto players and 
Russia. The latter’s coercive measures against Ukrainian trade were successfully 
counteracted by the EU offering Kiev the opportunity to gain access to European 
markets. The joint EU-US pressures on Ukraine increased the perceived costs of a 
decision to not implement the Joint Declaration with Moldova and, in the run-up to the 
parliamentary elections of March 2006, made the government weary of the potential 
implications in terms of domestic support and international reputation. Indeed, the fact 
that the EU’s threats/pressures were backed up by the US might have rendered the costs 
of non-compliance prohibitive. Thus, it can be argued that an endorsement of the EU’s 
coercive strategies by the broader international community, and the US in particular, is 
likely to increase their effectiveness.  
The railway dispute between Moldova and Transnistria raised the challenge of a 
perceived compatibility between the political agenda of the regime in Tiraspol and the 
confidence-building measures proposed to address this significant outstanding issue. 
Smirnov’s firm disinclination to engage with Voronin in negotiations over the railway 
stalemate, despite the economic losses that both Moldova and Transnistria were 
suffering, was  the result of a deep preferential misfit, strengthened by a powerful 
network of domestic veto players. This was confirmed by the change in policy brought 
about by the new Transnistrian government in 2012, when the more progressive Yevgeny 
Shevchuk came to power. Better served politically by a policy of limited cooperation and 
economic integration with Moldova, Shevchuk’s government worked on resolving a 
number of practical issues with Chisinau, with the resumption of railway traffic being the 
most prominent dispute resolved. Shevchuk’s preferential fit with respect to the prospect 
of resuming railway traffic between Moldova and Transnistria was very strong to begin 
with, being part of his electoral pledge to improve Transnistria’s economy. Following his 
electoral success, the new Transnistrian leader was highly motivated to strike an 
agreement with Moldova in order to show that he can deliver on his promises. The 
strategic environment was also favourable, as the prominent veto players that had 
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dominated Smirnov’s time in power had been removed and Russia did not feel threatened 
by the normalisation of railway traffic and thus did not resort to coercive moves. Thus, 
Shevchuk’s behaviour was not subject to significant constraints and he was able to 
maintain the initial strong preferential fit with respect to allowing Transnistria to engage 
in limited, technical cooperation with Moldova and the EU. 
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Chapter 5 
The European Union Monitoring Mission to Georgia: 
breaking deadlocked security relationships 
The EUMM operates in a highly challenging political environment, having been 
deployed in order to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire between Georgia and 
Russia, following the August 2008 war. The mission’s mandate is technical and includes 
monitoring, analysing and reporting on the stabilisation and normalisation processes, as 
well as confidence-building measures at the technical level and informing EU policy. The 
EUMM’s confidence-building mandate requires the mission to ‘contribute to the 
reduction of tensions through liaison, facilitation of contacts between parties and other 
confidence building measures’.379 While also tasked with overseeing the stabilisation and 
normalisation processes in the aftermath of war, the confidence-building dimension of the 
EUMM’s mandate is crucial for the mission’s long-term contribution to conflict 
resolution. The EUMM has deployed a variety of CBMs ranging from monitoring the 
compliance of the conflict parties with the ceasefire agreement to encouraging parties to 
exchange information and give notification of military manoeuvres, as well as 
establishing information and observation routines between them in the form of regular 
communication platforms. Specifically, the mission has developed regular cooperation 
mechanisms through which the Georgian government and the de facto Abkhazian, South 
Ossetian and Russian authorities can exchange information in order to prevent violent 
incidents from escalating, as well as work towards the normalisation of the security 
situation at the de facto borders.  
The EUMM’s activity has been intertwined with the conflict settlement 
negotiations under the framework of the Geneva discussions. The mission’s reports and 
analyses feed into the preparation of the Geneva talks between the parties to the conflict.    
The Head of EUMM participates at the talks as the mission’s representative and briefs the 
other participants on the latest security developments around the Administrative 
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Boundary Lines (ABLs) between Georgia, and South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
380
 As a 
result of the fragile security situation in the aftermath of the August 2008 war, the 
EUMM proposed the establishment of ‘joint mechanisms with the relevant 
participants … in order to prevent and, where necessary, respond to incidents that could 
cause suffering to civilian populations and/or risk deterioration of the situation’.381 The 
incident settlement mechanism under the form of the Incident Prevention and Response 
Mechanism (IPRM) is meant to be a non-political forum that addresses practical 
challenges to the security of people living in the areas surrounding the ABLs. EUMM 
Head of Mission Hansjörg Haber stressed that ‘the idea is to leave the issues pertinent to 
the Geneva talks to Geneva and address in the IPRM concrete questions that affect the 
lives of people on the ground.’382  
The Geneva talks have been unable to move forward despite some arrangements 
to detach more practical issues form the difficult status discussions. The negotiations take 
place under two configurations: plenary sessions at which Russia, Georgia and the US 
participate, and informal working groups held under the auspices of the EU, UN and 
OSCE and including representatives from South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
383
 However, the 
sensitivity of issues like the return of refugees (which Abkhazia objects to because it 
would turn Abkhazians into a minority again) and the non-use of force (which Russia 
refuses to consent to claiming it is not a party to the conflict), have blocked any 
meaningful progress in the working groups. The only accomplishment with regard to the 
non-use of force issue and which can be credited to the EUMM is the signing of two 
Memoranda of Understanding with the Georgian Ministries of Defence and Interior 
which limit Tbilisi’s military movements. The rest of this chapter explores what can be 
considered the EUMM’s most notable achievements with respect to confidence-building: 
the MoU with Georgia in the context of its commitment to the non-use of force and the 
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Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM). In addition to providing an 
account of the mission’s confidence-building efforts, the chapter also seeks to explain the 
participation of conflict parties in such confidence-building frameworks and thus identify 
the conditions under which cooperation – in a conflict resolution context -  is possible.  
5.1. Implementing the ceasefire agreement: no recourse to the 
use of force 
The mission’s first and arguably most critical confidence-building task came in 
the aftermath of the August 2008 war and it involved monitoring compliance by the 
Georgian, South Ossetian and Russian parties with the Six-point ceasefire agreement 
reached by French President Nicolas Sarkozy and his counterpart Dmitry Medvedev. The 
provisions of the ceasefire plan included a commitment from all sides to put an end to 
hostilities and refrain from the use of force, as well as allow access for humanitarian 
assistance and engage in international discussions on the security and stability of South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia. In addition, and more importantly, Georgian forces would need to 
return to their garrisons, while Russian forces would have to withdraw to their positions 
before the start of hostilities.
384
 The sticking point of the agreement turned out to be the 
withdrawal of Russian troops which were by now scattered across the border area, 
including on previously undisputed Georgian territory.
385
 The mission started its work in 
earnest, conducting 14 patrols already on its first day on the ground, making contact with 
the Georgian authorities, Russian military staff and local population, including 
establishing technical contacts with Russian forces in preparation for an orderly 
withdrawal. As the deadline for the withdrawal of troops – 10 October 2008 – 
approached, the EUMM closely monitored the movement of Russian military forces. It 
reported the dismantling of the first Russian checkpoint on 5 October and the 
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intensification of the process over the following days, which allowed it to conclude that 
‘Russia seems to have completed most of the withdrawal’.386  
On the basis of this information, Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for 
the CFSP, confirmed ‘the withdrawal of Russian forces from the zones adjacent to South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia’ on 10 October 2008.387 Despite this formal confirmation, it soon 
became clear that the situation on the ground was different. In reality Russian troops 
remained stationed in a number of villages which had clearly been controlled by Georgia 
before the August 2008 war.
388
 This was particularly the case for the village of Perevi, 
located on the Georgian side of the ABL with South Ossetia and where Russian forces 
had allegedly refused to dismantle a checkpoint despite persistent calls from the 
EUMM.
389
 In spite of EU repeated calls (at Brussels, member state and EUMM level) for 
the withdrawal of Russian and South Ossetian military forces from the Georgian side of 
the boundary line and the reduction of the number of troops deployed in South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia, Russia continued to occupy previously Georgian-controlled territories. It 
also blocked attempts by the EUMM to gain access inside South Ossetia and 
subsequently Abkhazia by claiming that the formal recognition of the independence of 
the two regions by the Russian Federation rendered point 5 of the ceasefire agreement 
obsolete.
390
 As a result, the EUMM was unable to monitor the situation on the South 
Ossetian and Abkhazian sides of the ABLs.  
Although the EUMM and the EU strongly opposed Russia’s refusal to withdraw 
its forces, the continued Russian military presence in formerly Georgian-controlled 
villages and along the ABLs has at times reinforced the stabilisation process by arguably 
providing better protection than local South Ossetian militias.
391
 This led the EUMM to 
                                                 
386
 EUMM, ‘EUMM witnesses withdrawal of Russian troops’. Press Release, 8 October 2008, available at: 
http://www.eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/press_releases/96/?year=2008&month=12, 
accessed on 26 June 2015.  
387
 Council of the European Union, ‘Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, confirms the 
withdrawal of Russian forces from the zones adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia’, S332/08, 10 October 
2008.  
388
 The Georgian villages still occupied by Russian troops after the withdrawal deadline included Akhmaji 
and Perevi. 
389
 EUMM, ‘EUMM concerned about situation in Perevi’, Press release, 8 October 2008, available at: 
http://www.eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/press_releases/28/?year=2008&month=12, 
accessed on 26 June 2015.  
390
 Sabine Fischer, ‘The European Union Monitoring Mission’, 383. 
391
 Martin, ‘Crossing boundaries’, 134. 
137 
 
take the unusual step of suggesting that Russian troops return to the checkpoint in Perevi 
after Russia had reportedly decided to retreat from the village. The mission’s position 
was spurred by the anxious reaction of the local population to the departure of Russian 
forces and a realisation that such a move could exacerbate tensions and compromise the 
incipient stabilisation process. The issue was discussed at the EU-Russia Summit in Nice 
on 14 November 2008 where the EU raised the problem of the safety and security of the 
local population. As a result, Russian forces retook control of the checkpoint on 16 
November.
392
 Another example of the EUMM accepting the presence of Russian troops 
as a trade-off in exchange for stability is provided by the deployment of Russian forces in 
order to assist with the demarcation of what Tskhinvali considers the ‘state border’ 
between Georgia and South Ossetia. Following its recognition by Russia, South Ossetia 
reportedly requested that Russian experts provide assistance in the demarcation of the 
ABL with Georgia. In June 2010 International Crisis Group reported that an estimated 
900 Russian troops had been deployed along the ABL, with the purpose of demarcating 
the border, building 20 frontier posts and guarding the border until a South Ossetian 
Border Guard service would be created. Interestingly, the EUMM accepted the situation 
and even claims that border incidents have subsided since the deployment of Russian 
forces, a claim substantiated by the local population.
393
  
In addition to the challenging task of monitoring the Russian troop withdrawal, 
the EUMM also closely followed the compliance of Georgian troops with their 
commitments. In order to prevent the build-up of tensions between conflict parties as a 
result of a lack of communication and the misinterpretation of the other side’s actions, the 
mission attempted to discourage any behaviour that could be misconstrued as 
provocative, as well as monitor and report on issues such as troop mobilisation and 
movement of equipment. Thus, the mission advised the Georgian government against the 
deployment of armoured vehicles in the areas adjacent to the ABLs as it was believed 
their presence could aggravate the sense of insecurity around the buffer zones. Given the 
risk of insecurity perceptions leading to an escalation in hostilities, the EUMM advised 
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against the deployment of such military-style vehicles or, in case they should be used, 
their clear identification as police vehicles in order not to be confused with military 
equipment.
394
 The EUMM also succeeded in persuading Georgian police forces to 
accordingly mark their uniforms so that Abkhaz and South Ossetian militias could 
differentiate them from members of the Georgian armed forces.
395
  
Importantly for its confidence-building role, the EUMM was able on a number of 
occasions to dispute Russian and separatist allegations that Tbilisi was increasing the 
number of Georgian troops in the buffer zone. This was possible due to the Memoranda 
of Understanding (MoU) the mission had concluded with the Georgian Ministries of 
Defence (MoD) and Interior (MoI), which allowed the EUMM to conduct unrestricted 
inspections on Georgian deployments of equipment and personnel.
396
 Under the MoU 
with the Ministry of Interior, signed on 10 October 2008, the Georgian side agreed not to 
deploy heavy armaments in the areas adjacent to the ABLs, committed itself to notifying 
the EUMM in advance of any prospective police deployments in these areas and allowed 
for unannounced inspections on Georgian Police facilities.
397
 The arrangement also 
provided for a mechanism of cooperation and coordination between the EUMM and the 
Georgian MoI through liaison officers. In May 2009 an annex to the MoU was added 
expanding the areas around the ABLs where EUMM monitors could conduct 
unannounced inspections.
398
 The MoU with the MoD contained similar provisions 
regarding restrictions on movements of Georgian armed forces around the ABLs and the 
requirement to notify the EUMM in advance of any such plans. In addition, the EUMM 
was also called by Tbilisi to monitor the movements of the Georgian armed forces 
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throughout Georgia as a result of a restructuring programme in order to confirm that they 
do no amount to a military mobilization.
399
 
While the MoU have been hailed as an important confidence-building measure, 
they remain a unilateral gesture given that Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia have not 
reciprocated with equivalent commitments. Georgia’s willingness to adhere to an 
arrangement that placed rules of transparency on the actions of its military forces was 
acknowledged as ‘a brave and unilateral move to de-escalate and forestall tensions’ and 
allowed the EUMM to ‘issue, as it were, a clean bill of health to the effect that Georgia 
will not be able to assemble a force with sufficient escalation potential to militarily 
challenge the administrative boundary lines’.400  The EUMM has repeatedly urged South 
Ossetia, Abkhazia and the Russian representatives in the two regions to reciprocate these 
arrangements, claiming that ‘there will only be stability if all sides contribute to it’.401 
However, there is little interest for such a measure in the separatist regions and it seems 
highly unrealistic to expect this situation to change in the foreseeable future. The 
unilateral MoU have contributed to confidence-building to the extent that EUMM was 
able to investigate any allegations of a military build-up by Georgia and confirm that 
Tbilisi was compliant with the commitments it had undertaken and provided the 
necessary transparency and access to the mission’s monitors. By disputing accusations of 
a build-up of Georgian armed forces on a number on occasions, the mission has dispelled 
any misunderstanding that could have led to violent incidents.  
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5.2. Explaining Georgia’s Memoranda of Understanding with 
the EUMM: the strong preferential fit of the Saakashvili 
regime and the absence of strategic constraints 
Unlike EUBAM, which was deployed at a time when the acute phase of the 
conflict between Moldova and Transnistria had long passed, the EUMM was conceived 
as part of the ceasefire agreement that ended the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008. 
Being responsible for the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, the EUMM 
operated in a highly divisive environment where tensions were still running high and the 
possibility of a flare up in hostilities was realistic. The implication of this state of affairs 
on the political preferences of the incumbent regimes in Georgia, Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia is that these were shaped not only by the struggle for political office, but also by 
more fundamental issues of state survival – for Georgia, the country’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, and for South Ossetia and Abkhazia, self-determination and 
independence. Also, as it often happens when countries experience war, the political 
establishment tends to be unified in the face of foreign aggression, which can explain 
why veto players have been slow to emerge and a fairly united political front has 
characterised attitudes towards conflict settlement and confidence-building measures 
between conflict parties.  
Georgia’s willingness to allow its military movements to be overseen by the 
EUMM, in accordance with the Memoranda of Understanding concluded between the 
mission and the Georgian Ministries of Interior and Defence, has undoubtedly been one 
of the main factors that contributed to stability in the aftermath of the August war. Given 
the limitations imposed on its ability to defend itself, amounting to a restriction of 
sovereignty, and the absence of a reciprocal commitment from Russia, the Georgian 
government’s agreement to sign the MoU was not a foregone decision. According to the 
EUMM, Georgia’s obligations under the MoU stemmed from the diplomatic commitment 
made by President Saakashvili to President Sarkozy regarding the non-use of force.
402
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But the non-use of force clause applied to both conflict parties and a unilateral 
commitment on the part of Georgia without the equivalent commitment from Russia in 
no way guaranteed that further violence would be prevented. In light of this, it was 
argued, ‘any country would naturally pause before unilaterally and voluntarily limiting its 
own sovereign right to deploy its defence forces anywhere on its territory at any time, 
without having to inform anyone’.403  
There are several reasons which explain the Georgian government’s decision to 
sign the MoU under the terms proposed by the EUMM and they all point to the strong 
preferential fit between the political elites’ goal of staying in power and the mission’s – 
and more generally the international community’s – objective of keeping the Georgian 
leadership in check. Despite continuing to enjoy popular support in the aftermath of the 
war, Saakashivili was acutely aware that his political survival was precarious in the face 
of an undisguised Russian desire to see him replaced. He also appeared to be weighed 
down by the responsibility of the war and its implications for the future of Georgia. In the 
words of an American diplomat, ‘Saakashvili is stronger politically, but paradoxically 
more insecure, burdened by the fear history will judge him to have lost irrevocably the 
occupied territories’.404 At the same time, the international community was seeking 
guarantees from both Georgia and Russia that neither of them would resort to military 
force. With 20% of its internationally recognised territory occupied by Russia, Georgia 
greatly needed the support of the US and the EU. The government understood that it had 
to restore its image internationally and provide a set of guarantees that confirmed its 
determination not to use force and the commitment to a peaceful resolution of the 
conflict.
405
 There was little doubt among the Georgian political elites that Russia sought 
not only to thwart Tbilisi’s NATO aspirations and attempts at diversifying energy 
supplies, but that it was resolutely trying to achieve regime change.
406
 In order to avoid 
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this, Saakashvili had to assuage both domestic and international concerns about Georgia’s 
future military intentions. Indeed, restoring Georgia’s credibility on the international 
stage was critical for the reputation of Saakashvili’s regime and cooperation with the 
EUMM appeared as the most immediate way of achieving this.  
The EUMM was valued by Georgia not only for providing a greatly needed 
international presence on the ground, but also for its ability to confirm Tbilisi’s 
compliance with the ceasefire agreement and therefore rehabilitate the country’s 
reputation within the international community.
407
 The provisions of the MoU imposed 
restrictions on the deployment and movement of Georgian troops near the ABLs with 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia and required that Georgia give advance notice to EUMM of 
any military deployments. In addition, EUMM monitors were allowed to carry out 
unrestricted inspections across a mutually agreed area near the ABLs. By undertaking 
these commitments, Georgia took a politically sensitive decision of acting transparently 
and succeeded, at the same time, to claim the moral high ground vis-à-vis Russia. While 
the latter had repeatedly accused Tbilisi of deploying military equipment near the ABLs 
and mobilising its troops, the EUMM was able – due to the unfettered access that the 
MoU granted it – to dismiss these accusations as groundless every single time. Referring 
to one of the EUMM’s statements confirming Georgian compliance with the MoU, HoM 
Hansjörg Haber admitted a slight embarrassment at the ‘flattering’ tone of the statement 
but acknowledged that the mission had been ‘genuinely impressed with the level of the 
MOD’s cooperation’.408 
The decision of the Georgian government to engage in cooperation with the 
EUMM on the specific issue of the Memoranda of Understanding can be understood as 
the result of a strategic calculus which considered the respective costs and benefits of 
alternative courses of action in light of the actors’ preference for political survival and 
power. The alternative strategies that the Georgian leadership had at its disposal were to 
either cooperate with the EUMM by signing the MoU or to decline the agreement. Given 
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the government’s need to bolster its international standing and reassure the international 
community of its peaceful intentions, cooperation with the EUMM appeared to be the 
strategy providing the greatest benefits. The signing of the MoU would have not only 
rehabilitated Georgia’s international reputation, but it could have potentially gained the 
Saakashvili regime a good deal of sympathy and support abroad. Nonetheless, as this 
thesis has shown, actors pursue their interests under constraints which can often influence 
their cost-benefit calculations. Thus, factors such as the competing strategies of veto 
players, the existence of alternative coalitions and EU threats and side-payments could 
have affected the level of preferential fit between the Georgian government’s preference 
for political power and the objectives of the EUMM. As it happened, there were few 
environmental constraints affecting this particular strategic interaction. Despite 
expectations of domestic political opposition to the signing of the MoU, given the loss of 
sovereignty they entailed, the immediate aftermath of the war provided for a seemingly 
unified political front at least as far as the necessity to restore Georgia’s international 
credibility was concerned.
409
 Also, Saakashvili’s opponents were highly fragmented 
across the political spectrum and did not amount to a significant group of veto players. 
The considerable popular support he continued to enjoy after the war also contributed to 
strengthening his position vis-à-vis political adversaries. As a result, the support for the 
MoU with the EUMM did not incur significant domestic political costs and brought the 
benefit of showcasing Saakashvili’s commitment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. 
Georgia also lacked the existence of an alternative coalition that could have proposed a 
competing agreement to what the EU was offering. The broader international community, 
including the US, was highly supportive of the EUMM’s proposed MoU and a coalition 
with Russia was out of the question, given that the two countries had waged war against 
each other. On the other hand, a failure to conclude the MoU would have not only drawn 
international criticism of Saakashvili but also endangered the delivery of badly-needed 
international aid and assistance to Georgia. 
The Georgian government felt that any potential costs incurred by the MoU – 
with respect to relinquishing sovereignty – were outweighed by the benefits of 
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cooperation with the EUMM and the broader international community.
410
 As such, 
signing the MoU emerged as the highest utility-maximising strategy that would have 
most likely satisfied actors’ preferences. These efforts did indeed pay off, gaining the 
government international praise for ‘its sincere interest in being both cooperative and 
transparent with the international community’.411 On the contrary, Russia continued to 
show a lack of flexibility and transparency in its military manoeuvres and firmly refused 
to consider any suggestion of a non-use of force agreement, claiming that Georgia should 
sign such agreements directly with South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The EUMM had not 
initially planned to seek the signing of a MoU with the Russian side, given that the 
mission would not have been able to check on Russia’s military movements and any 
formal agreement could have been interpreted as conferring legitimacy on South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia.
412
 However, it was believed that any potential benefits of the Georgian 
MoU could only be fully capitalised upon if Russia responded with a similar agreement 
on the South Ossetian and Abkhaz sides of the ABLs.
413
 The stark contrast between 
Georgia’s open and cooperative behaviour and Russia’s obstinate and uncompromising 
attitude further contributed to restoring Georgia’s international credibility and 
strengthening Saakashvili’s position.  
5.3. Opening channels of communication: the Incident 
Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) 
As the only on-the-ground mechanism that brings together all the conflict parties 
and facilitates information exchange on local incidents, detentions and human rights 
violations, as well as promoting a quick and effective response to problems which affect 
the daily livelihoods of local populations, the IPRM is a powerful confidence-building 
tool. Having been proposed by the EUMM in the context of the Geneva talks, the IPRM 
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and its associated Hotline benefitted from strong backing at the political level.
414
 Violent 
incidents and other issues of concern for the conflict parties could be raised either at the 
regular meetings of the IPRM or, when urgent, they could be addressed by activating the 
Hotline. Two different IPRMs were set up for South Ossetia and Abkhazia respectively in 
order to optimise the resolution of practical issues affecting each of the regions. Seven 
years on, the IPRM remains the only concrete achievement of the Geneva conflict 
settlement negotiations
415
 and the one forum which ensures regular contact between 
conflict parties on the ground. It was believed that by enabling contacts between the 
structures responsible for security and public order in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, on 
one hand, and Georgia, on the other hand, the potential for tensions would be reduced.  
The need for a regular communication and incident diffusion platform was 
exacerbated by the inability of the EUMM to access the territories of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia and thus the possibility of monitoring the security situation in the separatist 
regions. Unable to observe, report, and investigate incidents that took place across the 
ABLs, the mission could do little to create an environment of mutual trust and 
unobstructed communication between parties. As a result, the EUMM adopted a 
‘knocking on the door’ strategy, trying to conduct patrols or gain ad hoc access to areas 
under separatist control whenever possible. When the mission was informed of violent 
detentions or other incidents the EUMM would approach the separatist authorities and 
Russian representatives in order to request access across the boundary lines. Sometimes 
access was bluntly denied, as when a South Ossetian resident was allegedly shot and 
killed by a sniper near the ABL and EUMM monitors were not allowed to cross the 
boundary line in order to collect information on the ground.
416
 Nonetheless, when the 
mission was given the opportunity to investigate reported incidents, it demonstrated an 
ability to ‘act decisively and contributed to fact-finding in a handful of detention 
cases’.417 
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Before the establishment and regular operation of the IPRM there was hardly any 
communication between the Georgian authorities, on one hand, and the separatist 
authorities and Russian representatives, on the other hand. The EUMM had to go to great 
lengths to facilitate contact between the conflict parties and often found it challenging to 
monitor and report incidents itself. The frequency of detentions on the ABLs in the early 
stages of the mission highlighted the challenge of ensuring freedom of movement for 
local residents of villages in the border areas. In the period immediately following the 
end of hostilities the main problem was a lack of border demarcation which often resulted 
in locals unintentionally crossing the ABL and subsequently being detained. The mission 
was closely involved in monitoring, reporting and attempting to bring such cases to a 
smooth resolution. Thus, when a group of 16 Georgian woodcutters were arrested by 
Russian Border Guards in October 2009, the EUMM encouraged the Georgian and South 
Ossetian authorities to address the matter to the IPRM and accompanied Georgian, 
Russian and South Ossetian representatives on a visit to the site of the arrest in order to 
jointly ascertain what had happened. Once it was established that the 16 Georgian 
citizens had probably accidentally crossed the ABL and that there was no ‘malicious 
intent’ on their part, they were released. The EUMM stressed the importance of 
addressing such inadvertent ABL crossings as administrative misdemeanors rather than 
criminal offences and urged law enforcement agencies on both sides of the administrative 
line to increase cooperation and show leniency in dealing with similar cases.
418
 
The IPRM was initially envisaged as a forum for weekly meetings between all 
sides, including the EUMM, OSCE and the UN, but its implementation has been 
hampered by the volatility and obtrusiveness of the separatist regimes and Russia. The 
IPRM for the South Ossetian theatre was suspended for over a year because the de facto 
authorities in Tskhinvali conditioned participation on receiving information on missing or 
detained South Ossetian residents.
419
 During this time the EUMM continued to make 
efforts at bringing incidents to a peaceful resolution and avoid a re-escalation of 
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hostilities. One of the most prominent cases investigated by the mission during this 
period was the detention in January 2010 of Gennady Pliyev, a South Ossetian resident 
who was held by Georgian police because he had allegedly approached a Georgian post 
on the ABL carrying a weapon. The de facto authorities of South Ossetia claimed that he 
had been abducted by Georgian forces from the outskirts of Tskhinvali. The EUMM 
investigation concluded that neither account could be confirmed and raised doubts that 
Pliyev ‘was abducted or that he was carrying a weapon at the time of his arrest’.420 By not 
confirming either version of the incident, the mission managed to establish an 
independent account of a contested case and possibly contributed to the release of Pliyev 
after three months, following a trial. This was significant because neither the Georgian 
nor the Abkhazian parties accepted the EUMM’s findings.  
IPRM meetings covering the South Ossetian theatre were resumed in late 2010 
and started addressing a variety of issues related to the stabilisation and normalisation 
processes: the smooth resolution of detention cases; the ability of local residents to cross 
the administrative line without difficulty; access to agricultural lands near the ABL; 
ensuring the security of farmers during the harvest period; demining activities, etc.
421
 
Significantly, in April 2013 it was decided in the context of the IPRM that the Hotline 
would be activated in order for Georgian and South Ossetian representatives to notify 
each other about planned agricultural works along the ABL.
422
 The Hotline has proved to 
be a useful instrument for promoting the normalisation of the lives of local populations, 
through its effective use in resolving specific issues from the mundane return of missing 
livestock to more serious cases of detention. In addition, the security of energy 
infrastructure and utilities was addressed in a number of meetings which underlined the 
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importance of implementing water and gas projects in the region.
423
 At the 20
th
 IPRM 
meeting in Ergneti on 21 February 2012 the possibility of creating an ad-hoc working 
group focused on ‘livelihood’ issues of local residents of villages around the ABL was 
discussed, demonstrating that the IPRM framework could provide the basis for more 
structured forms of cooperation.
424
  
Until 2012 IPRM Gali - covering the Abkhazian theatre - functioned relatively 
successfully. The mechanism allowed the conflict parties to address and diffuse 
potentially aggravating incidents, which could have otherwise stoked tensions. Such an 
incident took place in September 2010, when local residents of a village near the Abkhaz 
ABL reported that Russian Border Guards had detained several of them in a minibus and 
confiscated their goods. Upon arriving at the scene, Georgian Special Police officers 
detained the Russian guards in question in a move that could have easily escalated 
tensions. EUMM monitors who had been patrolling the area visited the site of the 
incident and subsequently the mission established contacts with both the Georgian and 
Russian authorities in order to obtain more information. The mission also facilitated 
discussions between Moscow and Tbilisi and a patrol oversaw the release of the 
detainees, thus bringing the incident to an uneventful conclusion.
425
 The case was brought 
up in the context of the IPRM in order to raise awareness of the potential destabilising 
nature of such episodes and encourage conflict parties to react moderately to any 
perceived provocation. 
The IPRM Gali was suspended in April 2012 as a result of the refusal of the 
Abkhazian authorities to participate in the meetings as long as Andrzej Tyszkiewicz, 
whom they had declared persona non grata, remained the Head of EUMM. Sukhumi had 
protested against what it perceived as offensive comments by the EUMM Head of 
Mission, accusing him of showing ‘disrespect’ towards and attempting to ‘politically 
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blackmail’ the Abkhaz side.426 The dispute appears to have originated in a request by the 
de facto government in Tskhinvali that EUMM investigate allegations regarding the 
existence of Georgian-backed paramilitary groups who operate in areas adjacent to the 
ABLs. When HoM Tyszkiewicz argued that the mission would need access to Abkhazia 
in order to conduct the investigation, he was accused of taking a confrontational position 
and making unacceptable demands. Despite Abkhazia claiming that it is ready to return to 
the IPRM meetings provided the EUMM is represented by someone other than HoM 
Tyszkiewicz, this has not happened so far even though the mission has changed two 
Heads of Mission between 2013 and 2015. The new reason put forward by Sukhumi for 
not taking part in IPRM Gali is its protest against Tbilisi’s intention of including the 
Abkhazian government in exile in the IPRM framework.
427
  
The situation has deprived the EUMM of a vital mechanism for reporting on 
violations of human rights and providing conflict parties with a platform for addressing 
these issues before any potential escalation of hostilities. When used by all sides, the 
IPRM offers an environment conducive to greater confidence and cooperation where 
Abkhazian, South Ossetian, Russian and Georgian representatives can meet and discuss 
challenges to security and normalisation on the ground. In the absence of a regular 
communication and prevention mechanism the EUMM has had to rely on its monitoring 
activities and the ad hoc use of the Hotline. Luckily its presence has been increasingly 
requested for assistance with investigations in both entities
428
 and the Hotline is being 
used regularly and effectively by all parties in order to address specific cases of detention 
and various challenges to local residents’ daily activities. 
The role of the IPRM was brought into sharp focus by the so-called 
‘borderisation’ process which raises a number of challenges on the ABLs. In 2013 the 
mission noted the intensification of the installation of fences and other physical obstacles 
along the ABLs
429
 which undermines the freedom of movement of local residents and 
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affects their ability to carry out day to day activities such as seeking medical treatment, 
visiting relatives or tending to property.
430
 This process has involved the installation of 
fences and barbed wire along the ABLs (in particular the administrative line that 
separates South Ossetia from Georgian recognized territory), frequently cutting across 
communities. The ABLs are enforced strictly by the separatist authorities who consider 
them ‘state borders’. The EUMM has reported the situation to the European External 
Action Service in Brussels and the EU Member States, and raised the issue in the context 
of the Hotline and at the IPRM meetings between conflict parties. Further to this, on 29 
November 2013, incidentally the last day of the Vilnius Summit, the EUMM released a 
press statement noting the resumption of the installation of fences along the ABL with 
South Ossetia and calling for exchange of information between parties and consideration 
of the impact of the actions on people’s livelihoods.431 Understandably, the local 
population has reacted angrily and in some instances, like in the village of Ditsi, has 
protested against the installation of fences. EUMM responded promptly to the 
disturbance, participating in an ad-hoc meeting. The presence of the EUMM was possibly 
the key factor in preventing the outbreak of incidents in a tense context characterized by 
popular discontent and an increasing security personnel presence from all sides.
432
 While 
the ‘borderisation’ of the ABLs continues to this day, so does the EUMM’s monitoring 
and reporting of the situation, with the issue being raised at almost every IPRM meeting 
and round of Geneva talks since April 2013.  
The obstacles encountered by the EUMM in its attempts to establish confidence-
building platforms such as the IPRM underline the fragility of the mission’s position and 
the fact that, in carrying out its mandate, it is entirely dependent on the willingness of the 
two breakaway regions to cooperate. The lack of access to South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
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clearly limits the potential for confidence-building, since the EUMM can only provide 
information on the deployment of Georgian armed forces but has no way of confirming 
or infirming a military build-up on the South Ossetian or Abkhazian sides of the ABLs. 
On a number of occasions the EUMM was able to gain access to South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, as a result of facilitation through IPRM meetings
433
, but such sporadic 
incursions in order to participate in the investigation of isolated incidents cannot provide 
the mission with the kind of regular on-the-ground reporting and monitoring which could 
foster confidence-building. The unwillingness of the separatist authorities and the 
Russian government to allow EUMM access to the breakaway territories has undermined 
the mission’s ability to oversee the withdrawal of Russian troops and investigate 
incidents and human rights violations. In this sense, EUMM has been able to fulfill its 
mandate only half-way, on the Georgian side of the ABL.  
Nonetheless, while the full compliance with the six-point agreement was not 
achieved and the presence of Russian troops was bolstered rather than reduced, the 
EUMM has nonetheless been a critical actor in stabilising the situation along the ABLs 
between Georgia and South Ossetia and Abkhazia respectively.
434
 By establishing a field 
presence during the critical stage of cessation of hostilities, monitoring troop movements, 
reporting on its findings and calling on Russia to comply with the provisions, the EUMM 
used its monitoring and reporting resources to expose destabilising acts. The mission 
demonstrated an ability to adapt to very difficult circumstances and work within the 
parameters of a political context it had no control over. Despite not being able to 
effectively monitor the comprehensive compliance with the ceasefire agreement, the 
EUMM has provided a framework for stabilisation efforts which in turn acted as a 
deterrent to the renewal of hostilities. The EUMM’s critical role in contributing to 
stabilisation in the aftermath of the war notwithstanding, the effectiveness of its 
confidence-building mechanisms between conflict parties remains questionable. As one 
analysis point out, ‘it will remain difficult to make a direct contribution to confidence-
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building, beyond the IPRM framework, without functioning relations with all parties to 
the conflict’.435 
 
5.4. Explaining the IPRM: preferential misfit in the separatist 
territories as a result of total dependence on Russia 
The exceptional circumstances of the EUMM’s deployment – in the aftermath of 
a war between a country which aspires to EU membership and a major power which 
perceives the Union as a competitor in the region – are significant for explaining the 
entrenched positions of the conflict parties as EU or Russia allies. If for Transnistria the 
choice of cooperation with both the EU (and Moldova) and Russia was possible, allowing 
the incumbent regime to select areas of engagement in accordance with their political 
interests, in the case of South Ossetia and Abkhazia the August 2008 conflict turned this 
choice into a zero-sum game. The configuration of alliances was rigidly drawn following 
the war, with Georgia’s territorial integrity being supported by the EU and the US and the 
formal independence of the breakaway regions being recognised by Russia. The EU had 
never played a significant role in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, among others due to a lack 
of initiatives on Georgia’s part to support a gradual opening of the two entities to 
interdependence with the EU.
436
 The war minimised further any possibility of 
cooperation between the EU and South Ossetia and Abkhazia by deepening existing 
divisions and animosities.  
While Moscow provides South Ossetia and Abkhazia with everything from 
recognition to financial support and military assistance, the EU has not offered any 
concessions that could have enticed the two entities to cooperate. As one survey of 
attitudes of the EU in Abkhazia suggests, it is not only the de facto authorities, but also 
representatives of civil society and youth groups who accuse the EU of bias in Georgia’s 
favour and feel there is no point in engaging with Europe unless it recognises 
                                                 
435
 Fischer, ‘The European Union Monitoring Mission’, 386. 
436
 Alina Doroftei, Kakha Gogolashvili and Thea Kentchadze, ‘The ENP and conflict resolution in 
Georgia’, Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies and Crisis Management Initiative, 
March 2009, 17. 
153 
 
Abkhazia.
437
 Incursions of EU monitors into the territories of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia without explicit authorisation have been considered ‘unacceptable’438 as they 
seem to treat the entities as Georgian territories, something the de facto authorities 
oppose in the strongest terms. The issue of recognition or ‘status’ in the language of the 
Geneva talks, is at the heart of South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s lack of engagement with 
the EU. The positions of the two separatist entities in the context of the Geneva talks, the 
IPRMs and vis-à-vis the EUMM’s access to their territories are shaped by the de facto 
governments’ interest in achieving internationally sanctioned independence, as well as by 
their overwhelming dependence on Russia. Cooperation with the EU, in this context, has 
been occasionally instrumentalised as a strategy to help the South Ossetian and 
Abkhazian de facto authorities achieve their goal of international recognition. On one 
hand, in light of the EU’s declared support for Georgia’s territorial integrity, the 
preferences of the de facto political elites in the two separatist entities appear anathema to 
any form of cooperation with the EU and the EUMM. However, participating in 
internationally-mediated negotiation and confidence-building frameworks also represents 
a rare opportunity for the unrecognised entities to achieve a degree of communication and 
engagement with the international community that they typically do not enjoy. That both 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia ultimately engaged with the IPRMs set up by the EUMM 
and the inconsistent nature of this involvement can be partly explained by the extent to 
which this framework is seen as fulfilling some of the interests of the de facto authorities. 
It has been argued that participation in the IPRMs has been motivated not only by the de 
facto South Ossetian and Abkhazian authorities’ pursuit of international recognition and 
legitimacy, but also by their ability to win domestic support for contributing to the 
resolution of practical issues that affect the livelihood of local communities.
439
 At the 
same time, the role of Russia and its ability to fully control the strategies of South 
Ossetian and Abkhazian leaders should not be neglected, given its interest in keeping a 
tight grip on developments in the two territories and limiting the EU’s influence. 
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The political elites and societies in the separatist territories are not entirely 
comfortable with their absolute dependence on Russia, particularly in Abkhazia which 
has a long history of autonomy and is keen on remaining independent. The Abkhaz elite 
have arguably been divided between those who favour independence and a degree of 
integration with Europe and those who support de facto integration with Russia.
440
 
However, these lines have increasingly been blurred in the aftermath of the war when it 
became clear that closer relations with the EU effectively meant reintegration with 
Georgia and the only viable option was to preserve whatever degree of independence 
Russia allowed for. Negotiations over the ‘integration agreements’ signed in November 
2014 with Abkhazia and March 2015 with South Ossetia revealed concerns in the 
separatist territories over surrendering their defence entirely to Moscow. The prospect of 
subsuming South Ossetia’s military, security services and part of its judiciary under the 
Russian government’s control raised alarm in Tskhinvali, where a Georgian invasion is 
still feared. This was poignantly suggested by the declaration of a South Ossetian official: 
‘If the military command sits with Moscow, in a situation like that, Moscow might be 
reluctant to come to our support — that is what happened when we were fighting for our 
independence in the early-1990s’.441  
Despite unease at Russia’s growing economic and military clout over the 
separatist regions, there has hardly been any significant opposition to Moscow among the 
local political elites. Both South Ossetia and Abkhazia have relatively pluralistic political 
systems and leadership contests following the 2008 war have tended to be intensely 
disputed. On occasion, political developments have moved away from Moscow’s 
preferences, as shown by the 2011 presidential elections in South Ossetia which were 
unexpectedly won by independent candidate Alla Dzhioyeva, despite Russia’s public 
endorsement of her opponent, Anatoly Bibilov. Nonetheless, Dzhioyeva herself was seen 
as pro-Russian and her campaign centered on domestic issues related to corruption and 
the misappropriation of Russian funds.
442
 Similarly, the forceful removal of Abkhazia’s 
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president in 2014 appears to have been fueled by accusations of corruption and an 
inability to improve the economic situation of the breakaway region, rather than foreign 
policy considerations.
443
 On the other hand, there are claims that Ankvab’s demise was 
spurred by a financial crisis artificially created by Russia with the specific purpose of 
producing a domestic context conducive to regime change.
444
A degree of political 
allegiance to Moscow appears to be a sine qua non condition for the political elites of 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia and, despite occasional divisions between those who 
advocate integration with Russia and those who support independence, Russia is the only 
international actor willing and able to provide the support sought by governments in 
Tskhinvali and Sukhumi. The European Union is not perceived as a viable alternative, 
despite its attempt at reaching out to the two entities through a strategy of ‘engagement 
without recognition’. Both South Ossetia and Abkhazia remain suspicious of any 
European cooperation initiative in the absence of recognition, fearing that the ultimate 
goal in Brussels is to bring them under Georgian sovereignty.  
In addition to the importance of international recognition, the political preferences 
of the governments of the two breakaway regions must be understood in light of Russia’s 
overwhelming control over political, economic and strategic developments in the two 
breakaway regions. The literature on power and interdependence posits that in a situation 
of asymmetric interdependence the less dependent actor is more likely to have the upper 
hand in a political bargaining process; however, this should not be confused with a 
situation of pure dependence in which bargaining becomes redundant and control over 
political decisions can be easily enforced.
445
 This is precisely the type of relationship that 
exists between Russia, on one hand, and South Ossetia and Abkhazia, on the other hand, 
and it goes a long way toward explaining Tskhinvali’s and Sukhumi’s limited 
participation in and willingness to cooperate with the confidence building mechanisms 
set up by the EUMM. While the results of elections have occasionally diverged from 
Moscow’s preferred outcomes, there is little doubt that the South Ossetian and Abkhazian 
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positions over the conflict settlement process, engagement in confidence-building 
measures with Georgia and general cooperation with the EUMM are shaped by Russia’s 
own stance. Given Moscow’s strategic interest in preserving the independence of the 
separatist entities and minimising the role of other international actors in the region, there 
is no reason to expect that Russia would sanction confidence-building measures that 
could facilitate Tbilisi regaining control over the disputed territories. 
Both South Ossetia and Abkhazia are entirely dependent on Russia for their 
continued existence as de facto states: Moscow provides Tskhinvali and Sukhumi with 
recognition, security guarantees and financial support. In addition, Russia essentially runs 
the internal affairs of South Ossetia and Abkhazia through its representatives on the 
ground. Before the August 2008 war, Russia formally recognised Georgia’s territorial 
integrity and its military presence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia was presented as part of 
peacekeeping forces – the so-called Joint Peacekeeping Forces in South Ossetia 
composed of Russian, Georgian and South Ossetian troops and CIS peacekeepers in 
Abkhazia.
446
 Following ‘Russia’s demonstration of hard power in Georgia’447, Moscow 
abandoned any semblance of neutrality and recognised South Ossetia and Abkhazia as 
independent states. Its military support shifted from being disguised behind multilateral 
peacekeeping formats to open, bilateral agreements on military cooperation.  
The two breakaway regions are also heavily dependent on Russian aid and 
subsidies, with contributions from Moscow making up approximately half of Sukhumi’s 
state budget
448
, while South Ossetia is entirely dependent on its northern neighbour due to 
its small size and lack of resources.
449
 Relations between Russia and South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia have been further consolidated through the signing of strategic treaties in 
March 2015 and November 2014 respectively. The agreement with Sukhumi envisages 
the creation of a joint Russian-Abkhazian military force, a prominent role for Russia in 
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Abkhazia’s foreign policy, the integration of Abkhazia’s trade laws with the Eurasian 
Economic Union and the subsidising for modernising Abkhazia’s military by Russia450. 
Under a similar treaty, South Ossetia will be almost entirely incorporated into Russia 
militarily and economically.
451
 In addition to large-scale military and financial support, 
Russia has reinforced the dependence of the two entities through a variety of measures 
such as issuing Russian passports, investment in healthcare and culture, Russian 
purchases of real estate, the intensification of Russian language-teaching, as well as the 
provision of legal assistance and restoration of air, rail and road traffic.
452
 Facilitating 
access to South Ossetia and Abkhazia and imposing barriers to cross-border travel to 
Georgia are also part of this policy.  
More relevant for the EUMM’s role, Russia controls South Ossetia’s and 
Abkhazia’s borders, having signed agreements with the two entities on border control 
cooperation in April 2009. Although the agreements were meant to stay in place until 
Sukhumi and Tskhinvali established their own border control agencies, the more recent 
agreements on Alliance and Integration stipulate the merger of Russian, Abkhazian and 
Ossetian customs and border services, effectively relinquishing the breakaway regions’ 
border control responsibilities to Moscow.
453
 The EUMM itself supported to a certain 
extent the control of the ABLs by Russia, which was in a much better position to offer 
public order and protection to the local population than separatist militias. However, this 
did not amount to an endorsement by the mission of Russia’s military presence on the 
boundary line, but was the result of a pragmatic choice between the ‘mob rule’ of local 
militias and the potential of Russian troops to provide stability.
454
  
Russia’s virtual control over the breakaway regions’ military forces, economy, 
borders and domestic and foreign policy direction has resulted in Moscow being able to 
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largely shape the positions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia at the Geneva talks, the IPRM 
and vis-à-vis the EUMM’s access to the separatist territories. Given that Russia’s 
interests in the region have focused on the preservation of its sphere of influence, as well 
as preventing Georgia’s NATO and EU membership, Moscow predictably opposed the 
presence of EUMM monitors in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In fact, Russia was firmly 
opposed to any increased international presence on the ground, despite this being the only 
effective way of implementing an agreement on the non-use of force between conflict 
parties.
455
 This is not surprising given that Moscow has no interest in allowing an 
international presence which could disturb a status quo that allows it to control the two 
secessionist provinces and, by extension, gives it leverage over Georgia’s strategic 
choices (i.e. NATO membership). Russia’s staunch opposition to allowing EUMM 
monitors inside South Ossetia and Abkhazia was also confirmed at the time of OSCE’s 
termination of its mission in Georgia, when French Minister of Foreign Affairs Bernard 
Kouchner was quoted as telling journalists in reference to the EUMM: ‘I just asked 
[Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov] for one millimeter of progress in giving the 
E.U. observers access to the other side of the line. It has not been accepted.’456 
From the very beginning of its deployment, the EUMM’s role on the ground has 
been instrumentalised by Russia in accordance with its preferences. Thus, the Russians 
have allegedly hoped that the mission would provide a check on ‘Saakashvili’s erratic 
behaviour’457, suggesting that they did not envision a role for the EUMM in South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia. Notably, Moscow chose to interpret the EUMM’s mandate as 
exclusively meant to monitor and report on the activities of the Georgian side while 
having no authority in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Consequently, as Russia was 
withdrawing its troops from South Ossetia in October 2008, Russian officials asked the 
EUMM to sign off documents which transferred authority back to Georgia, in an apparent 
attempt to commit the mission to becoming directly involved in the provision of security. 
In addition, Russian representatives also asked Head of Mission Hansjörg Haber to sign 
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two Memoranda of Understanding – one limiting the presence of Georgian armed forces 
in the areas previously occupied by the Russians and the second confirming Russia’s 
withdrawal to pre-war positions and guaranteeing that the EUMM would not seek access 
into South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
458
  
This liberal interpretation of the EUMM’s mandate was partly a consequence of 
the vaguely phrased point 2 of the Sarkozy-Medvedev agreement of 8 September which 
called for European Union ‘observers’ to replace Russian ‘peacekeeping forces’.459 
Russia capitalised on this confusion in order to repeatedly criticise the EUMM for not 
doing enough to provide security and even for the alleged weakness of the MoU with the 
Georgian Ministry of Defence which, it claimed, ‘did not conform to Russian military 
requirements’ and was not binding.460 In addition to invalidating any request by the 
EUMM to access the territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia’s attempts to 
portray the mission as tasked to monitor strictly the Georgian side of the ABLs was 
meant to underline the Russian troops’ role as ‘stabilisers’ on the South Ossetian and 
Abkhazian sides. By implying this equivalence, Moscow aimed to shift the perception of 
Russia as a conflict party to that of Russia as a mediator in the conflict.  
Having failed to persuade the EUMM to willingly restrict its activities to the 
Georgian side of the ABLs and faced with repeated requests for access to the separatist 
territories, Russia resorted to more covert tactics aimed at undermining the mission’s 
mandate. On 26 October 2008, the EUMM was invited to a meeting by the South 
Ossetian de facto authorities, which however the latter failed to attend. The South 
Ossetian media later accused the mission – who had waited for the South Ossetians for 
ninety minutes on the ABL – of crossing the boundary line without authorisation and thus 
violating its mandate.
461
 On a different occasion a EUMM armoured patrol vehicle and an 
accompanying ambulance were damaged by explosions near the Abkhazian ABL, 
resulting in the death of the ambulance driver and the injury of a medic. The timing of the 
incident - which occurred in the aftermath of Russia vetoing the continued presence of 
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UNOMIG on the ground and a week before the OSCE monitoring mission ceased its 
activities – as well as the specific circumstances of the explosions, suggested that the 
attack might have been targeted. An American diplomat speculated that ‘the attack 
suggests that some side(s) may want to dissuade the EUMM from continuing its 
monitoring efforts’.462 These incidents suggest that despite public statements to the 
contrary, Russia would have preferred to see the EUMM’s mandate terminated or, in any 
case, modified to explicitly exclude access to South Ossetian and Abkhazian territory.  
EUMM’s confidence-building initiatives are meant to reduce the risk of a 
resumption of hostilities through facilitating communication between the Georgian, 
Abkhazian, South Ossetian and Russian parties and pave the way for a working 
relationship between these actors in order to tackle practical issues that affect the 
livelihoods of local communities. The IPRM has arguably been the only concrete result 
of the Geneva talks and a valuable confidence-building mechanism, supporting conflict 
parties in exchanging information and tackling violent incidents around the ABLs. It is 
the only forum which facilitates regular contacts between security providers on the 
ground and is, thus, essential to preserving peace in the region. The EUMM put forward 
the proposal for an incident settlement at the Geneva talks in the hope that the mechanism 
could help conflict parties address challenges to stabilisation and normalisation, as well 
as foster confidence-building between participants. The IPRM attempts to avoid the 
sensitive political issues of status and conflict settlement outcomes. However, in practice, 
it is difficult to detach strictly technical confidence-building measures from the political 
context of the conflict. As a result, the de facto authorities and Russian representatives 
constantly try to push for the recognition of independence of the two breakaway regions 
by bringing politicised issues such as border demarcation within the framework of the 
IPRMs.
463
 While Georgia has been open to engage in the IPRM, South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia have repeatedly tried to undermine the mechanism either at Russia’s behest or 
because it did not advance the political agenda of the government in power at the time.
464
 
Although Tskhinvali and Sukhumi have occasionally been cooperative vis-à-vis the 
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IPRM, their pattern of engagement is indicative of a Russian-directed ‘good cop-bad cop 
routine’.465 Moscow’s strategy has been to play the card of intransigence on the part of 
the de facto South Ossetian and Abkhazian governments while seemingly attempting to 
plead with them for moderation.
466
 
Initially it was South Ossetia who refused to participate in the IPRM under a 
variety of pretexts, including its insistence that the meetings should take place on the 
ABL in Ergneti, rather than alternatively on the Georgian and South Ossetian sides. Once 
Georgia agreed to the Ossetian demand, Tskhinvali brought up a new issue – that of the 
chairmanship of the IPRM – arguing that it cannot accept that the meetings be chaired by 
the EUMM together with the OSCE and lobbying for the replacement of the latter by 
Russia.
467
 In addition, the IPRM was further conditioned on the resolution of the case of 
three missing Ossetians. However, as an indication that the case was merely being used 
as a pretext in order to undermine the IPRM, when a Georgian official suggested that 
Tbilisi would be willing to allow a South Ossetian delegation to visit the place where 
they believed the South Ossetians were detained in exchange for Georgia being also 
allowed to investigate cases of concern on the South Ossetian side of the ABL, the 
Russian representative to Tskhinvali flatly refused.
468
 The standoff was only brought to 
an end after more than a year when the South Ossetian side agreed to take part again in 
the IPRM following the publication of a report on missing persons in the August 2008 
conflict by the Council of Europe’s Human Rights Commissioner.469  
The restoration of the IPRM for the South Ossetian theatre was, however, 
followed by a breakdown of IPRM Gali, covering the Abkhazian theatre. Despite an 
initial openness in Abkhazia to cooperate with the EUMM and address practical issues in 
the context of the IPRM, an incident involving the Head of the EUMM in April 2012 led 
Sukhumi to suspend the mechanism. The dispute reportedly emerged when, responding 
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to a request from the Abkhazian de facto authorities to investigate a violent episode, 
HoM Tyszkiewicz requested access to Abkhazia and was, as a result, accused of political 
blackmail and declared persona-non grata in the separatist entity. Similarly to the 
suspension of the IPRM for South Ossetia, the boycott of IPRM Gali appears to have at 
its origin a deeper intention to undermine the IPRM and, implicitly, cooperation with the 
EUMM.
470
  In addition, it has been argued that the suspension of IPRM Gali represented 
a political decision which responded to the imperatives of the Sukhumi regime’s agenda 
at the time.
471
 Although Abkhazia claimed that it would be willing to renew its 
participation in IPRM Gali if the EUMM was represented by someone other than HoM 
Tyszkiewicz, the suspension continues well after the mission’s leadership has been taken 
over by a new Head of Mission. The new pretext used by Sukhumi to justify its continued 
refusal to restart the confidence-building mechanism is its opposition to the inclusion of 
the Abkhazian government in exile in the IPRM framework, something which Tbilisi has 
allegedly been pursuing.
472
  
The obstructiveness of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in relation to the IPRMs 
should be regarded in the context of a primary concern with status – the recognition of 
the two entities as independent - and only a secondary interest in addressing practical 
issues that affect people’s daily lives, which is precisely what a confidence-building 
platform such as the IPRM seeks to do.
473
 This is consistent with attempts by Sukhumi in 
November 2012 at changing the format of the Geneva talks by upgrading the status of 
negotiators to ‘delegations’, as opposed to ‘participants’ as they are currently 
identified.
474
 This move runs contrary to the ‘status neutral’ format of the Geneva 
discussions, adopted precisely in order to avoid the initial deadlock in negotiations 
caused by disagreements between Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia over the formal 
recognition of the breakaway regions. By seeking to open up this controversial issue, it is 
plausible to assume that the separatist entities and Russia aim to either force the status 
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issue onto the Geneva agenda or use any ensuing impasse in order to boycott the Geneva 
discussions altogether.
475
  
The behaviour of decision-makers in South Ossetia and Abkhazia regarding 
engagement in the IPRMs must be understood in the context of their fundamental 
concern with political survival, itself a function of the preservation of the de facto 
independence of the two entities and of their total dependence on Russia. Cooperation 
with the EU did not provide an opportunity for the separatist territories to enhance their 
autonomy – on the contrary – neither did it represent a realistic alternative to Russia. 
Therefore, engaging in the IPRMs and the other confidence-building measures supported 
by the EUMM brought benefits only to the extent that this form of cooperation could be 
shown to boost the governments’ standing at home. However, whenever such benefits 
were outweighed by the potential costs of Russian retaliation or by competing domestic 
interests, cooperation with the EUMM inevitably suffered. With the EU not positioning 
itself as a credible alternative coalition and thus lacking any leverage in terms of threats 
and side-payments and the absence of opposition from domestic veto players (given that 
no one among the political elites in Tskhinvali and Sukhumi would have benefitted from 
cooperation with the EU at the cost of antagonising Russia), there was little that could 
have altered this strong preferential misfit. The benefits of cooperation with the EU and 
the EUMM were simply too marginal to overcome domestic political imperatives or 
Russian pressures. While participating in the IPRMs can offer the de facto authorities a 
degree of visibility and even legitimacy, this ceases to be appealing when Russia opposes 
it. Considering the entities’ lack of autonomy and inability to make independent 
decisions, it is the interests of the Russian leadership rather than those of the South 
Ossetian and Abkhazian de facto authorities which often influence outcomes in the two 
territories.   
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5.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has confirmed that the emergence and persistence of confidence-
building mechanisms in the context of EU civilian missions in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood can only take place under conditions of preferential fit between the 
incumbent regimes’ motivation to gain or retain power and the specific measures 
advocated by CSDP missions. If a particular confidence-building initiative is perceived to 
incur political costs that outweigh its benefits, it is unlikely that it will be adopted by the 
target government. The preferential (mis)fit of the de facto regimes in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia is shaped by their need for international recognition and legitimacy and by their 
total dependence on Russia, which explains the inconsistent and at times obstructive 
behaviour in the context of the IPRMs. The EU’s support for the territorial integrity of 
Georgia means that the Union does not represent a viable foreign policy coalition for the 
largely unrecognised entities. The involvement of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the 
IPRMs has been informed, on one hand, by the opportunities provided by this framework 
in terms of international recognition and domestic political capital and, on the other hand, 
by Russia’s highly strategic behaviour in the form of attempts to gain leverage over the 
functioning of the mechanism in order to sabotage the broader Geneva negotiation 
framework. When the two factors were compatible, effective cooperation in the 
framework of the IPRMs was possible because of strong or, at least, passive preferential 
fit between the de facto authorities and EUMM. However, when they were at 
loggerheads, Russia’s ability to convert the strong and/or passive preferential fit into 
weak preferential fit determined South Ossetia and Abkhazia to undermine the EUMM’s 
confidence-building efforts. The overwhelming dependence of the separatist territories on 
Russia positioned Moscow as the only viable coalition and shaped the strategic 
environment surrounding the EU-driven confidence-building processes in a way which 
did not allow for the EU to situate itself as a credible alternative to Russia or to offer 
threats and/or side-payments which could have altered the cost-benefit calculations of de 
facto leaders. At the same time, the extent of reliance on Moscow also prevented the 
emergence of domestic veto players with different interests from those of the de facto 
incumbent regimes. Ultimately, the degree of preferential fit between the preference for 
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political survival of the South Ossetian and Abkhazian elites and the EUMM confidence-
building goals was mainly constrained by the vital role played by Russia within the two 
territories. Moscow successfully constituted itself as the only potential cooperation 
partner for South Ossetia and Abkhazia, whose leaders’ political survival and ability to 
preserve power hinged entirely on their willingness to support the Russian agenda. The 
EU, on the other hand, lacked leverage and its ability to constrain the strategic 
environment of the two entities and thus alter their cost-benefit calculations was limited 
at best. 
The  Memoranda of Understanding between the EUMM and the Georgian 
government illustrate well how failure to participate in a confidence-building framework 
can also be politically costly and this consideration may induce political leaders to adhere 
to measures which they would have otherwise not adopted Saakashvili took the 
politically sensitive decision to limit Georgia’s ability to mobilise military forces around 
the internal boundary lines because a refusal to sign the MoU with the EUMM could 
have cost Georgia the support of the international community and potentially ended his 
political career. All things considered, an agreement with the EUMM over the MoU 
appeared to be the utility-maximising strategy, allowing Saakashvili to retain his 
popularity abroad and consolidate his power domestically. Given the fragmented nature 
of the political opposition and the significant challenges in forming a unified group of 
veto players that could effectively oppose the President, the decision to sign the MoU 
involved little, if any, domestic cost to Saakashvili. Moreover, there was no prospect of 
an alternative coalition to the EU and the West broadly, since the obvious candidate for 
this role – Russia – was considered an occupying power in Georgia. The role of the 
unified front presented by the international community on the MoU issue should also be 
noted, as it is likely to have been carefully considered in Saakashvili’s strategic 
calculations. As was the case with the customs regime between Moldova and Ukraine, a 
policy action that enjoys the endorsement of the broader international community leaves 
the target government with fewer options in terms of potential alternative coalitions and 
thus makes it more likely that the proposed measure would be accepted. The case of the 
MoU represents one of the few instances where the regime in power (Saakashvili) faces 
few, if any, environmental constraints and can thus act according to its preferences. 
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Saakashvili’s preferential fit with the EU’s agenda was generally strong and was further 
enhanced in the aftermath of the war with Russia when Georgia had few options but 
comply with the requests of the international community.  
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Chapter 6 
EUJUST Themis: cooperation and rule transfer in 
Georgia’s criminal justice system reform 
This chapter examines the cooperation between the EUJUST Themis rule of law 
mission and the Georgian government in the context of the reform of Georgia’s criminal 
justice system. According to the mission statement, ‘EUJUST THEMIS, shall, in full 
coordination with, and in complementarity to, EC programmes, as well as other donors’ 
programmes, assist in the development of a horizontal governmental strategy guiding the 
reform process for all relevant stakeholders within the criminal justice sector, including 
the establishment of a mechanism for coordination and priority setting for the criminal 
justice reform’.476 The mission’s specific objectives included the provision of guidance to 
Georgia’s government on a new criminal justice reform strategy, supporting coordination 
between relevant rule of law actors, assisting with the drafting of new legislation and 
supporting the development of international cooperation. The chapter begins with an 
empirical analysis of the mission’s mandate and seeks to highlight the extent to which 
EUJUST Themis has been able to assist in the rule transfer stipulated by its mandate. The 
second part of the chapter aims to provide an explanation for the extent of rule transfer 
through the prism of the Georgian government’s preferential misfit with EUJUST’s 
reform programme.  
6.1. Developing a new criminal justice reform strategy 
The first part of the mission’s activity on the ground consisted of an assessment 
phase which was planned to last between two and four months and aimed at producing a 
comprehensive assessment of the Georgian criminal justice system. On the basis of this 
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evaluation, Themis experts would provide their Georgian counterparts with 
recommendations and advice on how to proceed with the reform of Georgia’s criminal 
justice system. As part of the assessment process, Themis experts visited courtrooms 
across Georgia, attended court sessions and interviewed their Georgian counterparts in 
order to acquire an understanding of the characteristics of the Georgian system and 
elaborate a series of reform proposals.
477
 This process posed challenges for some of the 
experts who felt they had been received with suspicion by their counterparts. The 
interviewing process was in some cases undermined by language barriers and a perceived 
lack of trust between EU experts and Georgian officials, the latter giving the impression 
that they thought the mission personnel was there to ‘spy’ on them.478 Another problem 
was that mission experts would sometimes receive contradictory information, which 
seemed to suggest that Georgian officials, particularly at high level, only conveyed 
information that suited their interests and attempted to cover phenomena such as the 
arbitrary removal of judges.
479
 
In terms of the concrete recommendations of the mission, the most prominent 
issue flagged up by EUJUST Themis was the incompatibility between several features of 
the Georgian criminal justice system and the principle of independence of the judiciary. 
The role of the President in the Georgian Constitutional system was assessed as 
detrimental to the independence of the judiciary, given its prerogatives to appoint and 
dismiss judges and change the territorial jurisdiction of different courts.
480
  Moreover, the 
High Council of Justice was deemed to be incompatible with the principles of the 
European Charter on the judiciary. Whereas the Charter requires that disciplinary 
proceedings against judges must be conducted by an independent institution, the High 
Council of Justice was an advisory institution to the President.
481
 As far as the 
Prosecution was concerned, Themis noted that the Georgian Prosecution system was 
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highly hierarchical with power concentrated in the General Prosecutor’s hands.482 The 
mission recommended enhancing the individual prosecutors’ autonomy in order to 
improve the speed and effectiveness of prosecutorial activities.
483
  
In order to proceed with the drafting of a criminal justice strategy, the mission 
recommended the creation of a high-level working group and nine sectoral subgroups. 
Given Themis’s task to ‘assist in the development of a horizontal governmental strategy’, 
it was crucial for the mission to involve all the relevant stakeholders in the process of 
drafting Georgia’s new criminal justice strategy. The high-level working group proposed 
was meant to be ‘the main co-ordinating mechanism and strategic decision making body 
of the criminal justice reform process in Georgia’484 and also coordinate the work of the 
subgroups. But the formal approval process became protracted as President Saakashvili 
only signed a presidential decree setting up the working group and affiliated subgroups 
several months later, in October 2004. This was a crucial moment for EUJUST Themis, 
since a failure to have its proposals approved could have resulted in the termination of the 
mission. The delay of President Saakashvili in signing the decree raised alarm among 
mission experts who perceived the seeming disinterest as an indication of the lack of 
support and commitment of the Georgian government.
485
 However, once the coordinating 
mechanism was formally set up, the mission starting working on deciding the groups’ 
membership together with its Georgian counterparts.  
The high-level working group was composed of the Minister of Justice of 
Georgia, who also headed the group, and representatives of other relevant judicial 
institutions: the Secretary of the National Security Council, the Secretary of the High 
Council of Justice, the Minister of Finance, the Chairman of the Supreme Court, the 
General Prosecutor, the Public Defender, the Head of the Legal Affairs Committee of the 
Parliament, two Members of Parliament, a Member of the Working Group on the 
Criminal Procedure Code and representatives from the Liberty Institute and ‘IRIS’ 
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Georgia NGOs. The high-level working group was supported by nine subgroups whose 
task was to draft the strategy in the relevant sectors of the criminal justice system: 1. 
Police Authorities and Crime Prevention; 2. Prosecution; 3. The Bar and advancement of 
the Legal Aid system; 4. The Judiciary; 5. Reforms of the Criminal and Administrative 
Violations’ Codes; 6. Execution of Penalties; 7. The Criminal Procedure Code; 8. Reform 
of the Public Defender’s (ombudsman) institution; 9. Reform of Education of 
Lawyers’.486 The practice of co-location – the placement of EUJUST Themis legal 
experts in relevant Georgian institutions – was meant to contribute to enhancing 
communication between Georgian actors in the area of criminal justice through 
facilitating  ‘the co-ordination and co-operation between various rule of law institutions 
in Georgia’. EUJUST Themis experts were also actively involved in supporting joint 
meetings of different subgroups in order for these to harmonise their individual draft 
concepts into a coherent horizontal reform strategy.
487
  
While the mechanism of the working groups provided excellent opportunities for 
cooperation and coordination between Georgian rule of law institutions, the personnel 
reshuffles championed by Saakashvili across the state administration resulted in the 
membership of the group changing a number of times. The tragic death of Prime Minister 
Zhvania in February 2005 only reinforced the difficulties of getting the high-level 
working group started, bringing about further changes in its composition and delaying a 
previously scheduled meeting by one month.
488
 The combined effect of PM Zhvania’s 
death and the constant staff reshuffles in the judicial system was that the high-level 
working group hardly ever met.
489
 As for the subgroups, they also suffered some 
personnel changes, although the majority of coordinators and key members remained the 
same.
490
 Nonetheless, it appears they did not meet regularly either and some of them were 
composed of a very limited number of people.
491
 For instance, records of a meeting 
between the Head of Mission Sylvie Panz and EUJUST Themis senior legal expert Rafal 
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Pelc with the Public Defender Sozar Subari show that Ms Panz expressed concern at the 
delay in the work of the subgroup on the reform of the Public Defender’s (ombudsman) 
institution.
492
 Also, the High Council of Justice had failed to send a representative to 
participate in the subgroup on the judiciary which clearly limited the progress the sectoral 
group could make given the importance of the HCOJ.
493
 
The mission raised the issue of the irregular meetings of the high-level working 
group with several high-ranking Georgian figures, including Prime Minister Noghaideli 
and Minister of Justice Kemularia, and received assurances regarding the commitment of 
the Georgian government to the reform of the criminal justice system.
494
 During a 
meeting of the governmental Euro-Integration Commission on 9 March 2005, Minister of 
Justice Kemularia gave assurances that the high-level group would meet twice a month 
and that the draft strategy would be ready by mid-April.
495
 Prime Minister Noghaideli 
intervened to request the renewal of the composition of the high-level working group in 
order to reflect the personnel reshuffles; better coordination between subgroups; weekly 
reporting to the government regarding the progress of the subgroups and the high-level 
working group.
496
 However, the high-level group continued to meet infrequently as a 
result of the government’s anti-corruption efforts. Georgian officials who were part of the 
group were routinely changed, which proved disruptive to the work carried out and 
prevented the achievement of significant progress in harmonising and integrating the nine 
sectoral draft concepts into a coherent criminal justice strategy.  
Ultimately, it can be argued that the mission succeeded in bringing the various 
stakeholders of the criminal justice system around the table and incentivised them to 
coordinate their reform efforts.
497
 But the difficulties posed by a volatile political 
environment, in particular the constant personnel reshuffles, severely limited the 
effectiveness of coordinating mechanisms such as the working groups and undermined 
what should have been the end result of their work: the drafting of Georgia’s criminal 
justice strategy. EUJUST Themis itself acknowledged that ‘it is not clear whether this co-
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operation and co-ordination is going to be sustainable in the long term’.498 As the rest of 
this section shows, the failure of the Georgian leadership to actively commit to and 
engage in drafting the criminal justice strategy resulted in large parts of this document 
being drafted by the mission experts, with no involvement from Georgian stakeholders.  
While the nine subgroups, with the advice and support of EUJUST Themis, 
produced the sectoral draft concepts
499
, the high-level working group failed to deliver on 
its commitment to submit a comprehensive and integrated criminal justice strategy by the 
end of April 2005. Despite a clear deadline, the Georgian leadership did not bring its 
contribution to finalising the draft strategy. This situation triggered something akin to an 
internal crisis within the mission, which found itself under extraordinary pressure to 
obtain a comprehensive document by mid-May 2005.
500
 Themis went ahead with drafting 
the strategy without Georgian input
501
 and also proceeded to put political pressure on the 
Georgian leadership. As a result, Minister of Justice Konstantine Kemularia was invited 
to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) in Brussels which nudged the Georgian 
authorities to submit their contribution to the strategy. The result was a short, minimalist 
document which, despite being adopted by the government on 20 May 2005 had to be 
revised several times.
502
 The revised draft - the National Strategy for Criminal Justice 
Reform – was finally adopted by President Saakashvili in July 2005 by decree.503 
The drafting of the criminal justice strategy was in many respects a fiasco. 
Whereas the EU’s assessment of the mission as a success reflects its self-congratulatory 
tendencies, the fact that the strategy did not reflect national ownership seriously 
undermined its legitimacy. The mission itself had gone to great lengths to entice its 
Georgian counterparts to fully participate and ‘own’ the drafting of the strategy, but the 
politicisation of the judicial process prevented this from happening. Thus, as far as the 
reform of the judiciary was concerned, Georgian judges were very much interested in the 
reform process and wanted to participate actively. The obstacle was that most of the 
proposals put forward by the judges were rejected by a newly-appointed President of the 
                                                 
498
 Council of the European Union, ‘EUJUST Themis’, 15. 
499
 Council of the European Union, ‘EUJUST Themis’, 6. 
500
 Helly, ‘EUJUST Themis in Georgia’, 100. 
501
 Kurowska, ‘The rule of law mission in Georgia’, 206. 
502
 Helly, ‘EUJUST Themis in Georgia’, 100. 
503
 Kurowska, ‘The rule of law mission in Georgia’, 206. 
173 
 
Supreme Court. Also, many of the judges were dismissed and the newly appointed ones 
were reluctant to cooperate with the mission.
504
 On the other hand, in other areas such as 
the reform of the Prosecutor’s Office there was simply no interest in altering a status quo 
that provided the General Prosecutor with overwhelming power to the detriment of the 
defence and judges.  
6.2. EUJUST Themis and international cooperation in the 
area of criminal justice 
To some extent Themis played a significant role in coordinating the donor 
community in Georgia, succeeding in relaunching a donors’ information exchange in the 
field of rule of law.
505
 One mission expert points out that this was the responsibility of the 
recipient country, however, the Georgian authorities made little effort towards 
coordinating international efforts, either because of a lack of local capacity or because 
they ‘didn’t mind getting the same thing from several actors’.506 International donors’ 
roundtables were organised regularly and Themis actively participated in these, as well as 
in various seminars and conferences organised by other international donors.
507
 Several 
joint meetings between EUJUST Themis, other international donors working in the rule 
of law area and Georgian authorities took place. On 3 March 2005 the Deputy Head of 
Mission together with the Head of the EC Delegation, the personal representative of the 
Council of Europe Secretary General and the Head of the OSCE Mission to Georgia met 
Georgian Prime Minister Kemularia to discuss the competences of different international 
actors and the improvement of coordination among international donors and with 
Georgian institutions.
508
 On 14 March 2005 Themis participated in a meeting with the 
International Organisation for Migration (IOM) to discuss trafficking in human beings, a 
new ‘alien law’ and a law on labour migration.509 The mission also met with CoE 
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representatives on a number of occasions and attended various conferences organised by 
the CoE, on its own or in cooperation with the Georgian civil society.  
These events contributed to the development of international cooperation between 
international donors in the area of rule of law, although they fell short of supporting a 
coordinated approach to reform efforts. One particular international donor with which 
Themis appears to have had a relatively closer relationship was the Norwegian Rule of 
Law Mission (NORLAG) which, like EUJUST, had a one year mandate to advise the 
Georgian authorities on criminal justice-related issues. EUJUST Themis and NORLAG 
cooperated in a number of ways, including discussing legal developments in the Georgian 
criminal justice system, informing each other of their respective activities, priorities and 
working foci and participating in each other’s seminars and workshops.510 Coordination 
appeared to work more effectively in the field of penitentiary reform through the creation 
of a roundtable which included the OSCE, ICRC, Penal Reform International and 
TACIS, as well as one Themis expert.
511
 However, as far as penitentiary reform was 
concern, the main EU actor involved in the process was the European Commission with 
EUJUST Themis proving necessary support rather than leading the process. 
Some of the EUJUST Themis experts have been critical of the coordination 
between relevant international donors in Georgia. There was an abundance of 
international actors offering assistance in the area of rule of law – according to some 
accounts, there were up to 28 different rule of law organisations or programmes operating 
simultaneously, which not only failed to cooperate with one another but even withheld 
information from each other.
512
 While international donors’ meetings took place 
regularly, some of the participants claimed that the discussions lacked meaningful 
substance and did not actually contribute to better coordination of the international 
donors’ community.513 There was no division of labour between the various organisations 
on the ground and this resulted in significant duplication, but also in the Georgians 
receiving very different advice on similar issues. In depth coordination and cooperation 
with other donors would have been challenging for EUJUST Themis, given ESDP (sic!) 
                                                 
510
 Council of the European Union, ‘EUJUST Themis’, 30. 
511
 Helly, ‘EUJUST Themis in Georgia’, 98. 
512
 Interview EUJUST Themis expert, 11 September 2013, via Skype. 
513
 Interview EUJUST Themis expert, 16 October 2013 via Skype. 
175 
 
confidentiality rules. As a result, neither the OSCE not the US government were 
consulted on the drafting of the strategy.
514
 
The relationship between Themis and the various US programmes and 
organisations on the ground was a complex one. The inter-personal relations between EU 
and American experts on the ground was good as they shared a frustration with the 
constant personnel changes which meant activities such as training and mentoring were 
oftentimes wasted on individuals who were no longer in the positions they had been 
trained for.
515
 But on a more general normative level, the EU-US relationship became 
competitive. While American legal experts allegedly supported Themis’s concept of a 
criminal justice system that would reflect and be compatible with Georgia’s historical and 
political specificities
516
, there was no doubt that the Georgian leadership and many in the 
legal profession were drawn to American elements such as jury trial and plea bargaining. 
Themis experts are unambiguous about the existence of a clash between European and 
American legal philosophies, exacerbated by the fact that the Americans offered the 
Georgians significantly more financial support than EUJUST Themis and the EC 
Delegation in Tbilisi.
517
 The preference of the Georgians for an American-style criminal 
justice system resulted in the adoption of a number of legal norms and procedures which 
were at odds with the recommendations of Themis for the draft criminal strategy.  
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6.3. Planning for the implementation of Georgia’s criminal 
justice reform strategy 
The final stage of Themis aimed at formulating a plan for the implementation of 
the criminal justice reform strategy by a high-level strategy group composed of Georgian 
and Themis experts.
518
 However, given the delay in drafting the strategy, there was no 
time to complete the implementation phase before the end of the mission’s 12-month 
mandate. The proposal by Themis experts that the mandate be prolonged found no 
support in Brussels and Tbilisi and it was decided that instead a follow-up mission 
composed of two Themis experts would be located in the office of the EUSR Border 
Support Team.
519
 The follow-up mission was meant to be on the ground for six months, 
from September 2005 until February 2006, and its main task was to assist in close 
cooperation with the EC Delegation the Steering Committee set up by the Georgian 
authorities to draft an implementation plan for the recently adopted strategy. The Steering 
Committee had been established through the July 2005 presidential decree (No.549) 
which also formally approved the criminal justice strategy, but the lack of broader 
endorsement, as well as the poor communication with EU officials raised doubts about 
the prospects for implementation. Problematically, the strategy had not been discussed in 
and formally adopted by the Parliament
520
 and the mission only found out about its 
adoption when it was orally informed in July 2005 and it took several months for the 
information to be transmitted via official channels.
521
  
Under these circumstances there was, understandably, a degree of scepticism 
among Themis experts regarding the success of the implementation phase.
522
 Not only 
did the Georgian leadership show little interest in the process, but the precarious status of 
the judiciary as an independent branch of power diminished the chances of the strategy to 
be implemented. Nonetheless, the two follow-up Themis experts started their work in 
earnest. They began meeting Georgian officials all over again in an attempt find out the 
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concrete details of the Georgian’s side efforts at implementation. According to one of the 
experts, one of the most difficult things was to convince them to allocate money from the 
budget in order to implement measures such as providing training.
523
 It soon became 
clear that very little progress was being made with respect to planning the 
implementation of the strategy. By the time the follow-up mission concluded its activity 
in December 2005 only parts of the implementation plan had been realised, with other 
issues still outstanding, such as: deciding the allocation of budget, establishing deadlines 
for various tasks, etc.
524
 Rather than implementing the strategy that the mission had 
developed, to a large extent on its own but with the support of the sub-groups, the 
Georgians ended up cherry picking those parts of the strategy they wanted to enforce and 
discarding the ones which were against their interests.  
In a Report detailing the follow-up phase of the mission the Themis experts noted 
that, while over the six months since the end of EUJUST Themis a variety of judiciary 
reforms have been adopted that go beyond the scope of the strategy, ‘this process has 
turned into a political controversy’.525 Among the reforms that did comply with the 
Strategy the experts noted the use of the three tier (trial, appeal and cassation) court 
system; changes to the Organic law on common courts regarding the composition of the 
High Council of Justice; the Law on Disciplinary Proceedings; changes with regard to the 
functioning of the General Prosecutor’s Office, particularly structural changes, the 
elaboration of an Ethics Code, the establishment of clear and transparent criteria for the 
appointment of prosecutors. But overall they assessed that ‘reforms are not well planned 
and prepared, there is a lack of transparency’.526 The position of the Prosecution in the 
broader framework of the judicial system remained excessively powerful, with the 
General Prosecutor a member of the High Council of Justice (HCOJ) and thus part of the 
executive branch, rather than the judiciary.
527
 While there had been efforts at reforming 
the HCOJ through expanding its composition, the inclusion of the General Prosecutor as 
a member failed to redress the power imbalance between the judicial and executive 
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branches identified by EUJUST Themis at the very beginning of its mandate. Overall the 
HCOJ did not incorporate in its reform the principles stipulated by the Strategy, 
particularly the provision of fair and impartial assessment of the activities of judges in a 
transparent way with the participation of society.
528
  
Moreover, the criteria for judges’ promotion from lower instances to a higher one 
remained unspecified allowing anyone who met the general requirements (law education, 
5-years working experience in the legal field) or even a person with no judicial 
experience to be appointed for high instance court such as the Supreme Court.
529
 On the 
other hand, no progress had been made on clarifying the grounds for dismissal of judges 
and no steps had been taken towards granting life tenure to judges.
530
 The disciplinary 
prosecution of judges was to be carried out by a disciplinary council composed of four 
members of the HCOJ, contrary to Themis’s recommendations that the body in charge of 
such proceedings should function without interference from the HCOJ, in order to 
preserve the independence of the judiciary. The precariousness of the judges’ positions 
continued to worsen after the departure of the mission. The follow-up experts raised this 
issue in their final report noting that ‘prosecutors in criminal cases intimidate judges in 
order to reach verdict of guilty. Such influence of so-called ‘telephone justice’ – like it 
was widely spread practice during earlier times, also takes place in certain civil 
proceedings especially on privatisation cases’.531 
Whatever compliance with Themis’s recommendations and the criminal justice 
strategy was minimal and failed to address the entrenched political interference in judicial 
affairs that prevailed in Georgia. While Saakashvili’s anti-corruption reforms were hailed 
as a model for democratic reform in the Eastern Neighbourhood, the forceful removal of 
judges was often arbitrary and not based on any substantial proof of corruption. The 
result was the replacement of those who were considered Shevardnadze’s supporters with 
Western-leaning, but young and inexperienced, Saakashvili supporters. By the end of 
EUJUST’s mandate, the reforms in the criminal justice system had been selective and 
failed to effect the one fundamental change that would have put Georgia on the path to a 
                                                 
528
 Council of the European Union, ‘EUJUST THEMIS follow-up’, 8. 
529
 Council of the European Union, ‘EUJUST THEMIS follow-up’, 8-9. 
530
 Council of the European Union, ‘EUJUST THEMIS follow-up’, 9. 
531
 Council of the European Union, ‘EUJUST THEMIS follow-up’, 7. 
179 
 
truly rule of law-based democracy: the independence of the judiciary. Moreover, reforms 
were often cosmetic or merely limited to a rhetorical level, whereas their substantial 
content contradicted rule of law principles and the concrete recommendations of the 
mission.  
6.4. Explaining rule of law cooperation: failed rule transfer in 
the face of preferential misfit? 
Saakashivili’s regime came to power in the aftermath of the 2003 Rose 
Revolution with an ambitious plan for reform - centred around the need for state building 
and the eradication of corruption – and with strong political backing from the EU and the 
US. Rule of law reform efforts, particularly the fight against corruption, were high on the 
new government’s agenda532. It was thus believed that EUJUST Themis’s support in the 
reform of the criminal justice system could complement the government’s overall 
objective of reforming the justice system. But despite the seeming fit between EU reform 
efforts in the rule of law area and the political agenda of the Saakashvili government, it 
soon became clear that in practice the ‘rule of law’ was conceptualised differently in 
Brussels and Tbilisi. Saakashvili prioritised state building over democracy, aiming to 
create a strong, well-functioning and less corrupt state, even if that meant centralising 
power in the executive branch, curtailing press freedom and civil liberties and, crucially, 
undermining the independence of the judiciary.
533
 
Under the banner of the fight against corruption, Saakashvili’s government 
engaged in a thorough purge of the public administration, targeting ministry personnel, 
judges and prosecutors associated with the Shevardnadze regime.
534
 While this was done 
in the name of replacing the vested interest groups of Shevardnadze’s administration, the 
new leadership had no intention of allowing the judiciary to function independently. The 
government’s intrusion in judicial affairs was heavy handed and raised serious concerns 
among EU legal experts. A large number of judges were dismissed without due process 
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or pressured into resigning and the constitution was amended in order to strengthen the 
executive branch.
535
 This allowed the government to attempt to dismiss all the judges of 
the Supreme Court twice within the space of two months via legislative means, in a 
blatant breach of the independence of the judiciary.
536
 The mission alarmingly pointed 
out that such forceful removals ‘have a negative effect on the independence of the 
judiciary by creating an atmosphere of arbitrariness, lack of transparency and 
infringement upon the separation of powers of the branches of government’.537 The new 
government’s grip on the judiciary was consolidated through an institutional structure 
which tightly linked the two branches of power: the High Council of Justice was an 
advisory institution to the President, while being responsible for the appointment and 
dismissal of judges and initiating disciplinary proceedings against them. In effect, the 
President had competence to appoint and dismiss judges and to change the territorial 
jurisdiction of courts, something which the Venice Commission had already pointed out 
as a problem. 
EUJUST Themis was in a position to observe Saakashvili’s increasingly 
repressive tendencies as his regime pressed forward with what has been variously 
described as a ‘purification’ process538 or a purge of public administration personnel 
meant to cleanse ‘the state apparatus from the cronies of the old administration’.539 This 
created a volatile environment as ministers, judges and other legal professionals were 
removed, replaced and shuffled around in the state administration. According to EUJUST 
Themis, the personnel changes were often non-transparent and did not correspond to EU 
best practice, in addition to amounting to a loss of institutional memory and expertise.
540
 
Of particular importance was the replacement of high-ranking officials such as the 
Minister of Justice, the President of the Supreme Court, the General Prosecutor, the 
Ombudsman, etc, who were EUJUST Themis’s direct counterparts. Among the changes 
that took place within less than a month were: on 17 February 2005 Minister of Justice 
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Giorgi Papuashvili was replaced by Konstantine Kemularia, on 19 February President 
Saakashvili nominated a new Chairman of the Supreme Court and on 21 February the 
Chairman of the High Council of Justice resigned because of a conflict of interests.
541
  
The frequent changes in personnel were aimed at bringing easily controllable 
people into key positions, typically young, well-educated Georgian professionals who 
nonetheless lacked the necessary experience and political influence. Most of those who 
had been nominated for ministerial positions lacked relevant political and professional 
experience for such prominent roles. The Minister of Justice at the time of EUJUST 
Themis’s deployment was a 32-year old who had previously worked as the Director of 
the Program “Rule of Law” at the Open Society Georgia Foundation.542 The Chairman of 
the Supreme Court nominated by the President in February 2005 was 31-years old and 
had been the first deputy justice minister between 2000 and 2002 when Saakashvili 
himself was the Minister of Justice. Despite Saakashvili justifying the nomination as an 
attempt to bring in a politically unaffiliated person who could introduce genuine reforms, 
EUJUST Themis experts were critical of his lack of professional experience, particularly 
as he had never been a judge.
543
 Similarly, the new 32-year old General Prosecutor had 
never been a prosecutor and took over his role after a rapid succession of nominations as 
Minister of Justice (December 2003 – February 2004), and Minister for State Security 
(February–June 2004). Mission experts found it difficult to work with such young and 
inexperienced counterparts and doubted their political autonomy. There was a pervasive 
perception among EU legal experts that the new nominees were meant to replace those 
from the Shevardnadze era with personalities supportive of Saakashvili who engaged 
with the mission rhetorically but would not push through with the adoption and 
implementation of reforms if this contravened vested political interests.  
In addition to constantly changing the counterparts the mission was working with 
and nominating young, inexperienced and politically weak individuals in key positions, 
the government’s personnel purge also left entire institutions understaffed. As already 
mentioned, the mission itself was aware of at least two attempts to dismiss all the judges 
of the Supreme Court via legislative means which were fortunately unsuccessful due to 
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vocal national and international criticism.
544
 But perhaps the most prominent initiative of 
the Georgian government to rid itself of undesired judges was a so-called scheme for 
voluntary retirement whereby every judge was given the possibility to get a lifetime 
pension if they voluntarily retired. Given the insecurity and political pressures involved, 
many conceded, which resulted in the Supreme Court, lower courts and other institutions 
such as the Council of Justice becoming barely functional.
545
 An ongoing project of 
merging courts was also aimed at making judges redundant, despite its stated goal of 
improving efficiency and there are even suggestions that the government was trying to 
fabricate evidence in order to charge judges with corruption.
546
  
The consequence of these developments was a climate of fear and unpredictability 
for many in the legal profession who had no motivation to engage with EUJUST Themis 
without knowing whether they would be able to keep their jobs. The government’s 
heavy-handed tactics eventually made many in the justice system doubt the genuine urge 
of the Saakashvili regime to adopt and implement reforms that would protect the 
judiciary from political interference. Under these circumstances, working on a criminal 
justice strategy that might have not been supported by the government seemed futile. 
Judges in the Court of Appeal were extremely interested in the work of the mission and 
participated actively in drafting reform proposals but their efforts were made redundant 
by the unwillingness of the new Chairman of the Supreme Court to press ahead with 
reforms. While some of these judges were dismissed or pressured into resigning, the 
newly appointed ones were scared and very reluctant to cooperate with the mission.
547
  
These insights highlight a significant preferential misfit between Saakashvili’s 
political agenda – which sought to bring the judiciary under executive control – and 
EUJUST Themis’s ultimate goal of promoting the independence of the judiciary. The 
Georgian government perceived the need for a strong executive as a necessity in order to 
successfully complete the state building process which had been deemed as a higher 
priority than democracy building. Reflecting on the government’s achievements in his 
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first State of the Union address, Saakashvili boasted that ‘when people ask us about our 
main achievement, we say that our main achievement is that for the first time in modern 
history, Georgia has become a proper state’.548 In this interpretation, democracy could 
only fully take root once the structure of a strong state was in place. This sequence thus 
justified a temporary increase in the central powers of the executive. Significantly, these 
hastened efforts to build the Georgian state also allowed Saakashvili to accomplish 
concrete reforms, by improving the efficiency of tax collection, reducing corruption in 
the police force, improving service delivery and strengthening the military. These 
achievements were popular with the voters and enabled the government to present itself 
as visionary, energetic and dedicated to transforming Georgia into a country which can 
provide for and protect its citizens. With a broad mandate at home and extraordinary 
goodwill and support from the West, Saakashvili felt confident to compromise 
democracy in the name of state building while arguing that this was in the best interest of 
Georgia’s long-term development.  
The preferential misfit between EUJUST Themis’s efforts at promoting reforms 
conducive to strengthening the independence of the judiciary and Saakashvili’s attempts 
at controlling the judicial branch was also supported by the existence of an influential 
group of internal veto players. Following Tsebelis, veto players are defined as ‘actors 
whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo.’549 At a micro level, 
EUJUST Themis aimed to change the status quo in the Georgian criminal justice by 
supporting Tbilisi in drafting a new criminal justice strategy which was hoped would, 
among others, limit the prerogatives of the Prosecution. Also, it was hoped that the 
Prosecutor’s Office would become a better functioning, more streamlined institution, by 
improving the autonomy of individual prosecutors and the level of investigation. The 
problem was that, within the judiciary, the balance of powers was strongly tilted in favour 
of the Prosecution not only compared to the Defence, but also as far as the role of judges 
was concerned. Thus, the new prosecutors brought in to replace those from 
Shevardnadze’s era were very keen on preserving a status quo which gave them 
significantly more power than any other actors within the judiciary. There was immense 
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pressure on judges to rule in favour of the Prosecution, making acquittals unlikely and 
leading to exceptionally high rates of conviction and overcrowded prisons.  
EUJUST Themis noted at the end of its activity that, despite its own advice, 
Georgia’s ‘Strategy of procuracy envisages that prosecution will become part of state 
executive power and will not be part of judiciary. Currently, position of procuracy is 
stronger than of judiciary, therefore inclusion of the Prosecutor General in the 
composition of HCOJ [High Council of Justice] will lead to a breaking down of balance 
between state powers’.550 Even more aggravating, the mission, as well as other 
international organisations in Georgia, had received reliable information about cases of 
prosecutors intimidating judges in order to pass ‘guilty’ verdicts, a practice EU legal 
experts referred to as ‘telephone justice’.551 Given these circumstances, it is not surprising 
that the judges were the most cooperative of the mission’s counterparts while the 
Prosecutor’s Office and the Ministry of Interior were the most obtrusive.552 Prosecutors 
had no interest in altering the status quo because that would have resulted in diminishing 
their influence. The measures that EUJUST Themis was proposing – a decoupling of the 
Prosecution and the executive power, as well as transparent and impartial assessments of 
judges’ activities – would have deprived the Prosecution of the power to exert control 
over judges, a situation that the General Prosecutor’s Office clearly tried to avoid. The 
result of the obstructiveness of veto players from amongst the Prosecution’s ranks was 
that any measures proposed by EUJUST Themis that could have undermined their 
influence were ignored, while changes were introduced in the structure of the judiciary’s 
administration which strengthened the Prosecution’s position.553 
The overall impression created by the nature and extent of the Georgian 
government’s cooperation with EUJUST Themis was that Saakashvili tried his best to 
instrumentalise the role of the mission. While there was a genuinely domestic drive for 
fighting corruption and the pervasiveness of criminal groups in Georgian society, 
Saakashvili’s priorities were to remove parallel monopolies of violence, build effective 
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law enforcement institutions and restore public confidence in security structures. As one 
scholar observes, these objectives were meant to inspire respect for the state rather than 
for the rule of law.
554
 This is why the mission was often confronted with Georgian ideas 
that did not coincide with its recommendations, which sometimes resulted in domestic 
proposals for reforms that were not aligned to EU best practice. The Georgian political 
elite’s commitment to EUJUST Themis’s agenda was perceived by the mission as merely 
rhetorical and indicative of a desire for increased EU assistance rather than support for a 
particular programme of reforms.
555
 As one Themis expert argues, the formal request by 
the Georgian Prime Minster for EU assistance was simply one of many Georgian 
demands for international support, and did not necessarily signal a desire to improve the 
rule of law in accordance with EU norms.
556
 Also, there was a perception that President 
Saakashvili was interested in as much international assistance as possible in order to 
prove Georgia’s European and Western credentials and also to consolidate his leadership 
with support from the EU and US.
557
 
In addition to influential domestic veto players, there were other factors which 
reinforced the preferential misfit between the interests of the Saakashvili regime and 
EUJUST Themis’s mandate. Thus, while the Georgian government’s preferential misfit 
with EUJUST’s objectives stemmed from a fundamentally different vision of the role of 
the judiciary, there were also diverging preferences regarding the particular model of 
criminal justice system to be adopted (European vs American). In this sense, it can be 
argued that the US succeeded, due to the provision of side-payments and the preferential 
fit between the Georgian government’s interests and the American model of criminal 
justice system, to position itself as an alternative coalition to the EU with respect to the 
content of rule of law reforms. The prominent influence of the US in rule of law reform 
efforts in Georgia was acknowledged by the officials involved in the process of drafting a 
new Criminal Procedure Code, with some of them barely considering EUJUST Themis’s 
input and arguing that their main counterpart was the US Department of Justice.
558
  While 
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there was a counter-current led by the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association which 
collaborated with German experts from the German Agency for Technical Cooperation 
(GTZ) and was influenced by European law, their influence did not overshadow the 
American school of legal thought. This influence, in the view of EUJUST Themis legal 
experts, is inextricably linked to the US’ ability to provide the Georgian regime with 
wide ranging side-payments and thus increase even further the perceived benefits of not 
implementing EUJUST’s requests. The Georgian rule of law sector was characterised by 
a multitude of international donors and programmes whose work often overlapped. 
Nonetheless, the US was clearly the most influential international actor in Georgia, 
having had a long history of support for the South Caucasian country whose new and 
young political elite had predominantly been educated at American universities. 
According to EUJUST Themis experts, the US rule of law support for Georgia came with 
considerable leverage in the form of generous financial help.
559
  While the US 
ambassador had a large budget he could use at his discretion, the EC Delegation 
depended on the slow decision-making process in Brussels. This allowed for projects 
such as the establishment of a new Bar Association, the costs of which were entirely 
covered by the US, whereas the reforms required by Themis lagged behind. 
By contrast, EUJUST Themis was never meant to provide financial assistance or 
other material incentives, but rather aimed to ‘export brains’ and support the reform of 
the criminal justice system through high-quality legal expertise.
560
 But while the mission 
did not make use of side-payments in the form of capacity-building in order to determine 
Georgia to take steps to reform its criminal justice system, there was a perception within 
EUJUST Themis that the Georgian side expected financial and technical support in return 
for reforms. While the Georgian counterparts never challenged the mission openly, some 
of the EUJUST experts felt that there was an expectation of financial support from the 
mission, rather than merely advice and mentoring. When this did not materialise, the 
enthusiasm in Tbilisi for Themis and the willingness to embrace the proposed reforms 
subsided. One EU legal expert recalled how, when the reform of the Rustavi prison was 
discussed, the Georgian side expressed willingness to engage in refurbishing the prison 
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court and training personnel, provided the EU covered the expenses.
561
  Another Themis 
expert pointed out that the Georgians gave the impression they would adopt American-
inspired criminal justice procedures in exchange for money.
562
 Claims by Georgian 
governmental actors that they had excellent legal professionals and expertise but only 
needed financial resources reinforced the impression of mission experts that the Georgian 
side was not interested in their advice and mentoring, but in financial assistance. The 
contrast between what the mission, on one hand, and US financed programmes, on the 
other hand, could offer was stark. While EUJUST Themis’s mandate did not envision the 
provision of financial assistance, the financial support provided by the US was extremely 
generous.
563
  In the opinion of a majority of EUJUST Themis experts, it was this 
difference between the lack of capacity-building provided by the EU and the very 
substantial US support that tilted the balance in favour of an American-style criminal 
justice system in Georgia.  
As far as EUJUST Themis was concerned, the criminal justice model Georgia 
wanted to adopt was at odds with the mission’s reform proposals. Among the issues that 
raised alarm among EU legal experts were the introduction of jury trials and plea 
bargaining. Themis experts believed that, inspired as they were by the American legal 
model, these measures were incompatible with the political and legal realities in Georgia. 
While the mission was not recommending a certain national European model (given that 
the experts came from nine different countries), they went to great lengths to coordinate 
their input in order to provide Georgian counterparts with options that would suit their 
tradition, legal system and history.
564
  The American-inspired elements that Tbilisi 
wanted to adopt were deemed inappropriate for a small country like Georgia where 
corruption was endemic and efforts to tackle it were at the very beginning. The practice 
of plea bargaining in particular was criticised for allowing suspects to purchase 
temporary or permanent freedom by making a financial contribution to the state budget, 
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which however was not properly accounted for.
565
  These features of the US criminal 
justice system made the American model much more palatable to the Georgian decision-
makers than the European one, preserving the prominent role of the Prosecution and 
enabling high-level corruption. The preferential fit between the US system and the 
interests of the Saakashvili regime was thus in stark contrast to the strong preferential 
misfit with EUJUST Themis’s proposed model which sought to reduce the role of the 
Prosecution and minimise opportunities for corruption. 
Nonetheless, despite the preferential misfit between Themis and the Georgian 
government, this could have potentially been altered and even shifted to a certain degree 
of preferential fit if the EU had been able to offer Tbilisi certain side-payments. The EU, 
however, did not place any conditionality on rule of law reforms and had few concrete 
rewards to offer to Georgia at the time. EUJUST Themis was not reinforced with a 
financial assistance package which might have incentivised the Georgian side to 
cooperate. This, according to EUJUST Themis experts, made a significant difference 
when it came to choosing between a European and American criminal justice model. 
At the time of EUJUST Themis’s deployment in 2004 the EU was just beginning 
to define its relationship with its neighbours through the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP). While early scholarly analyses have criticised the potential effectiveness of the 
ENP given the lack of a membership perspective for the Eastern neighbours, recent 
studies have argued that conditionality can work even when it is not linked to the big 
‘carrot’ of accession, but to sectoral policy rewards, provided the policy changes required 
fit the preference of domestic political elites.
566
 EUJUST Themis’s reform proposals were 
not linked to specific rewards but were loosely embedded in Georgia’s newly embraced 
pro-Western policy orientation. The political leadership in Tbilisi was eager to receive 
any type of support and assistance from the EU, while Brussels itself was keen on 
showing its readiness to engage with Georgia in the aftermath of the Rose Revolution and 
assist the new government in its reform efforts.
567
 According to some accounts, the early 
stages of the post-Rose Revolution period were characterised by an unrealistic belief in 
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Tbilisi that Georgia would soon become a NATO and EU member.
568
 Thus, despite a 
lack of policy-specific conditionality and preferential misfit on the part of the Georgian 
government, the Georgian government was very much interested in a successful outcome 
of EUJUST Themis, even if that mean shallow reforms that were subsequently 
overturned.  
Although EUJUST Themis did not offer the Georgian government any side-
payments that could have altered its cost-benefit calculations, it did resort to a negative 
strategy of threats and political pressures which, nonetheless, proved of limited 
effectiveness. When the Georgian authorities failed to deliver the comprehensive draft 
strategy in April 2005, as initially agreed, Head of Mission Sylvie Pantz had no other 
choice but to attempt to put pressure on the Georgian government through Brussels. After 
informing the EUSR for the South Caucasus about the situation, Ms Pantz travelled to 
Brussels in the hope of mobilising political support at the EU level. As a result, Minister 
of Justice Konstantine Kemularia was summoned by the Political and Security 
Committee where he pledged that work on the criminal justice strategy would be 
intensified. However, the political pressure did not amount to negative conditionality 
because it did not imply sanctions for non-compliance, nor did it offer any additional 
incentives to spur the Georgians into cooperation with EUJUST Themis. Under these 
circumstances and given the challenges the mission had encountered up to that point – the 
preferential misfit between its own reform ideas and the criminal justice system model 
preferred by many in the Georgian government, as well as the presence of multiple veto 
players and the competing side-payments offered by the US– the direct pressure used by 
the EU was not likely to achieve more than shallow adoption of the measures proposed 
by Themis.
569
 Indeed, the Georgian authorities scrambled to produce a minimalist 
document by the new deadline in May, parts of which were entirely drafted by EUJUST 
Themis experts. The strategy was formally approved through presidential decree in July 
2005 but hardly any of its provisions were implemented and a large proportion of them 
were eventually changed in 2009.  
                                                 
568
 Interviews EUJUST Themis experts, February-October 2013. 
569
 Ademmer and Börzel, ‘Migration, Energy and Good Governance’, 584.  
190 
 
While EUJUST Themis was not accompanied by a ‘carrot and stick’ approach, it 
is doubtful whether the offer of side-payments or the use of more assertive threats could 
have facilitated the mission’s rule transfer agenda. Saakashvili’s idea of consolidating the 
Georgian state – and through this his own regime – was at odds with basic rule of law 
standards which require the existence of an independent judiciary. The political 
objectives of Saakashvili’s government and EUJUST Themis could not have been more 
radically opposed. This deep division left little room for a shift in the government’s 
preferential fit which would have made policy-specific conditionality and the provision 
of capacity-building an exercise in futility.  
6.5. Conclusion  
This chapter has investigated the extent to which the Georgian government was 
willing to effectively cooperate with the EUJUST Themis rule of law mission in the 
context of its rule transfer activities regarding Georgia’s criminal justice system. The 
findings reveal minimal, if any, effective cooperation between the incumbent regime in 
Tbilisi and the EU mission, with EUJUST’s recommendations being largely unheeded 
and its proposed legislative changes resisted and eventually overturned. The extensive 
preferential misfit between the Georgian government and Themis’s objectives has meant 
that complying with the rules advanced by the mission did not serve the goals of the 
incumbent regime. Saakashvili was keen on attracting as much EU involvement in 
Georgia as possible in order to consolidate his own position, which largely relied on a 
pro-Western, reformist political profile. However, his political agenda of strengthening 
the executive functions of the state at the expense of the independence of the judiciary 
was antithetical to EUJUST’s fundamental goals. The presence of influential veto players 
who also supported the status quo and strongly resisted Themis’s proposed reforms only 
consolidated Saakashvili’s position by blocking reforms in relevant rule of law 
institutions. In addition, the Georgian government also had a viable alternative coalition 
to turn to which not only provided it with a criminal justice system model more attuned to 
its preferences but also offered significant side-payments. The US legal system proved 
more compatible with the interests of the Georgian political leadership and the offer of 
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generous financial support helped strengthen the commitment to American-inspired rule 
of law reforms.  
On the other hand, the EU did not provide any side-payments that could have 
affected the strategic calculations of the Georgian government and thus potentially reduce 
the level of preferential misfit. As far as side-payments are concerned, the two elements 
that could have incentivised the Saakashvili regime to engage at least in shallow rule 
transfer – policy-specific conditionality and capacity-building - were absent from 
EUJUST Themis’s modus operandi. The pressure exerted by the PSC on Georgia’s Prime 
Minister in order to get the Georgian authorities to contribute their share to the criminal 
justice strategy draft resonated with a negative conditionality approach, but the lack of 
effective ‘sticks’ resulted in the strategy being never implemented and substantially 
modified even before the termination of EUJUST’s mandate. Not only were there no 
identifiable benefits for the Georgian government to transfer the rules advocated by 
EUJUST Themis, but a failure to do so did not incur any costs either.  
One incentive that had the potential to change the regime’s strategy and minimise 
the level of preferential misfit was capacity-building. While it might have not induced the 
Georgian government to extensively embrace Themis’s reform programme because the 
preferences of the Saakashvili regime for consolidating political power would have still 
been threatened by a genuinely independent justice system, the offer of capacity-building 
as a side-payment could have weakened the position of the US as an alternative coalition. 
This could have resulted in the choice of a European-style criminal justice system rather 
than an American one. However, EUJUST did not have a capacity-building mandate and 
operated on a limited budget which resulted in considerable discrepancy with the 
generous financial support provided by the US Department of Justice. Considering the 
existence of domestic veto players , as well as the absence of policy-specific 
conditionality and capacity-building and the strong position of the US as an alternative 
coalition,  , it is not surprising that the preferential misfit between the government and the 
mission emerged as particularly strong and resilient. As a result, the Georgian 
government engaged in limited cooperation with EUJUST Themis and failed to take on 
board most of its recommended reform proposals.  
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Chapter 7 
EUBAM and the promotion of border management and 
customs reforms: cooperation on rule transfer at the 
Moldovan-Ukrainian border 
This chapter examines the cooperation between EUBAM, on one hand, and the 
Moldovan and Ukrainian governments, on the other hand, in the context of the reform of 
the two countries’ border management systems and customs procedures. As such it 
focuses on the extent to which the rules promoted by EUBAM in these areas have been 
adopted and implemented by the relevant authorities. As opposed to EUBAM’s 
confidence-building activities, the rule transfer dimension of its mandate aims to trigger 
concrete reforms in the form of legislative, institutional and behavioural changes. Over 
the years the range of the mission’s activities has been significantly enlarged and now 
includes, among others, support for the reform of the border and customs services in 
Moldova and Ukraine towards increased modernisation and effectiveness, as well as 
capacity building of these services, contributing to organised crime prevention, fighting 
corruption and helping Moldova and Ukraine to approximate the border and law 
enforcement standards of the EU, particularly through Integrated Border Management 
(IBM). The first half of the chapter presents an account of EUBAM’s reform efforts in 
the border management and customs areas respectively, followed by an analysis of how 
incumbent regimes in Moldova and Ukraine chose their strategies - in this case a choice 
between a cooperative strategy including the adoption of rules promoted by EUBAM or 
an uncooperative strategy of rejecting the mission’s rule transfer mandate – under 
conditions of fixed preferences for political survival and power.  Thus, the second half of 
the chapter explores the impact of factors such as domestic veto players in Moldova and 
Ukraine, and the EU’s offer of side-payments in the form of policy-specific 
conditionality and capacity-building with regards to border management and customs 
reforms, on the formation of preferential fit at governmental level which in turn 
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determined the scope of cooperation and rule transfer between EUBAM and the 
incumbent regimes in Kiev and Chisinau.  .  
7.1. Reforming border management systems in Moldova and 
Ukraine 
Although when EUBAM was deployed in 2005 the ENP had just been launched, 
the gradual progress of the EU’s relationship with Moldova and Ukraine brought the 
mission’s activity into focus, particularly as the two countries started taking concrete 
steps towards the signing of Association Agreements with the EU. Thus, in recent years 
the mission became actively engaged in assisting the two countries in their efforts to 
achieve the legislative and institutional reforms required by the visa liberalisation and 
DCFTA processes. The new priorities under the Visa Liberalisation Action Plans 
(VLAPs) and the DCFTA happened to coincide to a large extent with EUBAM’s 
mandate, which meant that the mission was in a unique position to support the necessary 
reforms. Many of the newly emerging requirements had already been put in motion by 
EUBAM through its efforts towards improving border control, harmonisation of customs 
procedures and the implementation of Integrated Border Management systems. Thus, 
EUBAM’s role with respect to the rule transfer function must necessarily take into 
account the existence of overarching policy frameworks such as the VLAPs and DCFTAs 
and their potential for exercising policy-specific conditionality. Nonetheless, the mission 
has only recently become explicitly involved with these policy frameworks and the 
largest part of its mandate has been carried out relatively autonomously. In trying to 
account for both the independent role of the mission in rule transfer, as well as for the 
implications of the launching of the visa liberalisation and DCFTA processes in Moldova 
and Ukraine, this chapter empirically traces EUBAM’s record of promoting the adoption 
and implementation of border management and customs rules. 
Moldova and Ukraine initiated Visa Liberalisation Action Plans (VLAPs) in 2011 
and 2010 respectively. The VLAPs include four blocks of benchmarks related to: 1. 
Document security, including biometrics; 2. Border management, migration and asylum; 
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3. Public order and security; and 4. External relations and fundamental rights.
570
 As this 
chapter will show, benchmark 2 is the most relevant for EUBAM’s work and covers 
issues ranging from the consolidation of the legal framework for border management to 
the implementation of adequate border checks and procedures, improvement of inter-
agency cooperation and the adoption and implementation of migration and asylum 
policies. EUBAM has been at the forefront of a reform process in border management 
that aims to transform border guard services in Moldova and Ukraine in modern law 
enforcement agencies, an objective stipulated by the two countries’ respective Visa 
Liberalization Action Plans (VLAP). In practice this entailed a wide range of changes in 
the legislation, organisation and performance of border institutions which revolved 
around EU best practice and concepts. One of the fundamental concepts of European 
border systems is the Integrated Border Management (IBM) which incorporates three 
pillars: intra-service, inter-agency and international cooperation and coordination. 
EUBAM capacity building efforts have thus focused on advising partner services to 
create legislative frameworks that facilitate such cooperation, remove any legal 
provisions that might restrict opportunities for coordination and develop the necessary 
institutional structures and operational capabilities to sustain IBM. At the same time, 
EUBAM has tried to promote the EU intelligence-led policing model which places risk 
analysis at the heart of border management systems.
571
 This has meant that the mission 
has worked hard to equip Moldovan and Ukrainian border guard and customs services, 
but also other law enforcement agencies, with the knowledge, skills and equipment 
necessary for carrying out effective border control. 
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7.2. Legislative and regulatory border management reforms 
The mission’s efforts at supporting partner services in developing the necessary 
institutional and operational mechanisms to effectively carry out their tasks had to 
inevitably tackle the legislative and regulatory frameworks within which these were 
embedded. The mission worked extensively on reviewing relevant legislation in the area 
of border management, identifying gaps and obstacles and providing advice on legislative 
changes. The border guard services in Moldova and Ukraine were generally receptive to 
the suggestions and accordingly adapted their legal provisions. A first step towards legal 
reform was the improvement of the legal basis for the functioning and development of the 
partner services, with a focus on provisions establishing the areas of responsibility and 
concrete tasks of agencies. 
Following the introduction of the Moldovan Border Guard law - which 
incorporated EUBAM’s suggestions - the MDBGS underwent a restructuring process in 
2008 resulting in decentralisation within the service.
572
  Moreover, the MDBGS adopted 
a three-year ‘Plan of Institutional Development of the Border Guard Service 2009-2011’ 
which provided for the modernisation and enhancement of the capacities of the service, 
including strengthening its legislative basis, optimising the organisational structure and 
management system, introducing an IBM system, restructuring the staff training system, 
updating logistics and international cooperation.
573
 A series of legislative acts which lay a 
solid foundation for modern border management were adopted in 2011 and 2012: the 
'Law on the State Border'; the 'Law on Border Police' – which provided a good basis for 
demilitarisation and professionalisation of the Border Guard Service, subsequently 
transformed into a Border Police – and several legislative amendments meant to grant the 
Border Guard Service competencies for prosecution and examination of administrative 
offences, among others.
574
 As part of the process of reforming the Moldovan Border 
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Guards and converting the agency into a Border Police, EUBAM offered substantial 
support by assisting with the creation of the National Coordination Centre of Border 
Police and the establishment of the Centre for Dogs Training.
575
 
Through the ‘Concept on Development of the UASBGS for the period 2006-
2015’ Ukraine’s border guards service has undergone an intensive organisational and 
logistical reform process divided into three stages in order to reach compliance with 
European border standards.
576
 In 2009 Ukraine adopted a new ‘Law on border control’, 
based on the principles of the Schengen Borders Code.
577
 The law was significant 
because it contained a set of provisions underlying the secure management of state 
borders, as well as provisions on fighting corruption at border crossing points, and was 
deemed to largely meet European and international standards.
578
 In order to ensure the 
continued effectiveness and relevance of border–related legislation, EUBAM regularly 
reviews legal provisions and monitors implementation in order to ensure alignment with 
EU and international norms.
579
 While progress was made towards transforming the 
UASBGS into a modern law-enforcement authority, the EU raised the issue of the 
service’s role in crime prevention and investigation as being relatively limited and urged 
that the UASBGS ‘should be allowed to participate in the detection and investigation of 
cross-border crime in coordination with all competent law enforcement authorities’.580 
These recommendations notwithstanding, the European Commission reported in 2013 
that several provisions of the new Ukrainian Criminal Procedure Code further reduced 
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the competences of the UASBGS, who lost their right to carry out preliminary criminal 
proceedings to the Prosecutor’s Office.581  
Following a review of the organisational and management structures of the 
partner services, EUBAM made a series of recommendations with a view to improving 
their ability to deliver high-quality border management. As far as the border guards were 
concerned, demilitarisation and professionalization, including ending conscription, 
represented priorities. In line with international norms, the mission recommended that 
border guard services prioritise their policing functions over the military ones in order to 
establish an independent, specialised and professional service. MDBGS ended its 
conscript recruitment in 2011 with the last contingent of 200 conscripts ending service in 
2012.
582
 Ukraine had phased out conscription even earlier and by 2011 all the staff at the 
Moldovan-Ukrainian border was contracted.
583
 The two border guard services also 
progressed towards a less hierarchical management system through the simplification of 
their organisational structure – the MDBGS switched from a 4 to a 3-level management 
system, while the UASBGS shifted from a 5 to a 4-level one.
584
  
Another crucial area in need of change identified by EUBAM was the top-down, 
centralised management structures in the partner services.
585
 This limited the possibilities 
for inter-agency and cross-border cooperation which are essential aspects of an Integrated 
Border Management system. With respect to inter-agency cooperation, the rather closed 
institutional environments of counterpart services meant that interaction was limited to 
the central level. The mission argued strongly for an ‘integrated approach to justice, law 
enforcement and border management’, as the best way to cope with the diverse 
challenges of modern border management.
586
 Following EUBAM’s recommendations, 
there seemed to be noticeable improvements in the willingness of services to cooperate, 
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both at central and regional level. This materialised in a number of encouraging 
initiatives, including joint training for mobile units, coordination between UASBGS, 
local police and tax authorities, and a joint operation resulting in a significant seizure in 
Otaci, Moldova.
587
 However, there remained a significant level of poor inter-agency 
cooperation in Ukraine, such as in the cases of the criminal justice system, and between 
border guard and customs services (exemplified by the handling of a stolen vehicles case 
in Odessa). In order to address this issue, EUBAM suggested that joint investigation 
teams should be created. In 2007 progress was noted in cooperation between border 
guard and customs services, as well as between the UASBGS and the traffic police and 
between MDCS, the Moldovan Police and the local Interpol office. At local level, 
significant progress was made in the implementation of joint border checks of cars and 
buses by border guards and customs officers, joint vehicle searches and joint checks of 
railway passengers.
588
  
7.3. Operational border management reforms 
The development of risk analysis capabilities within the organisational structures 
of partner services has been at the forefront of EUBAM’s capacity-building efforts, as an 
area of crucial importance in the approximation of border management in Moldova and 
Ukraine with European best practice.
589
 The initial focus of the mission in this area was 
the development of central-level risk analysis concepts and analytical units in each 
service. The foundations of such systems were established throughout 2006, with MDCS 
in the process of populating their database, both Moldovan services recruiting analysts 
and liaison officers, and the State Customs Service of Ukraine (SCSU) rolling out its 
quantitative risk analysis system at the local level.
590
 Risk Analysis Advisors were 
collocated at the central level in all four services which was hoped would ‘provide the 
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intellectual space that will, in time, be filled by the bottom-up developments that the 
mission is supporting’.591 
In 2007 the border guard services of Moldova and Ukraine and the State Customs 
Service of Ukraine implemented EUBAM’s recommendations and established regional 
Risk Analysis units.
592
 In 2008, Moldova and Ukraine continued to make progress in 
their development of risk analysis capabilities with the help of EUBAM, who provided 
service tailored risk profiles, reports identifying main criminal routes, trends and modi 
operandi related to illegal migration, trafficking in human beings, drug trafficking, 
vehicle trafficking, meat and cigarette smuggling and customs fraud.
593
 A brief look at 
the counterpart services reveals the enhanced risk analysis capacities acquired as a result 
of EUBAM support: MDBGS started elaborating risk assessment reports, risk forecasts 
and risk profiles, developed an intelligence database and renewed the information 
gathering process in line with EU best practice; the MDCS reinforced its Risk Analysis 
Unit, established an Intelligence Unit and promoted the reduction of the frequency of 
selective controls at the border; the UASBGS completed its risk analysis operational 
infrastructure and introduced risk analysis in the curriculum of the Border Guard 
Academy; UASCS upgraded the national automated risk analysis system, but EUBAM 
noted that the application of risk-based selectivity needed to be further improved. 
EUBAM’s Risk Analysis Advisors collocated in each of the four counterpart services 
played a crucial role in these developments, working on a daily basis with the Risk 
Analysis Units in the respective services and assisting with improving the quality and use 
of risk analysis products.
594
 
In order to ensure the sustainability of operational capacity building, EUBAM 
regularly evaluates border control procedures. In 2012 EUBAM was involved in 
overseeing the implementation of EU standards in second line border checks by partners. 
The mission assisted partner service in the selection process of travellers and vehicles 
planning to cross the Moldovan-Ukrainian state border, delivered a series of on-the-job 
training sessions on the methodology of travel document examination, provided 
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assistance in data gathering and border checks at Odessa and Illichevsk ports and helped 
with the implementation of the pre-arrival information system at Giurgiulesti port.
595
 
Reflecting the importance accorded by the mission to risk analysis as a fundamental 
methodology for border controls, EUBAM carried out eight one-day seminars on risk 
analysis to 57 representatives of the MDBP and 60 representatives of UASBGS, as well 
as seminars on risk profiling of travellers and facial recognition to 28 trainers from the 
MDBP and UASBGS.
596
  
7.4. Implementing effective border control: fighting against 
cross-border organised crime 
In order to evaluate border control at BCPs and on the green and blue border 
between Moldova and Ukraine and customs control at BCPs, EUBAM carried out a 
number of Joint Assistance Actions (JAAs) in 2011. The findings underlined that 
significant progress had been achieved in this area by all partner services. Thus, it was 
revealed that the infrastructure of most of the road BCPs in Moldova and Ukraine is 
adequate; EU best practices such as basic first line check equipment are in place at most 
BCPs on the common border; border check procedures are performed by border guards 
with good level of professional knowledge and skills; infrastructure and equipment of 
border guard posts are effective, although more so in Ukraine than in Moldova; border 
surveillance is carried out by both MDBGS and UASBGS through technical monitoring 
and patrolling in high risk areas; customs procedures were significantly improved in a 
number of areas: IBM, delegation of authorities from regional to local level, risk analysis, 
simplification of customs procedure, improvement of customs examination at BCPs, 
electronic customs clearance, accelerating customs clearance procedures and facilitating 
trade and traffic flow at BCPs.
597
 
Moreover, EUBAM’s Annual Report for 2013 assessed that ‘there is clear 
evidence of the improvements in the effectiveness of border checks […] in both services’. 
Not only did border control and surveillance measures improve in terms of procedure and 
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professionalism, but they also produced the desired results. As early as 2006 the 
implementation of EUBAM’s advice by partner services with regard to applying selective 
checking or tactical risk analysis resulted in improved effectiveness of border control 
procedures, as exemplified by increased rates of detections and seizures (i.e. a large 
consignment of contraband cigarettes in Odessa port and a case of undervaluation in 
Moldova).
598
 This trend continued, as shown in the mission’s Annual Report for 2013, 
which observed a notable increase in the detection of impostors and forged travel 
documents, detained trespassers on border crossing points and stolen vehicles, compared 
to the previous year.
599
 In 2010 the number of total violations of the state border 
decreased significantly compared to the previous year, from 1175 cases in 2009 to 665 
cases in 2010 (43% decrease). The figures for migration-related border apprehensions 
decreased by 29 percent in 2010 compared with the previous year (166 persons in 2010 
and 236 in 2009). As a further confirmation that EUBAM training is effective and does 
contribute to the improvement of border checks, the case of an alleged trafficker and a 
THB victim who were profiled on their way to Dubai is illustrative. The MDBP officers 
who carried out the profiling had been trained on profiling of THB victims during a 
EUBAM training event two months before.
600
 
EUBAM has taken a pro-active approach in supporting partner services in their 
border control and surveillance activities. The mission has advised counterpart services 
on the optimisation of passenger passport control through the streamlining of checking 
procedures, the avoidance of duplication and the integration of additional checks on 
foreign nationals into normal protocol.
601
 The mission’s support in the examination and 
inspection of vehicles and related documents has been of particular importance, in light 
of the high number of irregularities related to the crossing of BCPs by vehicles.
602
 
EUBAM’s recommendations regarding the maximisation of existing equipment and 
resources, together with the BOMMOLUK project which addressed many technical 
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needs of the partners, ensured that rigorous border management continued to be carried 
out without major investments from Moldova and Ukraine.
603
  
In 2008 border guard and custom services in Moldova and Ukraine became 
engaged in the Working Group on the Development of Jointly Operated BCPs. In order 
to assess how effective a jointly operated border crossing point would be and to 
determine the future basis for the concept of joint border control, the four services, at 
EUBAM’s recommendation, decided to set up a pilot project – the jointly operated BCP 
Briceni-Rossoshany. The mission assisted representatives from the customs and border 
guards in both countries to draft a protocol and supporting documents to facilitate the 
operation of the BCP and procured the necessary equipment to establish a data link 
between Rossoshany and Briceni.
604
 The concept of the JOBCP aims to unify and 
optimise border control procedures in order to reduce legal border crossing times by 
having border guards and police perform their duties ’shoulder-by-shoulder’ in one 
booth. Initial assessments of the project indicated positive results, with a decrease in 
crossing time of 15-20% in the first six months and several joint incident detections by 
the partner services .
605
 Having proved its success through faster movement of traffic and 
indications of greater transparentcy, JOBCP Rossoshany-Briceni served as an example 
for the development of other JOBCPs which are expected to enhance the efficiency of 
Moldovan-Ukrainian border cooperation.
606
  
EUBAM’s support of partner services in their efforts to prevent cross-border 
crimes has focused on ‘prevention, detection and investigation of transborder offences. 
This is done through support in risk analysis and investigations and through joint 
operations’.607 Thus, a significant part of the mission’s efforts was directed towards the 
identification of levels and trends in cross-border organised crime at the Moldovan-
Ukrainian border and providing partner services with the instruments and skills to 
perform such analyses themselves. One such instrument is the Common Border Security 
Assessment Report (CBSAR), a flagship EUBAM initiative, whose role is to provide the 
necessary information for developing an effective crime prevention strategy through 
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identifying risks and modi operandi and sharing this information with all relevant 
agencies. In 2008, on the basis of trend analysis of the quarterly CBSARs, EUBAM 
alerted partner services about emerging trends of illegal activity, including trafficking of 
hard drugs. Several seizures of drugs in Odessa port supported the mission’s suggestion 
of a trafficking route which used ports in Ukraine, transited Moldova and entered the 
EU.
608
  
Another important element in the fight against trans-national organised crime is 
effective operational information exchange. Moldova and Ukraine signed a Protocol on 
Operational Information Exchange in 2006 which established a good basis for 
information exchange between the border guard services of the two countries. Thus, since 
2006 the quality of the statistics exchanged has improved, and the frequency of the 
exchange has increased.
609
 EUBAM has been instrumental in establishing two further 
crucial mechanisms for the prevention of cross-border crime: working groups and task 
forces. The mission has made a key contribution to the establishment and development of 
working groups, helping partner services to investigate criminal cases and identify new 
trends in criminal activity. There are four working groups supporting information 
exchange and coordination at intra-agency, inter-agency and international level whose 
goal is to combat cross-border crime in the areas of illegal migration and trafficking in 
human beings, smuggling and intellectual property rights protection. In addition to the 
working groups, EUBAM has also established four task forces meant to offer information 
exchange and help coordinate law enforcement operational activities: Task Force Arms, 
Task Force Drugs, Task Force Tobacco and Task Force Vehicle Crimes.  
Joint border control operations (JBCOs) strengthen inter-agency and international 
cooperation, which in turn is a key aspect in the prevention of and fight against cross-
border crimes. Since the beginning of its activity, EUBAM has facilitated eleven JBCOs. 
JBCO OVIDIU, launched in 2012, resulted in 116 incidents being reported by the partner 
services, with the support of EUBAM and international partners. These involved the 
confiscation of 100.000 cigarettes, 19 vehicles, 3.896 litres of alcohol and two weapons, 
charges against 81 persons for violations of the border regime, the detention of 13 illegal 
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migrants and 3 facilitators and the detection of non-declared consumer goods in ten cases. 
Overall the value of seized goods reached €300.000. Of particular importance was the 
level of exchange of actionable intelligence and the high number of investigations 
developed, indicative of the effectiveness of the JBCO.
610
 In 2011, JBCO PODOLIA 
reported 95 incidents, including the confiscation of more than 800.000 pieces of 
cigarettes, 17 vehicles, 267 pills containing psychotropic substances, 603.5 litres of 
alcohol, 1.590 grams of mercury and 15.724.250 Russian roubles; 24 persons were 
detained for illegal border crossing and 54 persons were sanctioned for violations of the 
border regime; non-declared consumer goods were detected in 12 cases and the total 
amount of seized goods reached €600.000.611  
As far as irregular migration and trafficking in human beings are concerned, 
EUBAM carried out extensive work in trying to identify trends in irregular border 
crossings. It detected relatively large-scale illegal migration on the Transcarpathian route 
(Ukrainian-Slovak border) which was used by smugglers to cross migrants into the EU 
and offered advice to Ukraine on the return of migrants.
612
 Another route identified by 
the mission was across the Ukrainian-Moldovan border and via Odessa port through 
Ukraine towards the EU. With respect to a case of traffic in human beings and sexual 
exploitation of children in Moldova, EUBAM facilitated cooperation between 
representatives of EU member states and Moldova’s Center for Combatting Trafficking 
of Persons.
613
 In 2013 the mission supported partner services in investigating cases of 
irregular migration of Iranian and Afghani citizens and helped identify a new trend of 
irregular migration via the Criva-Mamaliga joint BCP.
614
 The mentoring and training 
provided by EUBAM to field officers proved effective in improving their skills, 
including their interview techniques, which led to an increase in the detection of forged 
documents (passports and Schengen visas).
615
 The mission, together with the IOM 
Missions in Moldova and Ukraine and the law enforcement agencies of the two countries 
produced a Report on Irregular Migration and Trafficking in Human Beings at the 
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Moldovan Ukrainian Border 2012. The report highlighted improvements of border and 
migration management systems in the framework of the visa liberalisation process and an 
enhanced ability of Moldovan and Ukrainian authorities to control irregular migration, 
but more importantly a decreasing trend in irregular migration.
616
 Nonetheless, this trend 
is not thoroughly positive, given the conclusion of the ENP Progress Report for 2014 that 
Moldova continues ‘to be a source country for the trafficking of men, women and 
children.
617
 
Drug smuggling represented a significant phenomenon on the Moldovan-
Ukrainian border long before EUBAM’s deployment. The mission identified several 
drug-smuggling routes and offered recommendations for tackling the issue. One of the 
routes detected passed through Northern Moldova and involved minor drugs (marijuana) 
cases. In light of a seizure of marijuana on a Chisinau-Russia train, EUBAM 
recommended the strengthening of law enforcement cooperation between Moldova, 
Ukraine and Russia.
618
 Over the following years the seizures of drugs became 
increasingly significant, with the mission concluding in 2007 that the detections are ‘risk 
indicators that Ukraine is a possible drugs trafficking route.
619
 In 2013 only EUBAM 
assisted in the investigation of several drug smuggling cases: ecstasy trafficking from 
Poland to Ukraine, heroin trafficking from Romania to Moldova, and Iran to Ukraine, and 
raw opium trafficking from Iran to Ukraine and Canada.
620
 As part of the efforts of Task 
Force Drugs to identify large drugs shipments, EUBAM initiated a joint control operation 
in 2013 - ‘PONTUS EUXINUS’ - which included the countries of the Black Sea Basin 
and transhipment ports on the Mediterranean Sea. The objective of the operation was to 
map out criminal activities in the region in order to take appropriate measures for 
preventing maritime drug trafficking. With the support of the mission, the partner 
services investigated several serious drug smuggling cases. By 2014 the proportion of 
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drug-related crimes had decreased
621
 , a development which confirmed the effectiveness 
of EUBAM-promoted regional cooperation between law enforcement agencies.
622
 
 
7.5. The reform of customs procedures and trade facilitation  
There are a number of measures under Moldova’s and Ukraine’s DCFTA 
provisions covered by EUBAM’s mandate, most notably the  requirements that fall under 
the ‘customs and trade facilitation’ chapter providing for the simplification of customs 
formalities, prevention of customs fraud and alignment of legislation and procedures with 
international standards.
623
 These provisions include more specific issues that EUBAM 
has closely been involved with, such as rules of origin and classification and valuation, 
among others. The rest of this section explores EUBAM’s rule transfer activities with 
respect to customs and trade-related reforms. While the mission has been involved in 
these areas since its deployment in 2005, the extensive requirements of the DCFTA 
implementation have triggered greater engagement on the part of EUBAM and stronger 
commitment on the part of the host countries.  
When it comes to implementing trade policy, the challenge is to achieve the right 
balance between trade facilitation and ensuring the integrity of customs procedures in 
order to protect the interests of state and society. EUBAM’s efforts in Moldova and 
Ukraine have been directed towards achieving this balance. Perhaps EUBAM’s greatest 
contribution to enhancing customs revenue was its monitoring of the implementation of 
the Joint Declaration between Ukraine and Moldova, which ensured that Transnistrian 
companies register with the Moldovan authorities and carry out legal foreign trade 
activities. The registration of Transnistrian companies with the State Registration 
Chamber of Moldova and the clearance of their goods with the Moldovan Customs 
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Service has meant that Moldova’s customs revenues have been significantly enhanced 
since the new customs regime came into force in 2006. Thus, as of 2010 the exports of 
Transnistrian companies had brought approximately €1.804 billion to Chisinau’s budget, 
while the import activities amounted to €364.143 million.624 
The mission can also be said to have contributed to enhancing customs revenue 
by supporting the process of modernisation of the customs services in Moldova and 
Ukraine and thus strengthening their ability to collect revenues. The Moldovan Customs 
Service underwent a significant restructuring process over the past years. The most 
important change was the modification of the legal framework which subordinated 
MDCS to the Ministry of Finance as of 2009, accompanied by several rounds of internal 
reorganisation which saw the reduction of customs bureaus, the restructuring of central 
level functions and the approval of a new structure of the MDCS HQ with a focus on 
intelligence and operational work.
625
 The institutional reforms which the Customs 
Services in Moldova adopted are embedded into a broader framework of preparation for 
Moldova’s adherence to the DCFTA and the Association Agreement with the EU. In the 
run-up to the initiation of the EU Autonomous Trade Preferences for Moldova in 2008, 
an intensification of institutional, administrative and operational upgrades related to 
customs services could be noted. Legal and operational amendments were made in order 
to allow MDCS to issue preferential certificates of origin for exports to the EU, which 
brought the procedure in line with the standards of the European Union.
626
 The mission 
also contributed to strengthening the capacity of Moldova’s customs authority to verify 
the origin of goods, allowing it to facilitate legitimate trade.
627
 Among other 
developments were the harmonisation of regulations on Intellectual Property Rights with 
EU legislation in 2008 and the modification of the Moldovan Customs in 2009 based on 
EU customs acquis.
628
 Also, the MDCS established ‘Post-clearance’ Audit and Origin 
Departments in line with EC recommendations.
629
 As far as the UASCS is concerned, it 
too has adopted a series of reforms as part of its accession to the WTO in 2008. These 
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included the unification and simplification of Ukrainian customs legislation in line with 
international standards on issues such as the identification of the country of origin and the 
right to suspend customs clearance of goods.
630
  
Strengthening the ability of MDCS and UASCS to collect customs revenues and 
increasing their value represented a priority for EUBAM’s mandate and the mission 
worked towards providing the partner services with the necessary operational and 
institutional tools. A crucial part of this process was the introduction and operation of the 
Pre-Arrival Information Exchange System (PAIES) by Ukraine and Moldova and the 
post clearance audit and control function.
631
 According to EUBAM’s own assessment 
‘PAIES succeeded in preventing and fighting customs fraud and increasing compliance, 
and therefore revenue’.632 PAIES, which allows the exchange of import/export 
information, has been operational since 2008 and has already proved its effectiveness in 
preventing customs fraud. Based on its successful operation on the Moldovan-Ukrainian 
border, the information exchange system will be replicated on the Belarus-Ukraine border 
through an EU funded project – PRINEX – due to become operational in 2015 .633  Data-
sharing has not only improved operational coordination, but has also enhanced trust-
based relations between services and has helped curb corruption.
634
  
In 2007 the mission identified a number of risks to the correct implementation of 
trade policy and the integrity of customs revenues: the undervaluation of many 
commodities and goods, including luxury vehicles and consumer goods which distorts 
markets and defrauds the state budget; the falsification of certificates of origin to goods 
which is designed to avoid payment of customs duties on imports and results in huge 
losses of revenue to the state budget (of Ukraine in this case – foodstuffs imported to 
Moldova from a non-CIS country, temporarily warehoused, legalised with false 
certificates of origin and then exported to Ukraine, benefiting from intra-CIS trade 
agreements). EUBAM supported a joint investigation by Moldovan and Ukrainian 
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agencies which revealed a large number of cases concerning forged certificates of origin, 
but additional work is necessary in order to ensure prosecution and convictions.
635
 In 
2009 the mission concluded that the concept of trade facilitation and a service mentality 
were well understood in the partner services, but that improvement was still needed, 
particularly in customs, if Moldova and Ukraine are to become more attractive to 
business.
636
 
Inter-agency cooperation at BCPs has been identified by EUBAM as not only a 
significant aspect of IBM, but also one of the crucial factors that enhance trade 
facilitation.
637
 In 2012 EUBAM assisted partner services in establishing regular working 
sessions which can provide a platform for cooperation between border control agencies 
and the implementation of the ‘one-stop shop’ and ‘single window’ concepts.638 The 
mission also supported efforts at capacity building at the local level, providing joint 
training to local managers on risk analysis and elaborating guidelines for the 
implementation of one-stop shop in the field offices.
639
 The mission was intensely 
involved in the implementation of the One-Stop-Shop concept, organising evaluation 
meetings and fact-finding missions which were able to establish that legislative gaps and 
infrastructural shortcomings continue to exist and prevent the full-scale implementation 
of the concept.
640
  
7.6. The fight against corruption  
EUBAM’s work in the area of corruption has been particularly challenging with 
respect to both border management and customs and trade related issues. While the initial 
adoption by partner services of anti-corruption legislation and regulatory frameworks was 
promising, it was not followed by rigorous implementation and did not result in an 
improvement of the corruption climate within border and customs agencies. Ukraine 
consistently lagged behind in fulfilling anti-corruption requirements, delaying the 
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developing of a national anti-corruption strategy, inconsistently developing Regional 
Action Plans on Combating Corruption across a limited number of UASBGS 
detachments and customs houses, and failing to make some of the regulatory frameworks 
legally binding (i.e. the UASCS Code of Conduct).
641
 Given the pervasive corruption 
present within Moldova’s and Ukraine’s state administrations, and particularly the border 
guard and customs services, the mission’s anti-corruption activities have tended to focus 
on the less controversial area of public education. In collaboration with a working group 
including representatives of Moldovan and Ukrainian partner services and academic 
institutions, EUBAM contributed to the development of an Anti-Corruption Training 
Curriculum and has been supporting its introduction as a training component for officers 
in the border guard and customs services.
642
 In Ukraine the curriculum was included in 
the Customs education system, while the border guards adopted it as a distance learning 
package. The mission is also involved in a wide-ranging civil society outreach initiative 
which aims to provide educational events to schools and universities and raise awareness 
of corruption and good governance issues. One of EUBAM’s flagship projects in this 
area is the Anti-Corruption summer school which is organised on an annual basis and 
includes students from both countries, as well as representatives from the border guard 
and customs services academies.
643
 The mission has also been involved in organising 
three international schools ‘Youth against Corruption’ in cooperation with the UASBGS 
and the Centre for Combatting Economic Crimes and Corruption (CCECC) in 
Moldova.
644
 
 A particular area of interest for EUBAM in the context of anti-corruption 
activities has been the integrity and human resources management of partner services. All 
four partner services adopted a number of preventive measures aimed at tackling 
corruption, including a rotation system of personnel, regular training events, the use of 
CCTV and psychological tests, the implementation of a new remuneration system which 
reduces the possibility for corrupt behaviour, as well as the creation of a database to 
register corruption offenders and the use of ‘undercover’ officers to identify corruption 
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cases.
645
 However, Ukraine has been unwilling to take cooperation with EUBAM further 
and as a result the mission has only been invited to carry out Integrity Risk Assessments 
for MDCS and the Moldovan Border Police.
646
 Under these circumstances, EUBAM has 
not been able to do more than provide general recommendations on integrity aspects of 
human resource management.  
As part of its anti-corruption work EUBAM also offered operational support, 
providing concrete advice on the improvement of procedures to reduce opportunities for 
corruption on the ground. JBCPs were identified as useful frameworks for promoting 
anti-corruption through peer accountability. In 2010 the mission initiated an innovative 
project meant to reduce corruption levels and improve the professional integrity of 
officers at BCPs, as well as demonstrating that it is possible to achieve concrete results in 
the fight against corruption provided there is strong commitment and dedicated 
leadership. Known as the ‘Model Border Crossing Point’ pilot project, the initiative 
established two ‘excellent’ BCPs at Tudora-Starokozache and Moghilev-Podolskiy-Otaci 
where mission staff works closely with field officers in order to advise and monitor on 
compliance with anti-corruption measures.
647
 In addition, each BCP carries out an annual 
survey in order to assess public perceptions regarding the levels of corruption and the 
quality of service experienced by members of the public at these particular BCPs. The 
results of the surveys have not indicated that travellers are significantly happier with the 
levels of integrity at the model BCPs, prompting the mission to assess that ‘both the 
measures and the surveys require reappraisal to be more consistent and effective’.648 
EUBAM has advocated that the project is replicated at all the other BCPs with partner 
services taking greater ownership of anti-corruption efforts and the mission taking a 
supporting role. However, it is questionable whether this idea would garner the support of 
the partner services given the pervasive levels of corruption at border crossing points.  
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7.7. Explaining EUBAM’S rule transfer: selective reforms 
and mixed results 
The mission enjoyed from the very beginning unprecedented support across the 
political leadership in Chisinau because the government was deeply supportive of the 
mission’s objective to contribute to the implementation of the Joint Declaration between 
Moldova and Ukraine. The main interest of the Moldovan government was in the 
mission’s contribution towards enforcing the difficult customs regime on the Moldovan-
Ukrainian border by coercing Transnistrian companies to function under Chisinau’s 
authority. Nonetheless, the mission also served other politically significant purposes for 
Moldova’s government, not least of which was EUBAM’s alleged ability to curb the 
illegal export of weapons from Transnistria. Moldova had long claimed that Transnistria 
was a source of large-scale arms smuggling and there were even suspicions of nuclear 
material trafficking. However, these allegations had never been proved and it had been 
argued that they were merely a result of Chisinau’s efforts to put pressure on Tiraspol.649 
When EUBAM’s investigations concluded that no evidence had been found to confirm 
these reports, Moldova interpreted the findings as proof of EUBAM’s effectiveness in 
deterring arms smuggling from Transnistria. This narrative emerges time and again from 
conversations between Moldovan officials and US diplomats in Chisinau. Thus, during a 
meeting with US diplomats in October 2007 Moldovan Prime Minister Vasile Tarlev 
‘praised EUBAM’s work and stated that he believed it had stopped the export of arms 
from TN [Transnistria]’650, while Voronin himself ‘expressed his gratitude for the 
introduction of EUBAM, noting that it had disappointed both Russia and Transnistria 
because arms trafficking had stopped’.651 EUBAM officials believe that both Chisinau 
and Tiraspol have appropriated the results of the mission’s investigations for their own 
political purposes: the former to claim that arms trafficking had been indeed taking place 
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but was stopped by EUBAM and the latter to show that there was no illegal weapons 
smuggling taking place in the first place and EUBAM had uncovered the reality behind 
Moldova’s accusations.652 
On the other hand, Ukraine had a slightly different attitude towards EUBAM. 
While the mission enjoyed strong support at the highest political levels given 
Yushchenko’s goal of strengthening Ukraine’s European credentials, there was a clear 
sense that the main beneficiary of the mission’s presence was Moldova and that Kiev was 
merely doing its neighbour a favour. This created a situation of heightened uncertainty 
with every renewal of EUBAM’s mandate because Ukraine would typically suggest it 
was considering terminating its contribution to the mission. This was partly the result of 
what has been variously described as the ‘corporate self-assurance’ of a large and 
‘arrogant’ country, but was also meant to extract as many concessions regarding 
EUBAM’s mandate as possible. The implication of this non-committal attitude was that 
the continued presence of EUBAM on the ground could never be taken for granted as far 
as Ukraine was concerned. The possibility of Ukraine withdrawing from cooperation with 
the mission featured prominently in negotiations for the renewal of EUBAM’s mandate 
and has been a great cause of anxiety for Moldovan officials over the years.
653
 In the 
early stages of the mission’s deployment Kiev was reluctant to accept the mission’s 
competences, including EUBAM’s right to make unannounced visits at checkpoints 
along the Moldovan-Ukrainian border.
654
 As a result, the mission decided to announce its 
visits in order to strengthen mutual trust and show the Ukrainian counterparts that its 
approach to cooperation was flexible and took into account the concerns of local actors.  
Despite the different positions of the Moldovan and Ukrainian governments vis-à-
vis EUBAM, it is safe to say that neither of them represented particularly strong driving 
forces behind the transfer of EU-inspired border management reforms. The main interest 
for both Moldova and Ukraine under Voronin and Yushchenko rested with the 
implementation of the customs regime rather than the extensive range of legal, 
institutional and operational reforms that EUBAM was proposing. That being said, 
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neither government was opposed to these changes and was willing to passively support 
any reforms that would not contravene important political interests and/or incur 
prohibitive costs. To be sure, the improvement of border control and the modernisation of 
border management institutions as envisaged by EUBAM were of interest to both 
Chisinau and Kiev, but neither the Voronin nor the Yushchenko regimes was willing to 
go through with domestic changes that could have cost them political capital. As a result, 
the rule transfer process in which EUBAM became involved in 2005 proceeded in a 
selective manner and wielded diverse results. Initially, the Moldovan and Ukrainian 
governments displayed passive preferential fit with EUBAM’s rule transfer mandate 
which was assessed as neither particularly beneficial nor detrimental to the two 
incumbent regimes’ preference for maintaining and strengthening political power. Under 
circumstances of passive preferential fit, factors such as veto players and the use of EU 
side-payments under the form of policy-specific conditionality and capacity-building can 
intervene in the cost-benefit calculations of governments and thus transform the passive 
preferential fit into a weak or a strong fit depending on whether it is the costs or the 
benefits which are increased. . In the case of EUBAM’s rule transfer mandate, the 
existence of domestic  veto players explains why anti-corruption reforms are still lagging 
behind in both countries, while policy-specific conditionality and capacity-building 
explain the adoption and implementation of certain policies which otherwise would have 
been too costly to be carried out.  
Returning to preferential fit, it is important to point out that the coming to power 
of new a new political leadership has the potential of altering the cost-benefit balance 
within the government, depending on the strategic alignment of the new regime. In 
Moldova, the preferential fit between the political agenda of the Moldovan government 
and EUBAM’s objectives was strengthened in 2009 with the election of a strongly pro-
European coalition government – the Alliance for European Integration (AEI) – who 
intensified reform efforts at the heart of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The 
goals of achieving a visa-free regime with the Schengen area and the conclusion of a 
DCFTA with the EU drove forward progress in approximating relevant legislation with 
EU standards and building the necessary institutional and administrative capacity. Thus, 
the government was praised for its extraordinary achievements in the visa liberalisation 
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process
655
 where the government’s ‘pre-emptive’ approach ensured that Chisinau met its 
targets well in advance of the EU schedule. The fast-paced progress led to Moldova 
becoming the first Eastern Partnership country to be granted visa-free travel to the 
Schengen zone, an outstanding accomplishment to which EUBAM brought a significant 
contribution.
656
 With respect to the establishment of a DCFTA, despite the high costs of 
essentially adopting the EU trade acquis, Moldova maintained a strong preferential fit 
with the EU’s goals, if only for the ‘tremendous symbolic value’ of the Association 
Agreement as a token of successful governance in the eyes of electorates and 
neighbouring countries such as Russia.
657
 In Ukraine, the coming to power of the 
Yanukovych government in 2010 weakened Ukraine’s overall commitment to European 
integration and contributed to the country lagging behind on its reform agenda. While the 
progress of border management reforms was not significantly undermined, Ukraine’s 
poor compliance with the anti-corruption measures required under the Visa Liberalisation 
Action Plan meant that the country could not be offered a visa-free agreement.
658
  
7.7.1. When preferential fit meets internal veto players 
The fight against corruption has indeed been one of the policy areas notorious for 
the lack of progress. EUBAM’s anti-corruption mandate proved from the very beginning 
to be a highly contentious issue in Moldova and Ukraine and was opposed by a 
significant number of veto players from the ranks of the mission’s partner services 
themselves. While the two countries are allegedly committed to an anti-corruption 
agenda, the endemic corruption that characterises the political and economic environment 
in both countries makes the implementation of anti-corruption measures extremely 
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difficult. In the early days of the mission there were hostile reactions from Moldovan and 
Ukrainian partner services to EUBAM’s idea of bringing in an anti-corruption expert. 
The issue proved to be so controversial that the position had to be renamed ‘integrity 
expert’ in order to gain the acceptance of the border guard and customs services.659 The 
problem continues to remain sensitive, as shown by the reluctance to present the ‘model’ 
border crossing point initiative as an anti-corruption measure, but rather as a project 
aimed at enhancing the integrity and professionalism of staff.
660
 This is hardly surprising 
given the double challenge that EUBAM is facing in Moldova and Ukraine: not only is 
corruption rife in virtually every policy sector in both countries, but the border guard and 
customs services represent perhaps the greatest targets for corruption in ‘development 
and trans-shipment states’.661 The reasons for the inextricable link between border guard 
and customs services and corruption are related to the structural vulnerability of security 
sectors in countries characterised by poor economic performance, weak governance and 
high levels of organised crime.  Corruption is deeply embedded within the Moldovan and 
Ukrainian border guard and customs services, from petty bribery of border guards to 
sophisticated illegal trade at the highest levels of government.  
Ukraine is notorious for ‘corruption at every level of government, from the rank-
and-file of the border security service to the highest-ranking officials’.662 As revealed by 
a US diplomat, there were suggestions that the Ukrainian border guard and customs 
services would have been glad to see EUBAM terminated since that would have not only 
allowed flexibility in implementing the customs regime at the border with Moldova, but it 
would have also lessened the pressure of EUBAM-driven anti-corruption reforms. 
Opposition to initiatives aimed at fighting corruption existed within the Moldovan partner 
services as well, but it tended to be more muted than in Ukraine, particularly after the 
2009 elections when the objective of signing an Association Agreement with the EU gave 
a renewed push to reform efforts.  
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 The election of the Alliance for European Integration (AEI) in Moldova had 
marked a shift towards stronger preferential fit with EUBAM’s mandate and, despite 
political infighting and protracted instability, the coalition can be credited   with 
Moldova’s remarkable reform progress after 2009. Prime Minister Vlad Filat tried hard to 
push his signature agenda item – European integration – and has been supported in this 
endeavour by a dedicated ministerial team who has been credited as largely responsible 
for Moldova’s advances.663 Thus, it can be argued that, despite some domestic opposition 
to EUBAM’s anti-corruption reforms, Moldova’s incumbent regime after 2009 
strategically assessed the benefits of cooperation with EUBAM as exceeding the potential 
costs inflicted by veto players.  
On the other hand, after 2010 and the coming to power of Yanukovych, Ukraine 
has had the opposite experience, with efforts towards EU-demanded reforms subsiding 
together with the government’s overall commitment to European integration. An example 
which illustrates how domestic veto players in Ukraine have reinforced   the already 
weak preferential fit with EUBAM’s agenda is the reform of Human Resources 
Management (HRM) systems. The issue has been strongly opposed by the leadership of 
Ukrainian border guard and customs services as it had the potential to disturb powerful 
interests in these organisations. As EUBAM’s leadership acknowledges, ‘this is 
understandable because it [the reform of HRM systems] would make nepotism 
difficult’.664 Engagement with Moldova in this area has been more successful to the 
extent that Chisinau agreed to have EUBAM analyse its Human Resources Management 
system and offer recommendations for its reform.
665
 Another telling example is provided 
by the reversal of the UASBGS’s investigative powers by provisions in the new 
Ukrainian Criminal Procedure Code. The measure is to be understood in the context of 
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the expansion of the UASBGS’s legal competences following EUBAM’s advice on this 
issue. The Ukrainian Border Guard service used to have very little investigative power, 
with criminal proceeding being typically forwarded to the Ukrainian Security Service 
(SBU)
666
, and EUBAM sought to remedy this imbalance in order to stimulate detentions 
and combat border guards’ reluctance to act against cross-border illegal activities. 
However, EUBAM’s recommendations threatened to undermine the extensive powers 
enjoyed by the SBU and were therefore reversed as soon as a new regime came to power, 
poignantly illustrating the changing cost-benefit calculations of regimes in power. 
Although veto players have the ability to alter the strategic calculations of political elites 
by shifting the balance between costs and benefits, in Ukraine’s case this does not seem 
to have been the case. Rather, veto players could only achieve their goals once a change 
of regime, and thus of preferential fit, took place. 
In fact, the preferential fit between the Ukrainian leadership and EUBAM’s anti-
corruption mandate weakened progressively – firstly, after the 2006 parliamentary 
elections that forced Yushchenko to share power with Yanukovych, and to an even 
greater degree after the 2010 presidential elections that brought the latter to power. This 
was consistent with the changing strategic alignment of the different incumbent regimes 
in Ukraine: from the pro-Western regime of Yushchenko whose political mandate was 
defined by the goal of European integration to the contradictory foreign policy directions 
of the Yushchenko-Yanukovych tandem and finally the growing pro-Russian orientation 
of Yanukovych presidency. Given the already low level of preferential fit between 
EUBAM and post-2006 Ukrainian incumbent regimes, the opposition of domestic veto 
players to anti-corruption reforms championed by EUBAM merely reinforced the 
incompatibility between governmental preferences for political power and the mission’s 
objectives but was not instrumental in altering this dynamics.     
Both countries have powerful veto players within the border guard and customs 
services, as well as other agencies whose work is relevant for export activities and border 
controls. Moldova and Ukraine also share the politicisation of public services primarily 
because the leadership of organisations such as the border guard or customs services is 
not protected from political interference and is thus vulnerable to pressures from political 
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and business elites. The potential for restrictions on EUBAM’s ability to transfer border 
management and customs rules is therefore significant but this chapter has shown that 
domestic veto players have not been able to decisively influence governments’ strategic 
calculations. Instead, they either did not have enough leverage to affect the cost-benefit 
balance for political regimes, like in Moldova, or they simply had to wait the coming to 
power of a government that shared their interests, as in Ukraine. . 
In addition to the competing strategies of veto players, another factor which has 
emerged as potentially influencing the cost-benefit calculations, and thus strategies, of 
governments in Moldova and Ukraine is the EU’s offer of side-payments under the form 
of policy-specific conditionality and capacity-building. Unlike the rule of law policy area 
in Georgia, border and customs management has been subject to policy-specific 
conditionality in Moldova and Ukraine. This is because the management of border 
regimes in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood has significant security implications for the 
EU, who wants to curb smuggling and illegal migration at its external borders. Thus, 
Brussels has placed the harmonisation of border and customs standards – falling under 
the freedom, security and justice chapter - among the priority objectives in the Action 
Plans of both countries.
667
 It is important to note here that it is not EUBAM who employs 
conditionality as a tool to entice partner services into complying with the requirements of 
its mandate, but that the mission’s mandate is part of a broader policy area that is subject 
to conditionality. 
The EU has offered two main rewards in exchange for Moldova and Ukraine 
bringing their border and customs regulations in line with EU standards: visa-free 
regimes and trade facilitation culminating in Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreements (DCFTAs). Paving the way for these long term goals are intermediate 
rewards such as visa facilitation agreements and Autonomous Trade Preferences (ATPs). 
Moldova has been a frontrunner in adopting and implementing the provisions of its 
Action Plan under the freedom, security and justice chapter, succeeding in being granted 
a visa-free regime as of December 2013 and introducing the DCFTA regime as a result of 
signing an Association Agreement with the EU in June 2014. Policy-specific 
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conditionality has arguably played an important role in keeping Moldova on track with its 
reform programme. As far as visa liberalisation is concerned, the EU’s technical 
approach including clear benchmarks and prompt rewards has paid off with Chisinau 
choosing to adopt a ‘pre-emptive’ implementation strategy in order to stay ahead of 
schedule.
668
 EUBAM itself has been extensively involved in many of the reforms that 
paved the way for the provision of visa free access to the Schengen area, such as efforts 
to combat organised crime, corruption and illegal migration, as well as improving the 
administrative capacity of the Border Police.  
With respect to trade facilitation, policy-specific conditionality has been crucial in 
gradually offering Moldova increasingly significant rewards in exchange for its progress 
in the customs sector. As Chisinau adopted and began applying the principle of risk-
based customs control, modified customs legislation (including the Customs Code) and 
created a risk analysis division within the Customs service in 2005, it was granted the 
Generalised system of Preferences Plus (GSP+). Next, legislation on competences in 
certification of origin and the issuing of export certificates, as well as the creation of the 
necessary administrative structure, and the inclusion of provisions on intellectual 
property rights in the Customs Code facilitated the granting of Autonomous Trade 
Preferences (ATPs) in 2007. Further alignment of the customs procedure code with EU 
standards, as well as an improved code of ethics ensured that Moldova had a credible 
perspective for a DCFTA.
669
  
Ukraine, on the other hand, did not respond similarly positively to the EU’s 
conditionality. Initially, at the beginning of EUBAM’s activity on the ground which 
incidentally coincided with the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, Kiev appeared 
willing to comply with the EU’s requirements in order to establish its democratic and 
pro-European credentials. However, Ukraine’s expectations were higher than Moldova’s 
and the former envisaged that the rewards promised by the EU would be more substantial 
and would arrive sooner. By 2008, as it became clear that the granting of a visa-free 
regime was still a distant prospect, Kiev’s commitment to comply with EU-required 
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reforms started to flounder.
670
 This was also related to the coming to power of the 
Yanukovych government in 2010 which weakened Ukraine’s overall commitment to 
European integration, and implicitly the preferential fit with EUBAM’s mandate, and 
contributed to the country lagging behind on its reform agenda. As a result, Kiev is still 
not close to being offered a visa-free regime, with Brussels urging Ukraine to make more 
progress in the areas of corruption and organised crime.
671
 
Policy-specific conditionality cannot provide the same comprehensive top-down 
adaptive pressures as enlargement conditionality and thus works in a different, bottom-up 
fashion. Rather than providing domestic actors with opportunity structures, as 
institutionalist approaches suggest, the success of policy-specific conditionality depends 
on the agency of national governments and the extent to which they instrumentalise it in 
order to achieve political purposes. The cases of Moldova and Ukraine illustrate both the 
ability of policy-specific conditionality to strengthen preferential fit by increasing the 
benefits of cooperation with the EU – as Moldova’s impressive rule transfer progress in 
the context of visa liberalisation and the DCFTA shows – as well as its relative weakness 
in the face of preferential misfit, a situation highlighted by Ukraine’s disinclination to 
push forward with the same reforms. In the former case, policy-specific conditionality 
acts as a catalyst, providing reform efforts with a clear direction and timeline, as well as 
giving incumbent regimes a legitimising framework for policy changes. It thus has the 
potential of mitigating the costs incurred by the adoption and implementation of reforms 
and raises the prospect of cooperation with the EU impact in policy areas where there is 
preferential fit between the government and EU objectives, but in the absence of EU 
rewards the costs are prohibitive. The substantial progress of Moldova towards fulfilling 
the requirements of the visa liberalisation process and the DCFTA negotiations illustrates 
this dynamic. On the other hand, if the incumbent regime does not have preferential fit 
with the EU’s objectives, as in Ukraine after Yanukovych won the presidency in 2010, 
policy-specific conditionality is unlikely to be able to increase either the benefits of 
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cooperation or the costs of non-cooperation for incumbent regimes to an extent that could 
fundamentally alter their strategic calculations. Thus, in light of the preferential fit of the 
Yanukovych regime with EUBAM’s general objectives, but in particular its anti-
corruption agenda, it is not surprising that little progress was achieved on the reform of 
Human Resources Management systems in Ukraine’s border guard and customs 
services). Unlike membership conditionality, the rewards offered by policy-specific 
conditionality are limited in light of the extensive reform efforts required. Thus, it is 
important that there is broad political support for the reform agenda.  
7.7.2. Add capacity-building to the mix 
According to the literature on EU-driven policy change in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood, policy-specific capacity building works through empowering certain 
domestic actors by offering additional benefits or mitigating adaptational costs.
672
 
Consistent with the focus on the agency of incumbent regimes in this thesis, capacity-
building is found here to influence the degree of preferential fit of governments through 
the provision of additional resources in the absence of which EU reforms would be too 
costly. This refers particularly to material costs, the one type which capacity-building can 
attenuate. Thus, it is often the case that EU-proposed reforms do not result in significant 
political benefits or costs for the elites in power and thus do not change their strategic 
calculations. In such a situation it would not be reasonable to expect the government to 
engage in rule transfer despite the absence of political costs. If the envisaged reforms 
would not bring about political benefits but could potentially incur material costs, one   of 
the factors that might marginally alter preferential fit is capacity-building. EUBAM’s rule 
transfer dimension presents such a situation under the Voronin and Yushchenko 
governments. At the time - before 2010 - the prospects of visa liberalisation and 
concluding DCFTAs with the EU appeared distant and the policy-specific conditionality 
that would later be put in motion in support of these policy goals was not yet active. The 
preferential fit of both regimes with EUBAM’s rule transfer mandate was passive and the 
mission’s reform programme was accepted as a slightly inconvenient, but necessary, 
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condition in support of the more important goal of ensuring the implementation of the 
customs regime at the Moldovan-Ukrainian border. In the absence of strong preferential 
fit and policy-specific conditionality, the Moldovan and Ukrainian governments were 
relatively indifferent to EUBAM’s rule transfer agenda (except for those issues that 
encountered opposition from internal veto players). But while many of the reforms would 
not have incurred political costs, there was still the matter of material costs which, in the 
absence of capacity-building, might have compromised EUBAM’s rule transfer efforts.  
As it happens, EUBAM has a specific mandate for capacity building of border 
guards/police and customs services in Moldova and Ukraine which has greatly assisted its 
reform efforts. The Memorandum of Understanding that established the mission clearly 
stipulates that it should ‘build up appropriate operational and institutional capacity in 
Moldova and Ukraine to endure effective border control and surveillance’. The mission is 
involved in a wide variety of capacity building activities, ranging from training 
practitioners and middle management to improving the institutional and organisational 
culture of partner services and strengthening operational capacity. Over almost ten years 
of activity on the ground, EUBAM has provided extensive technical and financial 
assistance to improve border management and surveillance on the Moldovan-Ukrainian 
border. In the first years of the mission EUBAM’s activities were reinforced by the EC-
funded project BOMMOLOK (Improving Management on the Moldovan-Ukrainian State 
Border) which provided financial assistance for the procurement of equipment, 
communication systems, training and risk analysis systems.
673
 BOMMOLUK I, which 
had a budget of €3.3 million, ran until December 2007 and was complemented by 
BOMMOLUK II with a budget of €6.6 million which was completed in December 2009. 
As a flanking project for EUBAM, BOMMOLUK organised study tours for partner 
services to EU member states and provided specific expertise through the contracting of 
short-term experts.
674
 This type of assistance was clearly a carrot for Moldovan and 
Ukrainian partner services, with border guard and customs services personnel eager to 
participate in study trips and to receive equipment in the form of last generation 
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gadgets.
675
 As a result of BOMMOLUK I and II, the border infrastructure on both sides 
of the Ukrainian-Moldovan border was improved and equipment consisting of personal 
computers, laser printers, portable thermal imagers and minibuses, among others, were 
delivered (predominantly to the Moldovan border guard service).
676
 
The provision of financial assistance contributed to a number of initiatives which 
could not have taken off otherwise, given the limited budgets of partner services. One of 
these was a public information campaign meant to distribute leaflets containing border 
crossing regulations which EUBAM partially funded on the understanding that the 
Moldovan and Ukrainian counterparts would contribute at a later stage.
677
 Nevertheless, 
by 2008-2009 EUBAM understood that it must reorient its focus from temporary needs to 
sustainable development. As one EUBAM officer points out, while Moldovan and 
Ukrainian counterparts are understandably enthusiastic about study visits and high-tech 
equipment, it is important for them to understand that the role of the mission is not 
limited to simply handing off money.
678
 Thus, in light of limitations on EUBAM’s own 
budget, direct financial contributions were phased out in favour of more sustainable 
forms of capacity-building such as training, mentoring and the provision of expert legal 
and institutional advice. In order to address the needs of partner services, a network of 
donors was put in place - including the World Customs Organisation (WCO), EUROPOL 
and FRONTEX - which can support the Moldovan and Ukrainian border guards/police 
and customs services beyond the assistance provided by EUBAM.
679
 
The sequencing of EUBAM’s capacity-building activities, with the provision of 
direct financial and technical assistance in the first years of the missions and its 
subsequent replacement with more sustainable forms of assistance, has matched the 
configuration of preferential fit and policy-specific conditionality before and after the 
2009 and 2010 changes in government. The fact that EUBAM could provide concrete 
capacity-building in its first years of operation on the ground contributed to institutional 
and operational reforms in the border guard and customs services which might have not 
been achieved in light of the passive preferential fit of the Voronin and Yushchenko 
                                                 
675
 Interview EUBAM local staff, 4 March 2013, Brussels. 
676
 Dura, ‘The EU Border Assistance Mission’, 281. 
677
 Interview EUBAM officer, 18 February 2013, London. 
678
 Interview EUBAM officer, 4 April 2013, Odessa. 
679
 Interview EUBAM Head of Unit, 4 April 2013, Odessa. 
225 
 
regimes with the mission’s rule transfer mandate, as well as the absence of policy-
specific conditionality.  
7.8. Conclusion  
This chapter has investigated the extent of cooperation   between EUBAM and 
incumbent regimes in Moldova and Ukraine with respect to rule transfer in the areas of 
border management and customs systems. As conceived of in this thesis, cooperation 
refers to the ability of EU missions to co-opt national governments in supporting their 
policy objectives. The analysis of EUBAM’s reform efforts and their results reveals the 
fact that the strategic environment, consisting of factors such as domestic veto-players 
and the EU’s use of side-payments, has not imposed strong constraints on the strategies 
of national decision-makers. Rather, the courses of action selected by the Moldovan and 
Ukrainian governments were mainly informed by the strategic alignment of the 
respective regimes with either the EU or Russia. Domestic veto players and EU side-
payments merely reinforced the resulting degree of preferential fit between these two 
ENP governments and EUBAM’s mandate, rather than alter the leaders’ cost-benefit 
calculations. 
Interestingly, EUBAM’s case shows that cooperation is possible both when the 
EU’s policy objectives are actively supported by the incumbent regimes, as well as when 
they are passively accepted. Thus strong preferential fit describes a situation in which the 
EU’s policy objectives are in the governments’ political interests, while passive 
preferential fit captures a neutral dynamics whereby EU goals neither enhance nor   
undermine the regimes’ preferences. Thus, EUBAM has been able to successfully engage 
in cooperation both in the first part of its mandate (2005-2010) when the Moldovan and 
Ukrainian governments were fairly indifferent to its reform agenda, as well as after 2009 
in Moldova when preferential fit was strengthened. Nonetheless, the fact that EUBAM’s 
impact in Moldova has been significantly more extensive – in terms of the scope of the 
reforms – after 2009 than before indicates that the strength of preferential fit matters.  
The strength of preferential fit is typically linked to the way in which the 
government positions itself vis-à-vis European integration, on one hand, and cooperation 
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with other international actors, on the other hand,  and the role played by this strategic 
alignment  in their electoral success. The extent to which a particular policy issue is 
perceived as compatible with the incumbent regime’s preference   for maintaining and/or 
gaining power represents in fact the fundamental consideration of preferential fit and 
appears to be a highly accurate predictor of the prospect for cooperation in the case of 
EUBAM’s rule transfer mandate. While  factors such as the existence of domestic  veto 
players and the offer of EU side-payment in the form of policy-specific conditionality 
and capacity-building, have been found to alter the governments’  strategies, their ability 
to act as effective constraints on governmental behaviour crucially depends on their 
ability to alter cost-benefit calculations. If the benefits offered and the prospective costs 
incurred are not significant enough to decisively enhance the cost-effectiveness of an 
alternative over the other, it is likely that the selected strategy will be shaped more by the 
degree of preferential fit resulting from the regimes’ strategic alignment than the 
constraints of environmental factors.  
Thus, between 2005 and 2010 capacity-building contributed to maintaining the 
Moldovan and Ukrainian governments’ commitment to border management and customs 
reforms but this was only possible under circumstances of passive preferential fit and the 
strategic alignment of the incumbent regimes in Kiev and Chisinau with the EU. At the 
same time, policy-specific conditionality helped Moldova stay focused on the necessary 
reforms in the run-up to its visa free agreement with the EU, but the strong preferential fit 
of the Filat government resulting from its positioning as a reformist, firmly pro-European 
regime, was crucial for the successful adoption and implementation of reforms. On the 
other hand, policy-specific conditionality did not provide the same political opportunities 
to Yanukovych’s government, given its significantly weaker preferential fit with a 
European integration agenda. Domestic veto players for whom the status quo is beneficial 
will always be a stumbling block in the way of reforms and Moldova’s and Ukraine’s 
difficulties in tackling corruption are to be largely attributed to the presence of veto 
players across key institutions. They have the potential of altering governmental 
preferential fit, although this will usually take the form of selective rule transfer rather 
than the complete abandonment of a reform programme. However, it cannot be argued 
that veto players have been able to decisively influence the Moldovan and Ukrainian 
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governments’ strategic calculations, but rather their influence has depended on the 
strategic alignment with either the EU or Russia. As such, in Moldova the strong 
preferential fit of the Filat regime has neutralised to some extent the influence of veto 
players, allowing for the adoption, albeit selective and limited, of anti-corruption reforms, 
while in Ukraine it was only the coming to power of a regime with weak preferential fit 
that enabled the reversal of some of EUBAM’s reforms.   
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion  
This thesis has started from the premise that the sine qua non condition for 
effective cooperation between EU foreign policy instruments such as CSDP missions and 
incumbent regimes in the Eastern Neighbourhood is the compatibility between EU 
objectives and the incumbent regimes’ intrinsic preference for gaining and/or maintaining 
political power. Defined as preferential fit, the ‘match’ between the goals of EU missions 
– as highlighted by their mandates – and the political agendas of national governments in 
ENP countries emerges as the necessary condition that facilitates effective EU-ENP 
cooperation . In addition to confirming the centrality of the agency-oriented concept of 
‘preferential fit’ – as opposed to the institutionalist notion of ‘goodness of fit’ – for the 
development of effective cooperation between the EU and its Eastern neighbours,   the 
findings outlined in the four empirical-analytical chapters have also tested the hypotheses 
of the research with respect to the conditions which shape the cost-benefit calculations of 
national governments. Domestic veto players, alternative coalitions and EU threats and 
side-payments have all emerged as relevant factors which affect the actors’ choice for the 
optimal strategy. When more than one intervening variable is present, incumbent regimes 
engage in assessing the cost-effectiveness of the alternative strategies prescribed by each 
of the factors against each other and opt for the utility-maximising one – i.e. the strategy 
perceived as most likely to ensure the gain and/or consolidation of political power.  
Contrary to the ‘goodness of fit’ concept encountered in the Europeanisation 
literature, which envisages fit as an institutional category and conceives of EU impact as 
the result of adaptive pressures, preferential fit is an agency-focused notion and treats 
EU-ENP interactions as relations of cooperation between co-equal actors rather than as 
the impact of the EU upon the ENP. This can be explained by the different expectations 
for cooperation with the EU in the Eastern Neighbourhood, as opposed to the candidate 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The accession process embedded EU rule 
transfer in the highly institutionalised framework of enlargement policy.  Underpinned by 
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membership conditionality which required the compulsory adoption of the acquis 
communautaire, accession worked as a top-down, institutional process. By contrast, the 
European Neighbourhood Policy lacked the binding character of enlargement because it 
did not offer EU neighbours a membership perspective. While aiming to encompass the 
same conditionality logic as enlargement, the ENP was weakly institutionalised and 
failed to exert the kind of top-down adaptive pressures that made accession an effective 
rule transfer policy. This realisation led most scholars studying the ENP to conclude that, 
in the absence of a membership offer and a more robust institutional framework, there is 
little scope for EU impact in the neighbourhood – of the kind witnessed within the 
candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This thesis argues that outside an 
enlargement context the role of institutional factors in explaining EU foreign policy 
diminishes in relevance and the salience of agency-related factors increases. This is 
because the strategic alignment of incumbent regimes in ENP countries with the EU 
cannot be taken for granted to the same extent as was the case with candidate countries. 
Domestic actors in the Eastern Neighbourhood have more room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis 
the EU than their Central and Eastern European counterparts. Not only are they not 
bound by strict accession requirements, but they also have Russia - and potentially other 
international actors - as an alternative foreign policy choice. To the extent that the EU can 
achieve its foreign policy objectives in the Eastern Neighbourhood, it is the incumbent 
regimes in ENP countries that one must look to for an explanation.  
The reason for identifying national governments as the most relevant actors is the 
inadequacy of the differential empowerment argument for the specific case of the Eastern 
Neighbourhood. If the EU has been able to differentially empower a variety of state and 
non-state actors in the Central and Eastern candidate countries by changing domestic 
opportunity structures in their favour, in the Eastern Neighbourhood the Union has 
struggled to empower reform-oriented coalitions that aim to challenge governments in 
power. This is to a certain extent due to the ENP’s institutional weakness, but also to the 
weakness of civil society, the limitations on civil and political rights and the pervasive 
corruption within state administrations that characterise Eastern neighbourhood countries. 
Given the difficulty for the EU to empower alternative domestic actors, governmental 
actors emerge as the main domestic forces that can facilitate and/or constrain cooperation 
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with the EU. In cases of secessionist conflicts, such as the Transnistrian, South Ossetian 
and Abkhazian conflicts, it is not only the legitimate authorities who can affect the 
possibilities for cooperation with the EU, but also the de facto authorities in the 
breakaway regions. 
This thesis argues that ENP governments shape the possibilities for cooperation 
with the EU by instrumentalising EU policy objectives in accordance with cost-benefit 
calculations. Drawing on rational-choice assumptions, the research shows that national 
governments in the Eastern Neighbourhood act strategically by examining alternative 
courses of action and taking the one which is most beneficial to their interests. In doing 
this, incumbent regimes engage in cost-benefit calculations meant to reveal the course of 
action that will maximise their utility. Consistent with rational-choice tenets, this thesis 
has assumed that actors’ preferences are defined exogenously and cannot be changed. 
This is because actors make choices under constraints, rather than from ideal states of the 
world and thus develop fixed preferences. The fixed preference of ENP governments is 
their inherent goal to gain and/or maintain political power, defined in the literature as 
preferential fit. Thus, it has been assumed that incumbent regimes in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood engage in cooperation with the EU when the objectives of CSDP 
missions are perceived as being compatible with the governments’ fundamental objective 
of coming to and/or staying in power. This compatibility, or fit, refers both to the 
perceived political benefits of engaging in cooperation with EU missions, as well as to 
the potential costs of a lack of cooperation. However, given the environmental constraints 
under which governments act, this thesis has argued that their cost-benefit calculations 
and thus their strategies can be altered by a number of factors: 1. The competing 
strategies of domestic veto players; 2. The potential for alternative coalitions (Russia, US 
other international organisations) 3. The cost-effectiveness of threats and side-payments 
(i.e. EU policy-specific conditionality and EU capacity-building). 
8.1. Domestic actors and their role in shaping CSDP impact 
The case studies explored in this thesis consistently confirm preferential fit as a 
necessary condition for effective EU-ENP cooperation. Thus, the analysis of confidence-
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building measures and rule transfer across EUJUST Themis, EUBAM and EUMM 
reveals that instances of successful cooperation invariably correlate with instances of 
preferential fit and that, on the contrary, CSDP goals have not been achieved in cases of 
preferential misfit. The strategic alignment of ENP governments with the EU, on one 
hand, or with Russia (or, less frequently, other international actors), on the other hand, 
represents one of the most important considerations shaping preferential fit because it can 
affect which decisions are the most beneficial or costly in terms of the incumbent 
regimes’ strategies for political survival and power maximisation.  
EUBAM’s mandate with respect to the implementation of the customs regime 
was facilitated by the strong preferential fit of President Yushchenko with a pro-
European political agenda. This was the result not only of the government’s overall pro-
EU inclinations, but also of the political costs involved in a decision to not implement the 
Joint Declaration with Moldova. Given that the EU - together with the US - had stepped 
up its pressure on Ukraine, in addition to deploying EUBAM, the Yushchenko regime 
would have incurred significant political costs in terms of its domestic support and its 
international reputation had it chosen to continue to tolerate illegal Transnistrian trade. 
On the other hand, the railway dispute between Moldova and Transnistria raised the 
challenge of a perceived incompatibility between the political agenda of the regime in 
Tiraspol and the confidence-building measures proposed to address this significant 
outstanding issue. Smirnov’s firm disinclination to engage with Voronin in negotiations 
over the railway stalemate, despite the economic losses that both Moldova and 
Transnistria were suffering, reflected his exclusive strategic alignment with Russia and 
the conviction than an opening to the EU would not have helped him maintain power. 
The change in policy brought about by the new Transnistrian government in 2012 turned 
this calculation on its head. Better served politically by a policy of limited cooperation 
and economic integration with Moldova and the EU, the government of the more 
progressive Yevgeny Shevchuk worked on addressing a number of practical issues with 
Chisinau, with the resumption of railway traffic being the most prominent dispute 
resolved.  
As far as the EUMM’s confidence-building mandate is concerned, the strategic 
alignment of the de facto regimes in South Ossetia and Abkhazia with Russia and the 
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opposite alignment of the Georgian government with the EU (and the West in general) 
provide insights into the possibilities and limitations of the mission’s goal to foster 
communication between conflict parties and facilitate the resolution of practical issues. 
The resulting preferential misfit of the de facto South Ossetian and Abkhazian authorities 
with the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms can be best described as a zero 
sum game. The political objectives of the de facto governments revolve around the 
recognition of their independence which the IPRMs deliberately do not address and 
which is not acknowledged by the international community with the notable exception of 
Russia.  
The involvement of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the IPRMs has been highly 
strategic, with their ultimate goal of obtaining the recognition of independence informing 
their attitude towards the confidence-building mechanism. On the contrary, the strategic 
alignment of the Georgian leadership with the EU, as well as the West more broadly, 
both before the 2008 conflict and to an even greater degree in its aftermath, created a 
context in which Georgia’s failure to participate in a EU-driven confidence-building 
framework could have been politically costly. Thus, Saakashvili took the politically 
sensitive decision to sign the Memoranda of Understanding proposed by the EUMM 
which limited Georgia’s ability to mobilise military forces around the internal boundary 
lines because a refusal to cooperate with the EUMM could have cost Georgia the support 
of the international community and potentially ended his political career. Nevertheless, 
the strategic alignment of the Saakashvili regime with the West, encompassing both the 
EU and the US, did not prevent the government from obstructing cooperation with 
EUJUST Themis and instead favour an American model of criminal justice system. This 
was possible because the EU and the US, while representing a coherent strategic choice, 
differed in their prescriptions for Georgia’s criminal justice system reform 
The extensive preferential misfit between the Georgian government’s political 
interests and EUJUST Themis’s objectives goes a long way towards explaining the 
minimal impact of the mission with respect to the reform of Georgia’s criminal justice 
system. For Saakashvili, complying with the rules advanced by EUJUST did not serve 
any politically relevant goals. The Georgian president was keen on attracting as much EU 
involvement as possible in order to consolidate his own position, which largely relied on 
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a pro-Western, reformist political profile. However, his political agenda of strengthening 
the executive functions of the state at the expense of the independence of the judiciary 
was antithetical to EUJUST’s fundamental goals.  
EUBAM’s case shows that the strategic alignments of governments in Moldova 
and Ukraine have broadly defined the parameters of their preferential fit with the 
mission’s rule transfer objectives. Thus, EUBAM has been able to engage in fruitful 
cooperation in the first part of its mandate (2005-2010) when the Moldovan and 
Ukrainian governments were fairly indifferent to its reform agenda, but nonetheless they 
both embraced a strategic alignment with the EU. After 2009 the preferential fit of 
Moldova’s government with EUBAM’s rule transfer mandate was strengthened with the 
coming to power of a determinately pro-European governing coalition. The fact that 
cooperation between EUBAM and the new Moldovan leadership has been significantly 
more extensive – in terms of the scope of the reforms – after 2009 than before indicates 
that the nature of the strategic alignment matters when it comes to the strength of 
preferential fit. As far as Ukraine is concerned, the ambiguous strategic alignment of the 
Yanukovych regime after 2010 and its pro-Russian leanings meant that the degree of 
preferential fit with EUBAM’s agenda decreased noticeably.  
While preferential fit encompasses the fixed preferences of incumbent regimes for 
political power and it is assumed here that actors behave according to these exogenously 
defined interests, the actual outcome of decision-making processes depends also on a set 
of environmental constraints. Thus, the strategies the governments resort to in order to 
achieve their goals can be altered by intervening factors. This means that, in principle, the 
cost-benefit calculations of political elites can be changed to the extent that their support 
for CSDP objectives is no longer the most politically profitable course of action. One of 
the intervening variables that has been identified as potentially influential in altering 
governmental preferences is the competing strategies of domestic veto players. The 
implementation of the customs regime with Moldova by Ukraine was a deeply divisive 
issue within the country and triggered the opposition of a number of veto players whose 
interests were negatively affected by the new regulations. These included a variety of 
business and governmental actors who benefitted from the illegal trade from Transnistria, 
as well as the Ukrainian border guard and customs services. Nonetheless, the pressures of 
234 
 
these domestic actors were not able to render the implementation of the Joint Declaration 
prohibitively costly for the Yushchenko regime, confirming the first hypothesis of this 
thesis according to which the effectiveness of veto players in altering the strategies of 
incumbent regimes depends on their ability to directly disrupt the regimes’ pursuit of 
political power. In turn, this is a function of both the capacity of veto players to form a 
coherent and unified front and of their position in the system. The domestic veto players 
that opposed the introduction of the new customs regime at the Moldovan-Ukrainian 
border represented an eclectic group of governmental officials, members of the border 
guard and customs services and business representatives who were not in a position to 
vitally undermine the Yushchenko regime, at least in the short-term. Similarly, those who 
opposed Saakashvili’s decision to sign the Memoranda of Understanding with the 
EUMM - restricting Georgia’s ability to deploy military forces on its territory - were not 
able to inflict any political costs on the incumbent president precisely because they were 
a highly fragmented group of veto players who could not credibly threaten the survival of 
the government in power.  
Moreover, in the context of the significant incompatibility between Smirnov’s 
regime preferences with regard to the railway dispute and EUBAM’s confidence-building 
measures, influential domestic veto players have acted to reinforce the misfit even 
further. The large network of powerful veto players that Smirnov was surrounded by 
included many who benefitted tremendously from Transnistria’s economic isolation and 
whose support was vital for Smirnov’s ability to stay in power. When it comes to 
Moldova’s and Ukraine’s cooperation with EUBAM on the mission’s anti-corruption 
agenda, it cannot be argued that domestic veto players have been able to influence the 
two governments’ strategic calculations away from the course of action predicted by their 
respective strategic alignment. With veto players perceived as unable to threaten its 
political survival, the strongly pro-EU Filat government selectively bypassed their 
opposition and allowed for some –albeit limited – anti-corruption reforms. On the other 
hand, the coming to power of Yanukovych triggered not only increased apathy in Kiev 
towards EUBAM’s anti-corruption mandate, but even the reversal of some already 
adopted reforms. This can hardly be attributed to the existence of veto players – although 
they certainly existed and opposed these reforms – but to the ambiguous strategic 
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alignment of the new Ukrainian government which oscillated between the EU/the West 
and Russia. Likewise, the preferential misfit between Saakashvili’s government and the 
objectives of EUJUST Themis was only strengthened by the existence of a number of 
actors within Georgian rule of law institutions (i.e. prosecutors) who would have incurred 
significant costs had the mission’s recommendations been implemented. Ultimately, it 
appears that the ability of domestic veto players to alter governmental strategies depends 
on how credibly they are perceived as threatening the regimes’ pursuit of political 
survival and power, in confirmation of this thesis’ first hypothesis. 
In addition to domestic veto players, this thesis has also identified a number of 
other factors which can potentially alter the cost-benefit calculations of governments. 
Notably, the potential for alternative coalitions to the EU provides incumbent regimes 
with a certain room for manoeuvre which can diminish the benefits, or increase the costs 
of, cooperation with the EU. This thesis has shown that, while Russia is the obvious 
alternative governance provider for Eastern ENP countries, the possibility of other 
prominent international actors – such as the US – being perceived as an alternative to the 
EU should not be neglected. The reason why this issue is rarely, if ever, discussed with 
reference to the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood is the binary conception of Russia vs the 
West, with the latter often understood as a homogeneous grouping. In reality, the EU and 
the US, as well as some of the international organisations working in the region such as 
the OSCE and the UN, have occasionally been at odds regarding their respective 
approaches to reform efforts. In Georgia, the US was seen as a less costly alternative to 
the EU’s EUJUST Themis rule of law mission which resulted in the Georgian 
government advocating for the adoption of an American-inspired model of criminal 
justice system. Nonetheless, Russia remains the main alternative coalition that has the 
ability to alter the ENP regimes’ strategic calculations given its unique role in the region. 
Confirming the second hypothesis advanced by this thesis, the case studies explored 
show that the ability of Russia to change governments’ cost-benefit calculations depends 
not merely on the degree of asymmetric interdependence between ENP countries and 
Moscow, but on the costliness of this interdependence. Given the peculiar type of 
interdependence that exists between Russia and the former Soviet republics, this is often 
dependent on the former’s willingness to resort to coercive measures such as trade 
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embargoes and the latter’s ability to mitigate the envisaged costs of such moves. Moscow 
has been able to undermine EU efforts particularly with respect to the missions’ 
confidence-building activities mainly due to the political sensitivity of the CBMs for the 
conflict settlement process and the total dependence of the breakaway regions in 
Moldova and Georgia on Russia’s recognition and financial support. Moscow’s direct 
attempts at undermining an EU-supported confidence-building framework are well 
illustrated by the significant pressures it exerted on Ukraine in order to change policy 
direction on the customs regime issue. At the same time, Moscow imposed a series of 
trade bans on Moldova and Ukraine in an attempt to pressure the two countries into 
abandoning the newly implemented customs regime. Nonetheless,  its  pressures failed to 
shift the Moldovan and Ukrainian  strategies given the existence of the EU’s alternative 
market and political benefits of reorienting the Moldovan and Ukrainian economies 
towards the EU (in spite of short-term economic costs). As indicated by the second 
hypothesis of this thesis, if ENP countries are able to mitigate the costs incurred by their 
asymmetric interdependence with Russia, Moscow’s ability to position itself as a better 
alternative to the EU decreases significantly. As far as the EUMM’s confidence-building 
frameworks are concerned, Russia has opposed the access of EU monitors in South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia and has also used the complete dependence of the separatist 
entities on its military protection and economic aid to control their behaviour within the 
Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms. In this case, the extent of the dependence 
– rather than asymmetric interdependence – of the two breakaway regions on Russia was 
such that cooperation with the EUMM on the part of the de facto authorities outside of 
the parameters established by Moscow itself would have been prohibitively costly in 
political terms. Thus, despite Russia’s overwhelming influence in the region, its ability to 
alter the strategies of ENP governments is limited by their cost-benefit calculations which 
often result in a decision by pro-EU regimes to resist Russian pressures if that is 
evaluated as the course of action most likely to enhance their political power.   
The EU itself has the ability to alter the cost-benefit calculations of ENP regimes 
by increasing the costs of non-cooperation through threats or providing additional 
benefits through the offer of side-payments, such as policy-specific conditionality and 
capacity-building. In line with the third hypothesis formulated, this thesis has shown that 
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the effectiveness of EU threats depends on the support it enjoys from other international 
actors, in particular if the pressures it exerts are seen as being backed up by other 
prominent members of the international community – notably the US. Thus, the fact that 
the EU and the US were perceived as jointly supporting international pressures on the 
Ukrainian government to implement the Joint Declaration rendered the potential costs of 
non-compliance more compelling. At the same time, given that the political credentials of 
the Yushchenko regime depended on the support of the ‘Orange’ pro-Western electorate, 
continuing to ignore the requests of the EU and the US appeared to be a politically 
counter-productive strategy.  
On the other hand, EU side-payments such as policy-specific conditionality and 
capacity-building have been assumed to have the potential to change the cost-benefit 
calculations of governments, depending on the size of the rewards offered. Nonetheless, 
this thesis found that EU side-payments, either in the form of capacity-building or the 
offer of visa liberalisation merely reinforced the preferential fit resulting from the 
strategic alignment of ENP governments with either the EU or Russia, rather than alter 
the regimes’ strategic calculations. Indeed, the side-payments which the EU was willing 
to provide were not significant enough to trigger a decisive change in the governments’ 
strategies, leading to outcomes which reflected primarily EU- or Russia – oriented 
strategic alignments.  Thus, this thesis has noted that under circumstances of passive 
preferential fit (when CSDP policy objectives do not result in significant benefits for the 
incumbent regime, but they do not incur costs either) and strategic alignment with the 
EU, capacity-building contributed to maintaining the Moldovan and Ukrainian 
governments’ commitment to border management and customs reform. Policy-specific 
conditionality helped Moldova push through with the necessary reforms in the run-up to 
its visa free agreement with the EU, but this was possible only due to the strong 
preferential fit of the Filat government with EUBAM’s agenda. The preferential misfit of 
the pro-Russian Yanukovych government in Ukraine explains why policy-specific 
conditionality did not result in the same outcomes for Kiev The case of EUJUST Themis 
shows how the absence of EU side-payments under circumstances of significant capacity-
building offered by an alternative coalition undermines the appeal of the EU as a 
desirable cooperation partner. The mission’s recommendations were never considered by 
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the Georgian government and, when the draft criminal justice strategy was adopted as a 
result of political pressure, it was immediately modified to remove Themis’s input. While 
this was largely the result of an initial preferential misfit between Saakashvili’s regime 
and EUJUST’s objectives, the offer of EU side-payments might have altered the 
government’s strategic calculations, thus reducing the level of preferential misfit and 
potentially enticing the Georgians into cooperating with the EU rule of law mission. The 
offer of significant capacity-building from the US appears to have been effective in tilting 
the cost-benefit balance in favour of cooperation with the US.  
8.2. New perspectives on EU foreign policy: contribution and 
way forward 
 Having examined how incumbent regimes in the Eastern Neighbourhood decide 
to engage in effective cooperation with CSDP missions, this thesis makes a number of 
much needed contributions to theoretical and empirical debates in the EU foreign policy 
literature. Despite a broad acknowledgement both at academic and policy-making levels 
that the EU’s external environment plays a crucial role in shaping EU foreign policy, the 
topic has been conspicuously absent from accounts of EU foreign policy effectiveness 
and external impact. To the extent that the literature addressed issues of effectiveness and 
impact, the focus tended to be on EU internal dynamics rather than external effects. By 
providing a theoretical understanding of the extent to which governments  in host 
countries facilitate and/or constrain the EU’s ability to pursue its goals  via foreign policy 
instruments such as the CSDP, this research expands the range of approaches available to 
EFP scholars.  
The focus on the agency of domestic actors, as opposed to the overarching 
institutionalist perspectives that dominate Europeanisation and external governance 
perspectives, is considered to be particularly fruitful in allowing a more balanced 
understanding of the interactions between the EU and the recipients of its policy. The 
thesis also counteracts the implicit assumption in much of the literature on the EU as an 
international actor that EU foreign policy success largely depends on the Union’s 
capabilities. Drawing on rational-choice premises, rather than on rationalist 
239 
 
institutionalism, this research posits that the domestic actors in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood act under domestic, regional and international political constraints, rather 
than EU institutional adaptive pressures. Theoretically, this is a significant shift from the 
institutionalist perspectives that have long dominated studies of how the EU triggers 
domestic changes in member states and candidate countries.  
Empirically, this research has made an original contribution to the CSDP and 
ENP literatures due to its extensive use of primary sources. It is also one of the few 
analyses that explores the three EU missions in the Eastern Neighbourhood in a 
comprehensive fashion, examining the role of region-specific factors such as Russia and 
pondering on the specific circumstances of this ‘shared neighbourhood’ at the EU’s 
borders. While this in-depth focus might have limited the comparative potential of the 
case studies and the possibility to broadly generalise the research findings, it is the 
conclusion of this thesis that the micro-domestic level where political actors compete for 
power is the critical arena that shapes the possibilities and limitations for EU foreign 
policy impact. Given their presence on the ground, sometimes for extended periods of 
time and the close interaction they engage in with local counterparts, any explanation that 
does not consider this microcosm of relationships is unlikely to provide an accurate 
picture of the mechanisms of impact.  
Nonetheless, this thesis only provides an account of the fit between CSDP policy 
objectives and the preferences of national governments as a necessary condition for 
CSDP impact. Moving forward with the study of EU external impact, it will be important 
to identify not only the necessary conditions, but also the sufficient ones. Here, the role of 
EU capabilities, including the Union’s ability to coordinate internally, is likely to emerge 
as relevant. Explanations than encompass both agency-focused and institutional factors 
are not uncommon and need not result in theoretical confusion. One of the most of the 
most prominent theories of European integration is Moravcsik’s rationalist framework of 
international cooperation, which envisages cooperation as the result of three distinct 
stages: national preference formation, interstate bargaining and the choice of international 
institutions.
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impact, as well as between necessary and sufficient conditions, would greatly enhance 
our understanding of the dynamic relationship between the EU and the recipients of its 
foreign policy. 
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